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Abstract

Research on the implications of law for organization theory in general and
interorganizational relations (IOR) in particular is conspicuous by its neglect. The tendency
has been to take the legal context as a unidimensional institutional given, ignoring the fact
that there are m a n y challenges to legislative efficacy. For this reason alone, theoretical and
practical contributions by organizational scholars to important mainstream debates on
regulation, deregulation and reregulation have been limited.
The purpose of this study is to offer some redress to the situation by focusing on
legally mandated IOR. Specifically, it poses and seeks to answer the following question:
what are the implications of legally mandating I O R through public policy, with particular
reference to occupational rehabilitation in N e w South Wales? Using Cranston's (1987)
four phase process model of legislative efficacy, modified to account more fully for the
compliance behaviour of the target population, a concept of partially mandated I O R is
developed. This concept attempts to explain the differences and the interaction between
mandated and voluntary I O R contingencies.
Following a case study research design which allows for contextually embedded
analysis employing multiple methods, the above model and concept, together with six
theoretical propositions, are examined and subsequently validated in their application to
legally mandated occupational rehabilitation. The largely historical analysis of mandate
emergence draws attention to the need for interorganizational learning and adaptation to a
complex, uncertain and variable set of unenforced, self-regulatory circumstances. Content
analysis of mandate form shows it to be vague, open-ended and partial in nature and reliant
upon the authority of nonmandated organizations (insurers and treating doctors). Network
analysis of mandate implementation is based on 81 interviews with 79 informants in 56
organizations which, except for the regulatory agency, are all situated in the Illawarra
region of N e w South Wales. Agency-target I O R tended to be consultative, based on

xvi
broadly unbridled target organization discretion. Compliance behaviour was found to
depend on voluntary incentives and the voluntary cooperation of the nonmandated rather
than through agency enforcement. Finally, the absence of objective mandate impact
measures did not preclude the formation of positive views and experience largely attributed
to successful interorganizational activities.
These findings draw attention to the need for I O R theory to acknowledge the partial
nature of mandates, and for the public regulation literature to embrace I O R in policy
formulation as well as implementation. In addition to identifying the potential utility of
interorganizational collaboration in the management of I O R at a local, network and policy
level, the study also proposes a number of future research directions based on the concept
of partial mandates.

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 The General Research Problem
In the last 30 years or so organizational scholars and practitioners have directed an
increasing amount of conscious attention to the interdependence between organizations

their environments. This has been largely in response to open systems theory recogniti

that organizational structure, strategy and behaviour are often significantly influenc
shaped by external factors. Naturally, these factors include other organizations, such
suppliers, competitors, government, purchasers and other stakeholders. Much of this
organization-environment research has adopted an egocentric, organization set (Evan,

1966) perspective in exploring how to manage external contingencies such as competitio
(Porter, 1980), resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and transaction costs

(Williamson, 1975). In turn, this has led to the prescription of buffering strategies (S
1992) such as coding, stockpiling, levelling and forecasting, and bridging strategies

(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) such as co-optation, strategic alliances through joint ve
(Kanter, 1989) and mergers.
Notwithstanding the above, there has also been a growing recognition that some

problems, in drawing organizations into interaction with each other, are more appropria

defined, analysed and resolved from an interorganizational field or network perspectiv

rather than from that of the single organization (Emery, 1977; Gray, 1989; Perrow, 1986
Trist, 1983; Williams, 1982). Problems such as urban renewal, regional economic
development, ozone depletion, natural resource management and, in the context of this

study - the rehabilitation of injured workers. Interorganizational network analysis can
to a clearer understanding of such complex social issues by uncovering connections,
openings and blockages in the problem domain that would otherwise probably go

unnoticed by following an organization set approach. Since this study is concerned wit

complex interorganizational problems, specifically occupational rehabilitation, a network
analytic approach is considered the most suitable.
The interorganizational relations that arise out of the above circumstances can be
conceptualized as those interactions that take place between two or more organizations,
and whose content will be variously comprised of information, exchange (goods and
services), or norms (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981). Such relationships m a y vary in terms of
their permanence, from short through to long-term duration (Pointer, Begun and Luke,
1988), and in context from local arrangements through to global alliances (Limerick and
Cunnington, 1993).
From a comprehensive review of interorganizational theory and research, Oliver
(1990) identified two sets of contingencies as to w h y organizations form and maintain
relations with other organizations. O n e set is voluntary in nature: there is no higher
authority requirement for interactions. Five main reasons are considered to comprise this
voluntaristic set: asymmetry (power dependency), reciprocity (exchange), efficiency,
stability and legitimacy (institutional conformity). The second set is mandatory, that is,
I O R formation arises out of necessity, where "an organization often establishes linkages or
exchanges with other organizations in order to meet necessary legal or regulatory
requirements" (Oliver, 1990:243). Legal-political mandates are characteristically viewed
as sets of laws, rules and regulations through which the relations between and behaviour of
the relevant organizations are controlled (Raelin, 1980; Zald, 1978). Examples of
espoused necessity include State and Federal legislation, statutory regulations and codes of
practice, and codes of professional bodies. A major distinction between the mandated and
voluntary contingencies is that of choice: organizations tend to have less discretion in
entering into I O R under mandates than under voluntary contingencies. Oliver (1990) also
observed that I O R are often based on multiple contingencies rather than a single one.
However, her analysis shows that most of the research into single and multiple
determinants of I O R has centred on voluntary contingencies.

Thus, important gaps in I O R theory and research that warrant attention are the
differences and the interactions between mandated and voluntary interoganizational
relations. Preparatory to dealing with these issues, there is also a need to understand more
clearly the nature of public mandates that bring about IOR. In the past, I O R research has
tended to treat public mandates as unitary entities or givens, assuming mutual awareness
(Whetten, 1981) and domain consensus (Hall, Clark, Giordano and V a n Roekel, 1977), and
yet it has been recognised that they do not exist in pure form (Raelin, 1980). This neglect
of the law is not limited to interorganizational relations: it affects organization theory
generally. Barney, Edwards and Ringleb (1992:345) remarked that: "virtually every
introductory organizational theory and management textbook cites the importance of the
legal environment facing organizations. However, m u c h organizational research remains
relatively naive about the organizational implications of the law".
Just as the I O R literature has shown little systematic attention to the nature of
public mandates and even less to the differences and the interactions between mandated
and voluntary I O R contingencies, so the public policy literature has taken little formal
account of the influence of I O R in its formulation and implementation. This is somewhat
paradoxical given some of the central political (academic and practitioner) debates in
public regulation that focus on reducing the role of mandatory relations (the legislative
burden) through deregulation, and privatization (Majone, 1990; Swann, 1988). Such
attempts to place greater reliance on voluntary I O R often leads to re-regulation through
other policy forms. For example, deregulation and privatization m a y be accompanied by
stronger anti-trust regulation to maintain competitive structures and by n e w pricing
regulation to ensure consumer protection and social equity (Hills, 1986). Efforts at
overcoming the stand-off between the proponents of deregulation and state intervention
have focused on responsive, structural contingency approaches that are based on voluntary
interorganizational involvement in the policy-making and implementation process.
Examples include self-regulation, enforced self-regulation, tripartism involving public
interest groups, and partial industry intervention (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). However,

these I O R have not been examined per se. Since mandatory and voluntary I O R appear to
play an important part in public regulation process concerns, the justification for this study
is broadened further.
This study is designed to address some of the above issues. Thus, the general
research question is: what are the implications of legally mandating interorganizational
relations through public policy?
Based on Cranston's (1987) process model of legislative efficacy, challenges and
threats to the ideal mandate are identified and analysed in each phase of its emergence,
form, implementation and impact. Thus, it is considered more apposite to view mandates
as partially efficacious and to acknowledge that the resultant I O R will be a function of the
interdependence between voluntary and mandated contingencies. Six propositions are then
justified and put forward as a basis for testing the above concept of partial mandates. They
concern proposed significant differences between explicitly and implicitly mandated
components of interorganizational networks in terms of formalization, density
(connectedness); intensity; stability; threat to autonomy and concern for outcomes.
T o summarise thus far, in general research terms this study is justified on the
grounds of the increasing theoretical and practical importance of I O R with respect to and
as a part of public policy. At the same time, treatment of public policy by the I O R
literature and I O R by the public policy literature have been relatively neglected. Further
justification for this study is found in the following discussion of the particular research
problem selected to address the above research question.

1.2 The Particular Research Problem
The particular research problem to which the above general research question is
applied is the occupational rehabilitation of injured workers in N e w South Wales. A s the
value of h u m a n resources to employing organizations increases, so the status of m a n y
workers is transformed from a personnel cost to be minimised to an investment that needs
to be optimised. Consequently, in those organizations where the centrality of h u m a n

resources and the quality of their working lives are recognised, preserving the health and
safety of these resources becomes a question of protecting vital assets (Cascio, 1992).
From a business standpoint alone, prevention of illness and injury becomes more
important. Unfortunately, the completely hazard-free workplace remains an ideal
(Hammer, 1985). Therefore, the rehabilitation of ill or injured workers also gains in
importance for the employer and, of course, the injured employees w h o would expect (or
hope) that their employer would care enough to assist in their return to work. Beyond the
interests of business enterprises, moreover, public expectations and standards concerning
occupational health and safety as manifested through legislation have risen, placing still
further emphasis on both prevention and occupational rehabilitation.
The problem is not a small one. In addition to the tragic loss each year of about 400
lives due to work, more than 300,000 Australian employees lodge workers' compensation
claims annually (Quinlan and Bohle, 1991). In the financial year 1991-92, workers'
compensation costs amounted to $3,360 million, approximately 1.89% of total labour costs
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1992:18). For the same period, N e w South Wales
accounted for 31.5% of this figure at $1,057 million (WorkCover Authority, 1993a).
These figures do not include the uninsured social and economic costs such as personal and
family suffering, production and wage losses, lowered employee morale and tarnished
public goodwill.
In recent years, most Australian states, including the Federal Jurisdiction, have
enacted statutes to provide workers' compensation systems that promote more effective
rehabilitation of injured employees than was previously available ( C C H Australia, 1988
and 1990; Clayton, 1986; Robinson, 1994) The acknowledged primacy of workplacefocused rehabilitation within these systems (Brooks, 1988) is underpinned by its role in
mitigating the social and economic consequences of employee injury and illness. This
recognition is consistent with experience in a number of state jurisdictions in the U S A .
Pati (1985) notes that more than 37 states, including California, Minnesota, Georgia, N e w
York and Ohio, have mandated a linkage between workers' compensation and

rehabilitation. Benefit-cost analyses of employee rehabilitation conducted both in the U S A
(Pati, 1985) and in Australia (Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council, 1990) support the
view that, overall, rehabilitation is sound practice on purely economic grounds.
Zanko and Williams (1992:23) argued for the particular relevance of workers'
compensation cost control through effective rehabilitation in manufacturing organizations
(heavy manufacturing is the industry sector for one of the case studies that comprise the
empirical study). They noted that:
"Total workers' compensation costs for Australian manufacturing are the highest by
far compared with any other industry. During a 12-month period in 1988/1989,
these costs were A $ 9 0 2 million, 9 2 % greater than the next highest (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 1990). W h e n comparing Australian industries' average
workers' compensation costs per employee for the same period, manufacturing was
the third most expensive, after the mining and construction industries (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 1990). These figures assume greater significance when high
levels of absence (including work related injury) have been identified as a major
impediment to improved Australian manufacturing performance (Australian
Manufacturing Council, 1990)."
Organizations have internal incentives for employee rehabilitation that complement
any requirements for compliance with legislation. Nevertheless, given that legal mandates
in a large number of states in Australia, the U S A and elsewhere require that employees are
rehabilitated, irrespective of the local differences in such mandates, it is clearly relevant to
consider the issues that arise out of the interorganizational relations that occur in such an
activity. Occupational rehabilitation, as it is experienced in the State of N e w South Wales,
Australia serves as a useful case for this purpose.
Occupational rehabilitation is an interorganizational problem that is characterized
by I O R that involve both mandatory and voluntary contingencies. Since the early 1980s,
introduction of n e w workers' compensation statutes and radical modifications to
occupational health and safety legislation already in place, combined with perceived

economic and moral pressures, have forced organizations to focus increased attention on
ways of reducing workplace injury and illness and mitigating the consequences of

accidents. A major component of workplace health and safety strategy is the rehabilitati
of ill or injured workers. Occupational rehabilitation has been defined as "the combined
and co-ordinated use of medical, psychological, social, educational and vocational

measures to restore function or achieve the highest possible level of function of person
work, following injury or illness" (ACOM/ACRM, 1987). Clearly, such a complex
process will involve networks of organizations and actors working to fulfil such aims.
From a medical perspective alone, one survey found that work accident victims saw
between six and 50 different doctors (Lloyd and Stagoll, 1979).
In 1987, the New South Wales State legislature mandated occupational

rehabilitation to "coordinators" in employing organizations in response to the impact of

escalating financial and human costs or workplace-based illness and injury on the viabil
of a growing number of organizations. Such costs were highlighted in the epidemic of
occupational overuse syndrome in Australia, most commonly associated with the design
and malposition of information technology in organizations, and in the continuing major
problem of manual handling injuries, For example, in the years immediately prior to major
legislative change in New South Wales, workers' compensation payments increased from
A$349 million in 1979 to A$838 million in 1984-1985 (NSW Government Premier's
Department, 1986). This represented an average increase of 19% per annum, which was

far in excess of the inflation rate for that period. It was a significant social and eco
burden on individuals, organizations and society at large. Therefore, the incentives for

formation of occupational rehabilitation networks were not borne simply out of necessity
(mandate compliance) but also stemmed from efficiency (e.g., reduced costs), legitimacy
(e.g., enhanced public image), and stability (predictability) contingencies which are
voluntary in nature (Oliver, 1990). Furthermore, it has been suggested that compliance
with mandates will be strengthened where mandated relations are expected to fulfil other
organizational needs and expectations (Oliver, 1990).

There are three levels at which occupational rehabilitation m a y be considered: the
individual, the organization and the interorganizational field. At the individual level, the
main concern is the restoration of income-earning capacity and the resumption of a normal
working life. Factors to be considered include the nature, acuteness, chronicity and
treatability of the injury and the employee's position, age and competence. At the
organizational level, rehabilitation is a matter of repairing a h u m a n resource and exercising
responsibility insofar as injury or illness is work-related. Issues to be taken into account
include the technology in use, flexibility of work roles, h u m a n resource policies and
procedures, and the opportunity cost of rehabilitation.
From an interorganizational perspective, occupational rehabilitation is often a
complex of loosely coupled (Weick, 1976) network activities involving numerous
participants, for example, employers, medical practitioners, rehabilitation providers,
counsellors, trade unions, insurance companies and government agencies. These
participants are interdependent with respect to the rehabilitation of the injured employees
and their relationships are not contained within a single organization structure and
solutions, therefore, are unlikely to be amenable to single organization strategies. At this
level, the principal factors to be considered are the relations between the organizations
involved and the workers' compensation/rehabilitation laws that affect these relations.
While there exists a considerable body of research on factors at the first two levels, little
consideration has been given to the interorganizational relations that occur in occupational
rehabilitation and their impact on reintegrating employees back into the workplace (Zanko,
1990).
Given the above, the particular research problem is framed as what are the
implications of legally mandating interorganizational relations through public policy, with
particular reference to occupational rehabilitation in New South Wales?
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1.3

Contributions of the Study
T h e capstone justification for this study rests in its potential theoretical and

practical contributions. There are a number of theoretical contributions, primarily to the
I O R field. First, by suggesting a refinement to Cranston's (1987) four phase process model
of legislative efficacy, this study goes s o m e w a y to meeting the challenge of providing a
theoretical framework that integrates organizational and legal analyses (Barney, Edwards
and Ringleb, 1992).

Second, this research adds to the I O R literature through the

development and validation of the concept of partial mandates which effectively replaces
earlier simplistic treatments of legal mandates as unidimensional constructs. Thirdly, in
doing so, it permits a clearer, more accurate understanding of h o w mandated and voluntary
I O R both differ and interact. Fourth, this study contributes to the public policy literature
by drawing attention to the importance of I O R not only between the regulatory agency and
the target organizations, but also a m o n g the target organizations themselves. Fifth, the
conceptualization of occupational rehabilitation is extended and unpacked to incorporate
critical interorganizational contingencies that often m e a n the difference between successful
rehabilitation outcomes and failures. A t a more abstract level, the shift in focus in
occupational rehabilitation analysis also serves to broaden the conceptualization of the
quality of working life beyond the traditional boundaries of internal organizational
arrangements

(job

design,

hazard

control

etc.) to

explicitly

embrace

interorganizational/environmental factors. Finally, this thesis also sets an informed and
purposeful research agenda for future analysis of law and interorganizational relations.
The proposed practical contributions of this study concern improvements to public
policy formulation and implementation processes, and to occupational rehabilitation. With
regard to public policy, this study argues that policy makers increasingly need to take
account of voluntary interorganizational cooperation not only at the time of mandate
implementation but also in the negotiation and drafting of such mandates, otherwise
anticipated compliance is more likely to fall somewhat short of expectations. Furthermore,

as policy domains become more complex and intertwined with each other, legislative
processes will require productive voluntary interorganizational collaboration involving key
stakeholders at a local level. The implication is that cooperative mutual regulation is the
appropriate vehicle for achieving regulatory aims, a trend identified by Braithwaite,
Walker and Grabosky (1987).
The above discussion essentially outlines the practical contributions this study
makes to occupational rehabilitation. Where the rehabilitation process is hampered through
poor cooperation and coordination among organizations then there is a need for processes,
such as the search conference (Emery, 1982; Weisbord, 1993; Williams, 1979, 1982),
through which the relevant parties can design their o w n collaborative arrangements and
plan for their implementation.

1.4 Delimitations and Limitations
Delimitations
There are a number of areal and functional delimitations to this study. The overall
study is set in N e w South Wales, Australia and except for the head office of the regulatory
agency, the WorkCover Authority, the two interorganizational network case studies that
are the focus of rehabilitation mandate implementation are limited to those organizations
located in the Illawarra Region of N e w South Wales. In a study of this nature, it is
necessary to focus on a particular legal-political context. A s noted earlier, the N e w South
Wales jurisdiction has legally mandated the rehabilitation of injured workers.
Networks are determined by the researcher (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981). The
Illawarra Region of N e w South Wales was selected as the geographic boundary for the
case studies because it is one of the major social and economic areas representative of
highly urbanised Australia, and provides ready access to a wide range of network
organizations involved in occupational rehabilitation. Furthermore, the above criteria were
also set for reasons of enhanced pre-understanding (Gummesson, 1991) and resource and
time constraints. A s a former personnel manager for a large Australian service
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organization for almost five years, I had significant involvement and thus familiarity with
occupational rehabilitation networks and workers' compensation legislation. I also reside
in the Illawarra which provides for ready and relatively efficient access to network
organizations.
The functional delimitations include the substantive focus on occupational
rehabilitation, explained in Section 1.2. A second functional delimitation is the
composition of the two interorganizational network case studies. Each is comprised of
three occupational rehabilitation cases considered representative of those involving a
rehabilitation provider. The rationale for choosing cases involving a rehabilitation
provider was to ensure that both mandated and nonmandated organizations would be
involved (over and above the mandated employer organization) and so facilitate
comparison between mandated and voluntary (nonmandated) IOR.

Rehabilitation

providers also tend to be involved in the more complex and lengthy cases, which are the
most costly and least likely to be resolved successfully (Consultants for Health Services,
1987; Ganora and Wright, 1987). For example, in the financial year ending 30 June,
1992, in the Country South Region of N e w South Wales (incorporating the Illawarra)
"whilst only 5 % of temporary disability cases [due to workplace injury] resulted in time
lost of six months or more, these cases accounted for 3 7 % of the total gross incurred cost
and 3 5 % of the total time lost" (WorkCover Authority, 1993b: 13). All the rehabilitation
cases making up the two case studies involved more than six months' lost time.
The network case studies focus on I O R based in two domains: respectively heavy
manufacturing and tertiary education. They differ in terms of general economic sector,
industry type, occupational health and safety profile and the locus of control over workers'
compensation insurance. The reason for selecting two functionally diverse case studies is
to assess if the theoretical propositions are replicated, thus enhancing the study's external
validity.
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Limitations
Aside from the perennial claim of time and resource constraints that besets m u c h
social science research, the major limitation often levelled against the necessarily
qualitative case approach to this contextually embedded study is its idiosyncrasy. In turn,
this leads to criticisms concerning the lack of generalizability. For example, questions of
this study might ask about the absence of small employers, other industries, other
jurisdictions, other substantive legal areas, other injury types and so on. These are typical
of concerns about statistical generalization, where inferences are m a d e about a population
using sampled empirical data. However, analytic generalization is the m o d u s operandi in
this thesis and not statistical generalization. Analytic generalization is where the previously
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the
case study (Yin, 1989:38).

1.5 Arrangement of the Study
The remaining seven chapters of the study are arranged as follows. Chapter 2 has
two main aims: first, to identify and systematically review the research literature
pertaining to the abovementioned research question and second, to develop and justify a
theoretical model of partially mandated interorganizational relations for empirical
investigation. T h e literature review locates the study in an open systems approach and
examines a n u m b e r of organization-environment configurations and theories.
Organizational ecology theory (after Trist, 1977) with its emphasis on structural and
processual explanations of network phenomena embedded in their social context, is
considered the most suited to this study of I O R (interorganizational relations) in mandated
occupational rehabilitation. B y examining key I O R processes as well as the bases for I O R
formation, a clear need emerges for more detailed research into the nature of mandated
IOR. This leads to the development of a four phase process model of legislative efficacy

which argues for the concept of partial mandates. Using this concept, a set of six
propositions are set out for a study within the context of the above model of legal efficacy.
Chapter 3 addresses the research design and methodology for testing the theoretical
framework. It is argued that the empirical study of partially mandated I O R is most
appropriately undertaken using case study research. B y setting out the research design and
methodology in systematic detail, criticisms of vagueness and unreliability levelled at
qualitative research are countered.
In Chapter 4, the emergence of mandated occupational rehabilitation is examined.
B y establishing the historical environmental context within which the mandate emerged in
N e w South Wales, the patterns, frequency and nature of the changes to the mandate are
identified and explained. The implications of the uncertain and variable character of
mandate emergence for interorganizational relations are discussed.
The first of the two aims of Chapter 5 is to analyse the form and context of the
legislation, regulations, guidelines and W o r k C o v e r handbooks directly related to
occupational rehabilitation in order to determine:
(i)

the explicitly mandated organizations and their primary duties and obligations; and
de facto, those organizations involved directly in occupational rehabilitation w h o
are not explicitly mandated;

(ii)

the level of regulatory agency and explicitly mandated organizations' discretion
embodied within mandate provisions;

(iii)

mandate clarity and complexity; and

(iv)

potential "loopholes" and subsequent potential implementation problems.

The second aim of this chapter is to m a k e an initial assessment of h o w mandate form might
interact with and influence mandate implementation and impact. In fulfilling these aims,
their implication of mandate form for interorganizational relations are then assessed.
Chapter 6 focuses on h o w the occupational rehabilitation mandate is implemented
through enforcement by the regulatory agency and through compliance by organizations
directly involved in real-life rehabilitation cases based in two industry sectors (the case

studies) in the Illawarra Region of N e w South Wales. First, the two case studies are
analysed in terms of their composition and their geographic and sectorial contexts.
Second, mandate implementation at both the State and local, Illawarra levels is analysed
from a WorkCover Authority enforcement perspective using explanatory variables from
the four phase analytic framework. Third, mandate compliance is examined in and
between each case study in terms of the six propositions about I O R under partial mandates.
Finally, the findings from the preceding analysis are discussed with particular reference to
their implications for I O R theory and practice.
Chapter 7 looks at the impact of the occupational rehabilitation mandate on actual
practice. Perspectives taken in this assessment are at the State, policy level and at the
interorganizational network, operational level in the heavy manufacturing and tertiary
education sectors.
Finally, Chapter 8 draws conclusions about the overall study. Their implications
for I O R theory, public policy, the management of IOR, and the quality of working life are
detailed. Lastly, suggestions are m a d e for future directions of I O R research in public
regulation.

1.6 Summary
The grounds for conducting this study have been laid out and justified in terms of
the general and particular research problems. Significant gaps in the I O R and public policy
literatures were identified and the social and economic importance of occupational
rehabilitation warranting attention clearly established. In addressing these issues, potential
theoretical and practical contributions of the study were argued as the capstone
justification. Finally, key research delimitations and limitations were set out, followed by
the arrangement of the remaining chapters in the study.

Chapter 2
Literature Review and Theoretical Model

2.1 Introduction
This chapter has two main aims. The first is to identify and review the research
literature relevant to the research question discussed in Chapter 1. The second aim is to
develop and justify a theoretical model for subsequent empirical investigation that is
grounded in the research literature.
The literature review comprises the following four sections. First, it is established
that some organizational problems draw substantially on resources from their environment
and m a y be appropriately regarded as interorganizational problems (Section 2.2).
Organization-environment configurations are then assessed in terms of their levels,
characteristics and dynamics (Section 2.3). It is considered that interorganizational
problems such as occupational rehabilitation would benefit from a community level of
analysis, using a combined functional/areal field approach. In this study, mandated
interorganizational relations (IOR) will account for both technical as well as institutional
environmental characteristics. Analysis of environmental dynamics confirm the importance
of understanding I O R in terms of the changing wider sociocultural context.
In assessing four current and dominant theories of organization-environment
relations (Section 2.4), it is argued that all possessed merit in the study of legally politically
mandated IOR. For example, the population ecology perspective emphasises issues such as
the limited applicability of strategic adaptation, and the importance of studying
organizations over time. Resource dependence theory draws attention to the potential
power relations and dependencies that m a y arise between organizations, and to the wide,
shifting repertoire of I O R behaviours and forms. Institutional theory focuses on the issue of
contextual embeddedness. It reinforces that similar and dissimilar organizations should be
treated with equanimity, and that there is a need to study vertical as well as horizontal

IORs. Furthermore, institutional theory acknowledges that 1 0 networks m a y extend
beyond a particular geographic field and that the rules of IORs are considered as well
resource and information flows.
T h e above merits notwithstanding, the organizational ecology perspective is
considered the most appropriate overall for the purposes of this study. It emphasises
network phenomena embedded within a social context. It invokes processual as well as
structural explanations about collective life. Also, it introduces the notion that
organizations are part of their environments and vice versa. In addition, this approach
dictates that technical as well as institutional environments are to be considered. However,
it is both useful and theoretically more sound to embrace the merits identified in the three
other theories within an organizational ecological analysis of mandated IOR.
In evaluating major conceptual and empirical studies of I O R in what appears to be a
messy field (Section 2.5) a number of analytic points are made. First, arenas within which
IORs take place intersect and overlap. This thesis takes I O R research into an arena not
previously studied, that of occupational rehabilitation in Australia where there has been
little formal study of IOR. Second, this study straddles public administration, business and
community orientations. Third, grounds are established for studying the differences
between interorganizational coordination and cooperation. At the same time it is
considered necessary in I O R network analysis to take into account other processes such as
collaboration, competition and conflict. Fourth, in reviewing different interorganizational
forms, the network unit of analysis is considered the most relevant for this study in line
with the earlier analysis of environmental levels. It is also noted that using multiple levels
of analysis would enhance understanding of the primary unit, the network. Finally,
examination of the bases of interorganizational relationships indicates the need for more
research into mandated I O R as well as the relations between mandated and voluntary
contingencies for organizational interaction.

The second part of this chapter takes up this last point and, in assessing the nature of
interorganizational mandates (Section 2.6), it is found that generally prior research into
I O R has viewed them as single dimensional constructs, when in reality they vary in relation
to their substantive focus and efficacy. Using Cranston's (1987) four phase model of
legislative efficacy, interorganizational mandates are examined in terms of their emergence,
legal form, implementation and impact (Section 2.7). It is clearly established that mandates
are partially efficacious.
Building on the concept of partial mandates, six propositions concerning I O R
dimensions in such a context are put forward for empirical testing (Section 2.8). In
addition to these propositions, the four phase model of mandate efficacy outlined above is
to be empirically assessed using occupational rehabilitation in N e w South Wales, Australia
as the problem domain.

2.2 Open Systems Theory and Interorganizational Problems
Based on the pioneering work of von Bertalanffy (1950) in general systems, an open
systems perspective in organizational analysis stresses interdependence between the
organization and the environment of which it is a part. The input, transformation and
output of environmental resources and organizational self-maintenance through feedback
from these transactions underpins this organization-environment interdependence (Morgan,
1986; Scott, 1992).
Given the above, organizations inevitably c o m e into contact with one another
(Emery and Trist, 1965). Naturally, some organizational problems or issues will draw
more substantially upon resources from the environment and, in doing so, m a y be more
appropriately regarded as interorganizational problems.

Examples include

urban/community renewal (Trist, 1977; Trist, 1983), public involvement in health and
safety management (Gricar and Baratta, 1983), the structuring of health delivery systems
(Luke, Begun, Pointer and Dennis, 1989), and creating and maintaining strategic alliances

for competitive purposes (Kanter, 1989). A s already indicated in the introduction chapter,
the rehabilitation of ill or injured workers, the substantive focus of this study, can also be
usefully viewed as an interorganizational problem. In these circumstances, the nature of
the organization-environment configuration becomes an important theoretical
consideration.

2.3 Organizations and Environments
There is a large number of perspectives on the organization-environment
configuration. S o m e focus heavily on the environment itself with a view to explicating
different types, dimensions and their salient features for organizations (e.g. Dess and Beard,
1984; Dill, 1958; Emery and Trist, 1965; Jurkovich, 1974; Scott, 1992). Others
concentrate on h o w or what organizations need to do in order to maximise, optimise or
adapt relations with their operating environment (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Porter,
1985; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In essence, they look at environment issues from a focal
organization perspective. Still others view the environment as the primary unit of analysis
where some follow competitive, ecological ideas drawn from the biological sciences
(Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989);

some emphasise collaborative

organization ecologies (Astley, 1984; Astley and Fombrun, 1983; Emery and Trist, 1973;
Gray, 1989; Trist, 1977, 1983) and yet others point to the prevalence of institutional forces
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987, 1992). Scott's (1992) systematic review of
research on environments, by capturing these perspectives in terms of their levels,
characteristics and dynamics, is a useful means of addressing a number of theoretical issues
in this study.

Levels of Environments
Organizational environments can be analysed at a number of levels (Scott, 1992).
These include organization sets (Evan, 1966; Aldrich and Whetten, 1981), organizational

populations (Aldrich, 1979; Carroll, 1984; Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; McKelvey,
1982), areal organization fields (Scott, 1992; Singh and Lumsden, 1990; Trist, 1983) and
functional organization fields (Scott and Meyer, 1991). These latter two levels, areal and
functional organization fields, are consistent with Carroll's (1984) community level of
environmental analysis.
T h e most appropriate level to employ in this study is a function of the research
question, the particular problem under scrutiny and the resources available. Particular
problems that involve significant interorganizational relations between large numbers of
organizations will clearly benefit from a community level of analysis. At this level the
network relations within the relevant organizational field (Trist, 1983) are of primary
interest. B y developing a clearer understanding of the interactive aspects of such problems,
formerly obscure blockages and conflicts m a y be identified, analysed and possibly
resolved. Occupational rehabilitation is one such interorganizational network problem.
Thus, its study is focused primarily at the community level and is based on both functional
and areal organization field criteria: the rehabilitation of injured workers (functional)
within a particular region of a nation-state, the Illawarra in N e w South Wales (areal). B y
adopting both above criteria, Scott's (1992) criticism of areal field analysis, that there is an
overemphasis on horizontal I O R often at the expense of vertical relations (such as
regulatory systems connecting private and public sector organizations), is overcome. The
concurrent functional field analysis of occupational rehabilitation necessitates the study of
its institutional regulation by the State regulatory agency, in addition to the involvement of
key technical stakeholders, such as employers, unions, the medical and allied health
professions.

Characteristics of Environments
In addition to their levels, environments have c o m m o n l y been characterised as
either technical or institutional, the latter of these sometimes referred to as general or

contextual. Technical environments, similar to Dill's (1958) conceptualization of task
environments, have been defined as "those in which organizations produce a product or
service that is exchanged in a market such that they are rewarded for effective and efficient
performance" (Scott, 1992:132). Typically located in an organization's technical (task)
environment would be customers, suppliers, competitors, trade unions and regulators.
Institutional environments are defined as "the rules and requirements to which
individual organizations must conform in order to receive legitimacy and support" (Scott,
1992:132). Institutional theory is examined in greater detail later in this chapter. The
prominent sources of institutional structures are the state, both legally and politically, the
professions, trade unions and trade associations. Through these organizations, "rationalized
myths" (Meyer and R o w a n , 1977) such as corporate law (sourced from government
agencies, courts and the legal profession) influence not only the form organizations m a y
take, but also the scope for certain types of interaction between targeted organizations, for
example, collusion, mergers and insider dealing.
Technical and institutional environments differ in a number of ways. Technical
environments reward organizations for efficient and effective performance while
institutional environments confer social legitimacy and support for compliant
organizations. Technical environments are more likely to be perceived as more immediate
and visible than the symbolic and contextual sociocultural structures of institutional
environments. Sources of the technical environment m a y also differ from those of the
institutional; for example, suppliers, customers and competitors are primarily sources of
technical demand for the focal organization. Even though they differ, these two types of
environment do overlap and are contemporaneous. In this way, the day-to-day dealings
(technical tasks) by a manufacturing organization with a trade union on grievance matters
will be embedded within an overarching set of rules, procedures and understandings
(institution).

From the perspective of analysing interorganizational relations the characteristics of
and distinctions between technical and institutional environments points to the need to
focus not only on the form and content of dealings between the parties immediately
concerned, but on the social context within which these relations are embedded
(Galaskiewicz 1985).

In this study occupational rehabilitation networks (technical,

interorganizational) are examined within the context of the relevant emergent legal-political
mandate (institutional).

Dynamics of Environments
It is axiomatic that neither organizations nor the environments of which they form a
part are static entities. They are dynamic, they grow and decline, ebb and flow, expand and
contract, prosper and starve, live and die; they are in a process of continual and variable
evolution or change. In their seminal work on organizational environments, Emery and
Trist (1965) were among the first to delve into the dynamics of evolving environments and
the need for systems (organizations) to develop response patterns appropriate to the salient
conditions. They identified four generalised environmental types with different kinds of
causal texture which they explained in terms of stability, concentration and turbulence
dimensions, and their relevance for the distribution of goals and noxiants.
Emery and Trist (1965) argue that the above environmental contexts (I to IV)
become more complex at increasing rates. Also they contend that in Western Society the
salient environment is Type IV - the turbulent field. The greater interdependency and
uncertainty commonly associated with this environmental type leads to recognition of the
need for increased interorganizational awareness and sensitivity or what has been referred
to as appreciation (Vickers in Emery and Trist, 1973). This is supported by Terreberry's
(1968) argument that organizations that efficiently monitor and screen their environments
will be more likely to succeed.

From the perspective of this study of interorganizational relations, the idea of
dynamic environments changing at increasingly rapid rates into more complex, uncertain
interdependent and interconnected entities points to the need to understand these relations
in terms of the changing wider sociocultural context within which they take place over
time, not just their immediate task related interactions. Failure to take the environmental
context into account m a y lead to erroneous attribution of cause for certain behaviours or
events.

2.4 Organization-Environment Theories and Interorganizational Relations
In the last 30 years or so, there has been a great deal of research activity into
organizations and their environments leading to a number of influential theoretical models.
S o m e of the more prominent include agency theory (Barney, 1990), contingency theory
(Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), strategic contingency theory
(Child, 1972), sociotechnical systems (Trist and Bamforth, 1952), transaction costs analysis
(Williamson, 1975), population (organizational) ecology (Aldrich, 1979; Carroll, 1984;
Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1979; Singh and Lumsden, 1990), resource dependence
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1992) and organizational
ecology (based on social ecology and community ecology) (Astley, 1983, Emery, 1974;
Emery and Trist, 1973; Gray, 1985, 1989; Trist, 1977, 1983). All of the above are
relevant to the study of interorganizational relations; some more so than others. Thus, it is
worthwhile considering some of these theories in more depth to assess their potential value
in the analysis of contextually embedded interorganizational relations since the focus of
this study is on I O R within their legal-political context. For this purpose the latter four of
above theories have been selected. T h e grounds for choosing these relate to their
representativeness in terms of levels of analysis and environmental characteristics referred

to in Section 2.3. Table 2.1 sets out the primary level of analysis and the focal
environment(s) associated with each of the four theoretical perspectives.

Theory

Primary
Level of
Analysis

Focal
Environments)

Population
Ecology

Population
(e.g.. industry)

Task/
Institutional

Resource
Dependence

Organization Set

Task

Institutional
Theory

Societal/Community
(Areal/Functional Field)

Institutional

Organizational
Ecology

Network/Community
(Areal/Functional Field)

Task/
Institutional

Table 2.1 Theoretical Models - Levels of Analysis and Focal Environments

Population Ecology Theory
The first of these, the population ecology perspective (also referred to as
organizational ecology) of organizations and w h y they change has its intellectual origins in
the natural selection model of biology formulated by Charles Darwin. The major recent
proponents of such an approach include Aldrich (1979), Hannan and Freeman (1977,
1989), Carroll (1984), McKelvey (1982), Singh and Lumsden (1990). The fundamental
position of the population ecology model is that at the level of populations

of

organizations, environmental forces are pre-eminent in h o w organizational forms vary, h o w
some forms are selected and not others and finally w h y those selected are retained. This
essentially deterministic view stands in stark contrast to the adaptationist views of the
contingency, strategic contingency and resource-dependence theorists (Morgan, 1986;
Scott, 1992). This latter group argue that in order for organizations to succeed/survive they
can and must adapt to their environmental circumstances, for example, through structural
integration (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), or buffering and bridging strategies (Pfeffer and

Salancik, 1978). The population ecology approach, on the other hand, emphasises inertial
pressures that limit such adaptation (Hannan and Freeman, 1977).
T h e population ecology model is instructive in this study's examination of
embedded interorganizational relations in a number of ways. First, it alerts the researcher
to the notion that over time, strategic adaptation based on planned rational actions m a y not
be an option for m a n y organizations, that there are more significant environmental forces at
play shaping organizational form and behaviour. This underlines the potential importance
of relations between an organization and those that comprise its environment(s). Second,
population ecology draws attention to a level of analysis between that of the organization
and society as a whole, in addition to areal/functional organization fields. However, it is
not concerned specifically with the relations that take place between (populations of)
organizations. For this reason, as an analytic model for studying embedded I O R its value is
limited. Third, population ecology points to the importance of studying organizational
change and therefore interorganizational relations over time. In population ecology studies,
these time frames can be very long in organization theory terms. Periods in excess of fifty
years are quite c o m m o n (Carroll and Delacroix, 1982).

Resource Dependence Theory
Resource dependence theory, in a similar vein to population ecology, focuses on the
effects of environments on organizational forms and behaviour. There are, however, a
number of differences which are discussed presently. Resource dependence theory, as
proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), argues that organizations are externally controlled
or constrained through their actions or outcomes and, if they are to survive, it is necessary
for them to take account of and respond more effectively to those organizations in their
environment that hold important resources. In essence, it seeks to describe the emergence
of power relations between organizations and h o w this (external) power affects
organizational behaviour. This is in line with "the underlying premise of the external

perspective on organizations [which] is that organizational activities and outcomes are
accounted for by the context in which the organization is embedded". (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978:39). The context in this instance is largely comprised of those organizations
with w h o m a focal organization has direct dealings (described earlier as the task or
technical environment).
Resource dependence theory also attempts to identify, design and advocate
strategies to cope with and perhaps even reduce the effects of these external constraints.
Strategies to deal with interdependence include use of secrecy with respect to those making
demands, balancing conflicting organizations against one another, horizontal and vertical
mergers, interlocking directorates, joint ventures, diversification and seeking favourable
conditions through influencing public regulation and lobbying.

In reality, most

organizations deal with a large number of demands from m a n y and varied organizations,
demands which often will be incompatible. Three factors identified as critical in assessing
the dependence of one organization or another are:
• the importance of the resource for organizational operation and survival;
•

the degree of social actor discretion over resource allocation and use;

•

amount of resource substitutability (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:45-46).

Like population ecology, resource dependence theory focuses on the effects of
environments on (inter-) organizational form and behaviour. However, they differ in a
number of ways including level of analysis, analytic time frame, conceptualization of the
environment, focal environment, research questions and the amount of rationality operating
(Pfeffer, 1982; Singh and Lumsden, 1990).
The potential value of resource dependence theory for the analysis of embedded
interorganizational relations in this study rests on a number of grounds. First, it draws
attention to the need for understanding organizational behaviour within its operational
context: an open system perspective. Second, it importantly identifies the potential power
relations and dependencies that m a y arise between organizations. These considerations

m a y be useful in assessment of the network interaction between powerful professions (such
as medical practitioners), large employer organizations, and small paramedical groups
(such as physiotherapists). Third, the adaptation strategies advocated in resource
dependence theory suggest that interorganizational relations m a y be faced with a wide and
shifting repertoire of behaviours and forms.
However, resource dependence theory also detracts from the analysis of embedded
interorganizational relations. Insufficient attention is given explicitly to institutional
environments as a factor to consider in I O R analysis. The relevant environment in resource
dependence comprises those organizations with which the focal organization has dealings.
For interorganizational networks the relevant task environment m a y be one or more steps
removed from the focal organization in that each network m e m b e r will have dealings with
organizations with which other members will not c o m e into contact. In other words, the
task environment of 1 0 networks will tend to be wider than for any given local
organization. A d d to this a network's institutional environment and it is seen that the
environment for IO networks is likely to be somewhat more complex than conceived in
resource dependence theory. Another detraction of resource dependence theory arises out
of the level of analysis. Resource dependence theory employs an organization set approach
(Evan, 1966; Aldrich and Whetten, 1981) in its formulation. Interorganizational network
analysis is unlikely to be served well by such a perspective in that understanding network
form and behaviours needs to take account of all network members without adopting a
potentially biasing single organization stance. For example, conflict between organizations
in one part of a network and its potential consequences for an uninvolved party elsewhere
in the network would be lost in an organizational set analysis that uses the uninvolved party
as the focal organization. Finally, resource'dependence (and population ecology), offers
views of the organization-environment relation as being essentially competitive in nature.
This tends to ignore the important point that interorganizational relations are often
predicated on the basis of cooperation and collaboration.
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Institutional Theory
The third perspective on organization-environment relations to be examined is
institutional theory. Considered by some to be the most sociological in orientation
(Lincoln, 1990), this approach has its origins in Philip Selznick's (1949) study of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, a decentralized government agency. According to Selznick,
institutionalization is essentially concerned with the idea that organizations have a life of
their o w n beyond the formal tasks at hand. Attention is directed towards processes by
which organizations develop a distinctive character structure, in particular mechanisms
such as informal structures, co-optation and ideologies (Scott, 1992). M o r e recent
theorizing on institutionalism diverges from this earlier work in a number of significant
ways (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1991 for a detailed discussion), although both n e w and
old emphasise factors affecting rationality, the relationship between organization and
environment, and the importance of culture in shaping reality (Powell and DiMaggio,
1991).
The n e w institutionalism or neo institutionalism arose out of Meyer and Rowan's
(1977) seminal work on "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and
Ceremony". A social constructionist perspective deeply grounded in the work of Berger
and L u c k m a n n (1967), "

institutionalization involves the process by which social

processes, obligations, or actualities c o m e to take on a rule like status in social thought and
action." (Meyer and R o w a n , 1977:341). These institutions become rationalized myths:
widely held beliefs taking the form of rules and procedures which cannot be objectively
tested. For example, they are manifest in modern society in terms of the law, government
and the professions. In increasingly complex and differentiated symbolic environments,
organizations seek legitimacy from the relevant field for the things they do and the means
by which they do them. The point is, however, that within such environments they are
often faced with competition from institutions for loyalty or attention. Under these

circumstances, organizations will need to choose between the options that are seen to be
available (Scott, 1991). Empirical research in institutional theory development has focused
primarily on areas such as municipal reforms, the mental health sector, voluntary social
service agencies, arts funding, educational systems, (refer to Scott in Powell and DiMaggio,
1991 and Powell in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) - namely non profit organizations and
public agencies.
The n e w institutionalism has merit in this study's analysis of legally-politically
mandated I O R in that it focuses on the issue of contextual embeddedness through seeking
to understand h o w the structures and actions of organizations and therefore, their
interorganizational relations, are fashioned by the cultural, political and communal forces in
society. The unit of analysis in the n e w perspective is the (interorganizational field or
societal sectors (Scott and Meyer, 1991).
The n e w institutionalism is also analytically relevant to this study by conceiving the
environment as comprising institutional as well as technical sectors. This means that:
".... (1) attention is directed not only to the linkages among specific organizations
but also to the larger structure of relations within which these organizations m a y
function; (2) linkages among both similar and dissimilar organizations are of equal
interest; (3) both horizontal and vertical linkages are included; (4) both local and
non-local connections are examined; and (5) both technical and institutional
aspects of organizations and environments are viewed as salient (Scott and Meyer,
1991:111)."
With respect to the study of mandated IOR, the first point above implicitly
recognises that mandate implementation m a y involve organizations other than those
mandated.

T h e second point reinforces an important aspect of embedded

interorganizational analysis: networks in fields will comprise similar and dissimilar
organizations and analysis at the network level should treat this with equanimity. The third
point highlights the need to study horizontal IORs (e.g.. between mandated actors) and
vertical I O R s (e.g.. between the regulatory agency and target organizations, or between
contractor and contracted organizations such as an employer and a workers' compensation

insurer). T h e fourth point acknowledges that 1 0 networks m a y extend beyond a
geographic field. For example, the regulatory agency in mandated I O R m a y be situated
both inside and outside of the area under study. Finally, in accepting the salience of
technical and institutional environments in mandated IOR, attention is focused not only on
the information and resources necessary for the task at hand, but also on the rules (e.g. law
and guidelines) that inform the performance of such tasks. For the above reasons, the n e w
institutionalism in organizational analysis is closely aligned in approach with the
organizational ecology model that is discussed in the following subsection.
However, an area of neglect in the n e w institutionalism concerns the issues of power
and conflict. Unlike with Selznick's model, tradeoffs, vested interests, and political
alliances with all of their associated tensions are largely ignored. This is somewhat ironic
since one of the pre-eminent sources of institutional forces, government, has often been
analysed in terms of the power relations with its constituents, capture by those w h o m it
seeks to regulate and interpenetration by various interest groups (Olsen, 1981).

Organizational Ecology Theory
The fourth and final body of theory concerning organization-environment relations
to be examined is organizational ecology. T h e term "organizational ecology" is used by
different scholars to represent two distinct bodies of research into organizationenvironment relations: these are population ecology and organizational ecology (closely
akin to community ecology). The distinctions between the two perspectives are elaborated
in the body of the discussion, for example, population ecology is primarily concerned with
the influence of social conditions on the birth, change patterns and death of organizations
within populations of organizations (Singh and Lumsden, 1990), whereas organizational
ecology is more concerned on the patterns of relations that take place between populations
of organizations (Astley, 1984,1985; Trist, 1983). Each also represents a different level of
analysis. According to Carroll (1984) population ecology and community ecology (in this

case on equivalent of Trist's organizational ecology) are subsets of an organizational
ecology that comprises three levels of analysis: organizational, population, community.
Each is considered respectively to represent developmental selection and macro
evolutionary approaches to societal or organizational evolution.

Since the term

organizational ecology was first coined by Trist in 1977 and since the bulk of the work by
those professing to be concerned with organizational ecology is overwhelmingly within a
population ecology framework (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), this paper uses organizational
ecology broadly in line with Trist's formulation.
Based on the work of Emery and Trist (1973) and Trist (1977, 1983) and then
developed subsequently by others: Astley (1984, 1985), Astley and Fombrun (1983),
Bresser (1988), Gray (1985, 1989), Gray and H a y (1986), M c C a n n and Gray (1986),
Morgan (1986), Williams (1979, 1992), organizational ecology has been referred to as "...
the organizational field created by a number of organizations whose interrelations comprise
a system at the level of the field" (Trist, 1977:162). The fields or "interorganizational
domains are functional social systems that occupy a position in social space between the
society as a whole and the single organization" (Trist, 1983:270). Thus organizational and
interorganizational activities and outcomes, according to this model, are analysed not at
"the single organization level but at the larger system of which it is a part" (Trist,
1977:167), in effect a figure-ground reversal (Perrow, 1986). Attention directed at
interorganizational systems following the organizational ecology's approach holds that in
addition to competition and conflict between members, w h o some might view as being at
the mercy of the environment (e.g.. the population ecologists), there are important
collective, cooperative and collaborative forces that facilitate systematic adaptation to the
environment. Overarching collective adaptation to turbulent environments and their
associated "messes" increasingly characterises contemporary society.

F r o m an

organizational ecology perspective, such adaptation is consciously proactive in that it
recognises and advocates that groups of like and unlike organizations can work together to

shape their environments and futures, where emergent problems are regarded as
increasingly less amenable to single organization strategies (Trist, 1983), and adversarial
problem solving is considered unviable (Gray, 1985). In this sense, organizations are seen
to be active players in their environment, not external to it as posited by the population
ecologists.
In recent years, the notion of cooperation between organizations as a means of
achieving collective goals has gained more significant currency. Examples of such
cooperation include strategic alliance formation between major vehicle manufacturers
(Kanter, 1989), in joint ventures, partnerships, trade and union associations, interlocking
directorates (directors of companies serving on each others' boards), cartels for price fixing
purposes, hospitals pooling technical and professional competences through "quasi"
structures (Luke, Begun and Pointer, 1989), and European electronic silicon chip makers
forming a representative group to share valued and costly research and development
resources (Guterl, 1993).
For a number of reasons the organizational ecology theoretical perspective would
seem thus far to be a suitable and potent tool for the study's analysis of legally politically
mandated interorganizational network relations. First, it emphasises the connections that
take place between organizations within the defined community (network). Clearly,
explanations about behavioural and structural phenomena at this network level will need to
draw upon explanations about the actors and social forces involved at the surrounding
levels (societal and organizational, in particular). Secondly, this perspective invokes
processual (e.g.. Gray, 1985, 1989) as well as structural explanations (e.g. Astley, 1985;
Astley and Fombrun, 1983) about the significance of collective, network life, aspects that
are neglected by the population ecologists and resource dependency theorists. Therefore,
as mentioned earlier, the organizational ecology model overcomes the notion of the
environment as some exogenous constraint: rather, organizations are parts of their
environments and vice versa, an implicit assumption of network analysis. Thirdly, this

collectivistic model puts the "egocentric orientation (Astley, 1984) of m u c h of the
business policy and corporate strategy literature into a more balanced perspective. Namely,
strategic choice independent of other organizations is impossible, since existence let alone
strategy implementation brings organizations into contact with one another and, as such,
managers need to take these socio-ecological issues into account where recognition of
interdependence, cooperation and collaboration are to be seen as vital to successful
outcomes. Fourth, the organizational ecology model highlights the weakness of single
organization solution-seeking to problems in turbulent environments that require collective,
multi-party actions. The nature of the organizational ecology model overcomes this by its
focal shift to the connected, interorganizational field. Finally, this model not only
addresses domain-based issues but also serves to maintain close contact (often through the
referent organization) with the extended social field (Trist, 1983), as well as the "figure", in
effect the interorganizational network's environment. In this sense, therefore, the
organizational ecology model accounts for Scott's (1992) technical (the interorganizational
domain) and institutional (extended social field) environments.
A potential limitation of the organizational ecology model in the analysis of
interorganizational relations is the propensity to overemphasise collective strategy at the
expense of egocentric business or corporate strategy ,and interorganizational collaboration
and cooperation at the expense of interorganizational conflict and competition. Bresser
(1988) draws attention to conflicts that m a y arise between competitive and collective
strategies where, for example, the former requires plans to be kept secret and the latter
trades on open information disclosure as a basis for creating stability through predictability.

2.5 Conceptual and Empirical Studies in Interorganizational Relations
Although a large body of conceptual and empirical research into interorganizational
relations has accumulated since the 1960s, unfortunately no connective theory has emerged
which systematically integrates its wealth of findings. Major reviews of the I O R literature

refer to its fragmentariness (Oliver, 1990), inconsistent operationalization of key variables
(Whetten, 1982), overemphasis on the improvement of interorganizational coordination
(Whetten, 1981), and analytical messiness (Galaskiewicz, 1985). These problems make the
I O R research literature difficult to navigate. Therefore, the above reviews are used as a
basis for eliciting systematically the major developments that have taken place in I O R
analysis. This entails an examination of interorganizational fields of study, processes,
forms and the bases for organizational interaction. O f these, the bases for I O R are given
particular attention since they represent a major and outstanding analytic challenge and,
consequently, are the primary focus of this thesis. However, in later chapters, when the
empirical case of mandated occupational rehabilitation networks is explored, structural and
processual I O R explanations will be employed.

Fields of Study in Interorganizational Relations
In his review of I O R research, Whetten (1981) identified four distinct approaches or
fields of study: public administration, marketing, economic and sociological.. The first of
these, the public administration orientation, is largely concerned with producing lateral
service coordination in deliver systems such as are found in mental health (Black and Kase,
1963), h o m e care (Grunow and Lempert, 1980) and hospitals (Schermerhorn, 1981). The
argument that public administration, especially in human services, has been the dominant
field for empirical I O R research (Whetten, 1982) has continued since the Whetten studies.
Hospital and health care systems appear to receive a particularly high level of attention
(Cook, Shortell, Conrad and Morrisey, 1983; Evan and K l e m m , 1980; Fottler,
Schermerhorn, W o n g and Money, 1982; Lawless and Moore, 1989; Longest, 1990; Luke,
Begun and Pointer, 1989; Pointer, Begun and Luke, 1988; Provan, 1982, 1984; Tierney,
1985).
The second field of study, according to Whetten (1981) the marketing approach, has
focussed primarily on the interactions in distribution channels between interdependent

organizations "involved in the process of making a product or service available for
consumption" (Reve and Stern, 1979:405). Frazier (1984:68) has argued that such research
has been essentially limited to issues such as h o w firms acquire and use power, the
antecedents and consequences of interorganizational conflict in the distribution channel,
and h o w power and conflict interact. With this in mind, a particular research concern has
been with conflict reduction through improved interorganizational cooperation and
coordination (Reve and Stern, 1979).
The third approach to I O R research, the economic orientation, has examined h o w
organizations are connected through mechanisms such as interlocking directorates (Palmer,
1983), joint ventures and mergers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and executive recruitment
(Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973). The dominant issue in this field has been the optimization of
single or collective strategies in terms of economic outcomes.
The fourth I O R research orientation, according to Whetten (1981) is communitybased. This approach examines the contextual factors that influence the general pattern of
relations among community organizations. Issues analysed have included community
structure as an interorganizational resource network (Galaskiewicz and Krohn, 1984),
community health and anti-poverty organizations (Turk, 1973) and leadership and
networking among neighbourhood human service organizations (Galaskiewcz and Shakin,
1983).
Since Whetten's (1981) analysis, there has been a broadening of the
interorganizational fields studied in the last 10 years. Commercial auditor-client relations
(Levinthal and Fichman, 1988), coal policy development and implementation (Hay and
Gray, 1985; Rogers, 1986), the United States radio broadcasting industry (Leblebici,
Salancik, Copay and King, 1991), community involvement in health and safety (Gricar and
Baratta, 1985) information technology (Suomi, 1991), occupied countries during World
W a r II (Lammers, 1988) and intergovernmental relations (Mandell, 1988; O'Toole, 1988)
have all been analysed from an interorganizational perspective. While Whetten's

distinctions are useful for identifying general patterns or I O R research, often the fields of
study (orientations) are blurred and tend to merge. In his review of the I O R literature,
Galaskiewicz (1985) draws attention to the important point that the arenas within which
these I O R take place intersect and overlap. For example, activities that are concerned with
procurement and allocation of economic resources m a y involve two or more organizations
undertaking collective "political" action by lobbying a state government to protect their
interests, say, through a restrictive licensing scheme. Private business can and does get
involved with public administration, which in turn will often deal with communities at
large.
This thesis seeks to extend the body of I O R with respect to fields of study. First, the
empirical context will be based in Australia where, apart from work carried out by Stening
and W a i (1984) on interlocking directorates, there has been little formal study of
interorganizational relations. Second, the particular arena to be examined concerns the
occupational rehabilitation of injured workers. A search of the I O R and rehabilitation
literatures overseas and in Australia indicates that this problem has received almost no
consideration, apart from s o m e early conceptualization (Zanko, 1988, 1990). Third,
occupational rehabilitation, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, is a set of
activities that straddle Whetten's public administration, business and community
orientations. This is a development beyond the characteristic public sector/private sector
compartmentalization of I O R studies.

Interorganizational Processes of Interaction
There are five major processes by which organizations interact with one another:
coordination, cooperation, collaboration, competition and conflict. Each is examined in
turn.
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Interorganizational Coordination
According to Whetten (1981, 1982) and Turk (1985) interorganizational
coordination is the process which has received the most research attention, and then usually
from "the perspective of the elites in the system under investigation" (Whetten, 1981:24).
They also concur that the reason for this emphasis is probably due to a significant amount
of empirical work being undertaken in the public administration, h u m a n service delivery
domain where the primary research issue has been to enhance lateral coordination among
agencies (Mandell, 1988; O'Toole, 1988; Tierney, 1985). Indeed, one of the very few
books on I O R deals specifically with the issue of lateral coordination between nonbusiness
organizations in the public sector (Rogers and Whetten, 1982).
Interorganizational coordination has been defined as .... "the process whereby, two
or more organizations create and/or use existing decision rules that have been established
to deal collectively with their shared task environment" (Mulford and Rogers, 1982:12).
These decision rules m a y be developed by the participating organizations or mandated by
an external party, such as a state or a federal government. In this study, occupational
rehabilitation is mandated by the State Legislature to be coordinated by employer
organizations using statutory guidelines. In analysing interorganizational coordination
further, Mulford and Rogers (1982) distinguish between three major kinds of managed
coordination strategies ranging from fairly loosely to tightly coupled (Weick, 1976)
interorganizational arrangements: mutual adjustment, alliance and corporate strategies.
These strategies correspond closely with Warren's (1967) inclusive interorganizational
decision-making contexts: social choice, coalitional, federative, and unitary. W h a t
emerges from this brief examination is that interorganizational coordination is a broad
concept that can embody a wide range of behaviours and forms, issues that are examined in
the chapters dealing with the case study.

Interorganizational Cooperation
According to Schermerhorn (1975:847) interorganizational cooperation is defined as
".... the presence of deliberate relations between otherwise autonomous organizations for
the joint accomplishment of individual operating goals". This definition is underpinned by
notions of voluntary action and purpose: organizations are not required or otherwise
compelled to enter into relations with one another.
Mulford and Rogers (1982) argue that interorganizational cooperation and
coordination clearly differ along five criteria: rules and formality, goals and activities,
vertical and horizontal linkages, personal resources and threat to autonomy. Alter (1990),
on the other hand, considers interorganizational cooperation and coordination to be
interchangeable terms where, for example, coordination can be regarded as a form of
cooperative activity. While Mulford and Rogers (1982) consider joint ventures to be a
form of coordination, Harrigan and N e w m a n (1990) see them as manifestations of
interorganizational cooperation. Clearly, there is a debate as to whether such distinctions
exist.
A n initial premise of this study is that, in line with Mulford and Rogers (1982),
interorganizational coordination and cooperation are different. These differences are
subsequently assessed through analysis of the I O R that arise between organizations
mandated to coordinate their activities in the rehabilitation of injured workers and those
that are not mandated but still involved, and thus presumably cooperating in this process.

Interorganizational Collaboration
While interorganizational coordination and cooperation are the key processes under
study in this thesis, it is necessary to recognise that there is overlap with interorganizational
collaboration. Based on the work of Emery (1974), Emery and Trist (1965, 1973), Trist
(1977, 1983) and Williams (1979, 1982) collaboration is viewed as a process ".... through
which parties w h o see different aspects of a problem and constructively explore their

differences and search for solutions that go beyond their o w n limited vision of what is
possible" (Gray, 1989:5).
Gray (1989:15) argues that cooperation and coordination as viewed by Mulford and
Rogers (1982) are ".... static patterns of interorganizational relationships ...."; in other
words they are already organized and in place, whereas collaboration is a dynamic process
that permits analysis and problem solving over time. Yet, it is worth noting that Mulford
and Rogers (1982) regard coordination and cooperation as processes even though their
treatment assumes a prescribed state. Cooperation and coordination are often a part of the
collaboration process; for example, joint cooperation to arrive at a collective agreement on
problem definition, on the need to collaborate, on agendas, and joint coordination of
activities to see through implementation strategies and so forth.

Interorganizational Competition
Competition as an interorganizational process has not received the level or extent of
attention from organizational scholars that has been directed at the preceding three
processes.

It has been largely the province of population ecologists with their

bioecological models (Aldrich, 1979; Astley, 1985; Astley and V a n de Ven, 1983;
Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; Singh and Lumsden, 1990) and of economists through
their use of various analytic models of perfect and imperfect competition, oligopoly and
monopoly (Pennings, 1981). W h e r e competition is considered in interorganizational
relations, it is often in terms of strategies or actions that organizations might employ in
enhancing competitiveness. Hence, resource dependency theory with its organization set
approach to I O R suggests various options for the management of competitive
environmental elements. Options such as avoidance strategies, vertical or horizontal
mergers, diversification, joint ventures, co-optation of important external organizations
through interlocking directorates (Aldrich, 1979; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However,
there appears to have been little systematic assessment of competition process per se from

an interorganizational perspective. While competition is not a major focus of this study, it
is necessary to acknowledge that it m a y exist in networks and thus influence the network's
capacity or willingness for coordination and cooperation.

Interorganizational Conflict
It is hardly surprising that if there is no consensus to be formed on what is or are
coordination, cooperation and collaboration there will be little chance of establishing
consensus for conflict Following on from DiStefano (1984), Alter (1990:482) makes just
such an observation in her analysis of conflict and coordination in interorganizational
delivery systems. Interorganizational conflict has been conceptualised variously as a cause
of poor and dysfunctional outcomes, as an outcome itself, as a recurrent organizational
behaviour that is legitimate and necessary (Alter, 1990) and as potentially productive
tensions that motivate action and clarify goals (Gemiinden, 1986). It has also been
categorised as structural and operating (Molnar and Rogers, 1979) frictional and manifest
(Pondy, 1969). It can occur at interpersonal and interorganizational levels and as Alter
(1990:282) puts it".... individuals can direct angry words or acts at other individuals, and
organizations can undertake communication or action meant to neutralize, exclude, or harm
other organizations".
In his review of interorganizational conflict DiStefano (1984) argues for its
integration into organizational analysis rather than avoidance. There is in essence a need
to acknowledge that conflict is not always "bad", that it can be constructive (Assael, 1969),
and is mutually interdependent with cooperation (Zeitz, 1980). In this way, conflict m a y
be viewed as both a positive and negative constraint on IOR. T h e extent to which it is
positive will be a function of its resolution (Gray, 1989). This study follows DiStefano's
above prescription by taking conflict into account.

This brief review of interorganizational processes is instructive in this study of
legally-politically mandated networks. While the key processes under scrutiny are
interorganizational coordination and cooperation (and to a lesser extent, collaboration)
their unquestioning presence between the relevant parties cannot be assumed. Differences
between various organizations in networks on what is appropriate are inevitable.
Therefore, this study takes account of the role placed by conflict and competition in
shaping coordinated, cooperative network relations.

Forms of Interorganizational Relations
In addition to research on I O R contexts and processes, scholars have examined
different forms. These forms include dyads, organization sets, action sets and networks.
(Whetten, 1981). B y looking at each of these in turn, the most appropriate for this study
can be assessed.

Dyads
Dyads are considered to be the simplest form of interorganizational relationship:
the transactions or interactions arise between pairs of organizations. While this basic form
can provide insights into the various dimensions of IOR, such as formalization, intensity
and so on (Aldrich, 1979), it is not particularly informative about the environment within
which the dyadic linkage takes place, when clearly organizations are involved in relations
with others at the same time.

Organization Sets
Based on Evan's (1966) conceptualization, the organization set has been defined as
".... those organizations with which a focal organization has direct links" (Aldrich and
Whetten, 1981:386) or as Thompson (1967:28) put it"... those organizations which make
a difference to the organization in question".

A n organization set approach to interorganizational analysis tends to ignore critical
relations that take place outside of the focal organization's immediate domain, or what
Scott (1991) refers to as the institutional environment. Furthermore, this approach fails to
take account of the interactions among set members and their potential significance for the
focal organization (Whetten, 1981). Since this thesis is concerned with the context based
problem of legally-politically mandated occupational rehabilitation which concerns
multiple parties the set approach is of limited value. However, this I O R form does allude
to organizational egocentrism and the notion that in some networks some organizations
will be more prominent (focal, central) than others, for example, large employers in
regional cities.

Action Sets
The third form of I O R is referred to as the action set, which Aldrich (1979:280)
defines as "a group of organizations formed into a temporary alliance for a limited
purpose". It contrasts with organization set analysis in that it examines the relations
between all of the members of the set not just from the perspective of a focal organization.
In action set analysis there is no focal organization, the set itself is the focus.
The research utility of this I O R form is questionable. It is not clear for example,
what is meant by the terms "temporary" or "limited". This lack of clarity, underscored by
a dearth of published research on action sets per se suggests that they are referred to more
widely by the research community as networks, a form (and level of analysis) that has
received a significant and rapidly growing amount of attention in recent years.

Networks
Networks are the interorganizational form that are best suited to this contextual
study of occupational rehabilitation. This assertion is explained by addressing the

following four issues: problem definition, network definition, contextual orientation and
multiple levels of analysis.
Interorganizational network studies have covered a broad range of topics and
problem areas, including diffusion of innovation, community power, resource transactions,
personnel flows and the concentration of economic power (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981),
industrial relocation in the United Kingdom (Dunkerly, Spybey and Thrasher, 1981),
investment banking (Eccles and Crane, 1987), multinational corporations (Ghoshal and
Bartlett, 1990) and for-profit network forms in craft industries, regional economies,
industrial districts, extended trading groups, strategic alliances and vertical disaggregation
(Powell, 1990). In all of the above cases, as with all network research, networks are the
researcher's construct. It is the researcher w h o determines their boundaries for the analysis
of IORs. For example, in the design of a research study it is the investigator w h o sets out
if it is to be bounded by areal or functional field criteria, or by both (Scott, 1991). It is also
the researcher w h o decides whether or not to examine a "complete network" (Knoke and
Kuklinski, 1982:17-18) or a subsystem such as an organization set. W h a t is important is
that the network research design addresses the problem in question. Thus, as in this
particular study, w h e n the presenting problem is one which concerns a domain or
interorganizational field rather than one specific focal organization, then analysis which is
most likely to shed light on its real nature is at the level of the problem itself - at the
network level.
There are numerous definitions of interorganizational networks. There are those
which suggest that networks are loose formations between organizations, neither important
or long term enough to be deemed strategic (Luke, Begun and Pointer, 1989), and then
there are those which characterise networks as cooperative modes of exchange between
organizations that can be sustained over the long run (Powell, 1990). In the main,
however, most definitions are cast at a more general level emphasising relations between
organizations (Benson, 1975; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Stern, 1979; Thorelli, 1986:

V a n de Ven, Walker and Liston, 1979; Whetten, 1981). For the purpose of this study a
slightly modified definition for a network put forward by Aldrich and Whetten (1981:387)
is adopted in that it seems clearly to encapsulate its general nature within an
interorganizational context that also accounts for succeeding lower levels of analysis. It is
"

the totality of all the units connected by a certain type of relationship" [....] and is

constructed by finding the ties between all organizations in a population under study,
regardless of h o w the population is organized into organization-sets or action-sets [or
dyads*]".
Networks have been represented and analysed mostly through graphs or matrices
using techniques such as blockmodel analysis (DiMaggio, 1986), clique detection and
structural equivalence (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). However, it is claimed that such
sociometric representations render networks static and consequently their theoretical
relevance limited and that this relevance is only realised once the processes that led to the
current state are understood (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981). A s Whetten (1981:8) puts it
"this requires an indepth understanding of the contextual factors impinging on the entire
network and the evolutionary processes occurring within the dyadic and action set
components of the network". T w o important points arising from this which are adopted in
this study of I O R are firstly the need for a contextual, process orientation and secondly use
of multiple levels of analysis.
With regard to a contextual process orientation, a number of investigators have
supported Whetten's call for more contextualised studies in interorganizational relations
(Benson, 1982; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Rogers, 1986; Stern, 1979). T o this end, qualitative
research methods have been advocated that include ethnography (Whetten, 1982),
longitudinal case studies (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981), a social action perspective (Rogers,
1986), historical analysis (Zeitz, 1980) and comparative studies (Lammers, 1988;

*this author's modification

Abrahamson and F o m b r u m , 1992). Case study research as proposed by Yin (1989, 1993)
with its real-life context orientation is employed in this study.
With respect to the point of using multiple levels of analysis in IOR, Whetten
(1982) argued that I O R studies have generally focused only on a single level and therefore
have weaker explanatory power. B y utilizing a multiple level framework of analysis, it is
considered that improved understanding will result. For example, the existence of a
mandate (10 context) on the statute books does not mean necessarily the parties affected
will comply. T o elicit this requires analysis of target organizations' behaviour. A useful
four level typology is proposed by Whetten (1982:101):
"(1) the context of an I O network, such as the political, economic, and
demographic characteristics of a community, state, or society;
(2) the characteristics of a network e.g.. centrality, hierarchy, and density;
(3) the macro characteristics of specific interorganizational dyadic linkages; and
(4) the characteristics, of the micro, interpersonal linkages."
The usefulness of the typology is to sensitize research to the interactive two way
relationship between the different levels. For example, corporate members through their
trade association might seek to lobby for economic policy favouring their industry (e.g..
Japanesericegrowers), while government has targeted assistance for others. In this study,
the network as a whole (level 2) is the primary unit of analysis. However, the legalpolitical context (level 1) within which these networks arise will be examined as will
specific dyadic relations (level 2), for example, between employers and rehabilitation
providers.

Bases of Interaction
The final subsection of this general review of interorganizational relations considers
their bases of interaction. In other words, what are the reasons for organizations forming
relations with other organizations? The need to consider I O R formation was discussed

earlier: in order to generate meaningful and relevant I O R theory it is necessary to
understand w h y and h o w the current forms come about. In a comprehensive review of the
I O R literature over a thirty year period, Oliver (1991) identified six critical contingencies
of relationship formation and maintenance. They are necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity,
efficiency, stability and legitimacy. A s a reason for relationship formation, necessity is
where relations are established to meet legal or regulatory requirements. Asymmetry
refers to I O R s motivated by the desire to control other organisations and reluctance to give
up autonomy. The contingency of reciprocity arises in IORs which are established for the
purpose of pursuing c o m m o n or mutually beneficial goals or interests. Efficiency as a
reason for I O R formation occurs w h e n an organization(s) seek to economize on the costs
of transactions. Stability is a critical contingency of relationship formation where
organizations seek to increase predictability and reliability in their dealings with others,
thereby reducing uncertainty. Finally, legitimacy as a basis for I O R formation is where
institutional pressures induce organizations to justify their behaviour or outputs so as to
appear in conformity with prevailing norms, rules, beliefs and expectations.
The above contingencies can be broken d o w n into two broad categories: mandated
and voluntary. The mandated category includes the necessity contingency. Examples of
necessity include State and Federal legislation, associated mandatory instruments, and the
codes of professional bodies. Necessity, therefore, is regarded as the basis of IORs formed
by public regulation. The voluntary category includes the remaining five contingencies.
They are voluntary in the sense that there is no higher authority requirement for
interaction. A major distinction between the mandated and voluntary contingencies is that
of choice: organizations tend to have less discretion in entering into IORs under mandates
than under voluntary conditions. However, as Oliver (1990) suggests, organizations
usually form relations with one another on the basis of multiple contingencies. For
example, "the contingencies of asymmetry and reciprocity will interact w h e n cooperative
relations are formed for the purpose of exerting power over either a third organization or

other members of the organization's task environment" (Oliver, 1990:247). This view is
supported by Schmidt and Kochan (1977) w h o argue that power (asymmetry) and
exchange (reciprocity) are present concurrently in IORs, and that they can serve as mixed
motives where organizations act according to their interests.
The above voluntary contingencies have been analysed in earlier sections of this
chapter. Asymmetry was examined in the review of resource dependence theory which, as
noted earlier, seeks to describe the emergence of power relations between organizations
and h o w this (external) power affects (inter)organizational behaviour. Reciprocity was
considered in the review of organizational ecology and the processes of interorganizational
collaboration, cooperation and coordination. (It is worth noting that implicit within these
processes is the concept of exchange based on the work of Levine and White (1961), and
subsequently refined by C o o k (1977). Cook views exchange relations as voluntary and
mutually beneficial resource transfers between the participating organizations. It is this
distinctive notion of mutual benefit that is embodied within cooperation, collaboration and
to a lesser extent coordination, which m a y or m a y not be a voluntary joint activity).
Efficiency was touched on in the review of competition process where it was noted there is
limited I O R research. Stability as a concept was explored in the analysis of organizational
environments where it was argued that the salient environment in Western Society is Type
IV - the turbulent field (Emery and Trist, 1965). O n these "shaking" grounds was thus
recognised the need for organizations to be aware of and come to terms with one another to
enhance their mutual stability and reduce the uncertainty in their environments. Finally,
the legitimacy contingency was analysed in the discussion of institutional theory.
The above five voluntary contingencies have received far more attention in the
research literature than the mandated (Oliver, 1990). In either case, there has been a
pronounced tendency to focus on voluntary or mandated relations between organizations
rather than on the interaction between or even a comparison of the two kinds of relations.
In addition, little or no attention has been given to h o w the nature of a mandate influences

the relations between organizations. This is rather ironic given that a considerable
proportion of the literature on I O R s is based on work carried out in the public
administration/human service domains (Whetten, 1981), domains which tend to be heavily
circumscribed by public policy and regulation (mandates) and of course, funding. These
gaps in the research literature are worthy of further theoretical and empirical consideration
given that the societies in which w e live are continually and contradictorily asserted to be
under-or over-regulated, both for the good and for the bad. These contradictions have
brought on "an era of regulatory flux" (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992:7), with simultaneous
shifts towards regulation, deregulation and re-regulation. These are consonant with the
turbulent field (Emery and Trist, 1965) as heightened organizational and institutional
interdependence is faced with increasing environmental uncertainty and complexity. With
this view in mind, the second and final part of this chapter will assess the varied nature of
interorganizational mandates and then propose a theoretical process model on mandated
IORs together with propositions for subsequent empirical investigation.

2.6 The Nature of Interorganizational Mandates
In the last twenty years, mandated interorganizational relations have received a
growing amount of attention from a number of researchers (Benson, 1975; Crozier and
Thoenig, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Gray, 1989; Hall, Clark, Giordano, Johnson and
VanRoekel, 1977; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Oliver, 1990; O'Toole, 1988; Schmidt
and Kochan, 1977; Tierney, 1985; Whetten, 1981). Various types of interorganizational
mandates have been examined, including those that establish and drive public regulatory
systems, (Cook, Shortell, Conrad and Morrisey, 1983; Raelin, 1980, 1982; Schwochau,
Feuille and Delaney, 1988), private regulatory systems (Leblebici and Salancik, 1982;
Stern, 1979, 1981) and representative and control systems (Lammers, 1988).
In public regulatory systems, mandated IORs comprise a control agent, a group of
target organizations and third party interests represented by the control agency and through

legislatures and other regulatory bodies. For example, in N e w South Wales, Australia,
occupational heath and safety law that requires employers to consult with unions on
workplace issues such as safety committee formation is administered by the WorkCover
Authority, the control agent. The target organizations are those that comprise the various
industries in the state; third party interests are employees. In private regulatory systems,
the target organizations establishes their o w n control agent to produce and uphold
performance standards, control entry and prevent government intervention. Examples of
private regulatory systems are the N e w South Wales Rugby League, and the United States
National Collegiate Athletic Association (Stern, 1979, 1981). Representative and control
systems are typified by intermediary agencies that influence mandate implementation. A n
example of a representative system is a trade union whose officials receive their mandate
from below (their members) A n example of a control system is the WorkCover Authority
in N e w South Wales, a regulatory agency, which received its mandate from above, the
State government.
In all of the above situations, the mandate is characteristically viewed as a set of
imposed rules, laws or regulations through which the relations between and the behaviour
of the relevant (mandating and mandated) organizations are controlled. A recurrent
argument has been that the interorganizational relations that arise out of such mandates, are
distinct from those that are voluntary in nature (Oliver, 1991). Hall et al (1977:459) claim
that, unlike in voluntaristic circumstances, in legally mandated interorganizational
coordination domain consensus is not an issue. Whetten (1981) implicitly assumes that
under a mandate there is no need for organizations to have a positive attitude to
coordination and that all the relevant partners will be aware of one another through the
explicit prescriptions of the mandate. Yet, in reality the foregoing is often not the case. A s
Crozier and Thoenig (1976) have noted, all interorganizational systems are regulated either
explicitly or implicitly: there are the formal and informal rules of the game as well as the

game of exception, that which arises out of interaction between the formal and the
informal.
Using legal-political mandates (Hall et al, 1977); Raelin, 1980) as the basis for our
discussion w e will argue that the variability of mandates in terms of their efficacy
(Cranston, 1987) will determine the extent to which mandatory and voluntary
contingencies are involved in interorganizational relations. Legal-political mandates have
been selected on the grounds of their pervasiveness and importance in the social, political
and economic affairs of society.
From an interorganizational perspective, the legal-political mandate has been
conceptualized as "an expression of an interorganizational decision shaped .... by an
institutional effort imposed on a set of organizations by the larger society" (Raelin,
1980:58). For the larger part, research into I O R has treated such mandates as single
dimensional constructs that are unpermeated by exchange or power-dependence
contingencies. Although there has been recognition that mandated I O R are unlikely to
exist in pure form (Hall et al, 1977; Oliver, 1990; Raelin, 1980; Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978; Zanko and Williams, 1992), in the sense that I O R circumscribed by mandates will
interact with voluntary contingencies (Oliver, 1990), there has been little research effort
directed at examining the form and nature of these interactions. Indeed, "much
organizational research remains relatively naive about the organizational implications of
the law" (Barney, Edwards and Ringleb, 1992:345).
More particularly, there has been a dearth of systematic attention given to h o w such
mandates vary, and h o w these variations might explain the need for purposefully and
intentionally involving or maintaining voluntary incentives for effective IOR. A s Pfeffer
and Salancik (1978:194) noted "many norms and values governing organizations are only
imperfectly formalized in the legal system". In his study of occupied countries, Lammers
(1988:439) observed that mandates m a y be modified as they pass through intermediary

agencies; for example, a control agent m a y find it a functional necessity to allow those to
be controlled to pursue their o w n interests or even to defend those interests to superiors.
Variation in legal-political mandates is not only limited to the means and manner of
their implementation. In a theoretical examination of organizational response to regulation
in the hospital industry, Cook and her colleagues (1993:195) found pronounced variation
in the intensity of regulation across and even within states which, they postulated, would
affect the level and type of interhospital regulatory response. Four dimensions of
regulatory intensity were identified: scope, restrictiveness, degree of uncertainty and
duration. Scope refers to the extent of "a hospital's behavior [....] constrained by the
regulation". Restrictiveness is "the degree to which the hospital's behavior is constrained
by the regulation". Uncertainty includes "the degree of change in regulatory process", the
lack of regulatory clarity about incentives and the extent of coordination of regulatory
agencies. Duration refers to "the length of time that the regulation has been in
existence...." (Cook et al, 1983:195). In interorganizational terms, Cook at al. propose that
institutional level responses such as mergers and multiunit system involvement are more
likely to occur the more intense the regulation, and only after earlier, less costly
managerial and technical responses have been explored.

Significantly, there is

acknowledgment of interorganizational choice of action which to some degree will depend
on the form of regulation (mandate). There are, however, additional issues to consider in
and beyond the form of mandates, such as complexity and importance. These are
discussed below.

2.7 A Process Model of Mandated Interorganizational Relations
T o appreciate the efficacy of legal-political mandates with respect to IOR, it is
necessary to adopt a systematic processual framework that examines these mandates in
terms of their emergence, legal form, implementation and impact (Cranston, 1987). Such
an approach overcomes the criticism m a d e by Benson (1982) of I O R policy analysis that

there is an absence of concern about the larger societal context and its institutional
arrangements. It does this by examining interorganizational networks embedded within a
legal-political context.

Mandate Emergence
The operation of the mandate will be a function of its emergence (Stern, 1979). If
mandated I O R are preceded by power dependence and/or exchange processes (Cook,
1977; Hall et al, 1977; Raelin, 1980) then it is important to understand h o w these
voluntary interactions shaped the enacted mandate. For example, prior asymmetry
between organizations m a y be reflected in the provisions of the mandate as a consequence
of the more effective lobbying capability of the dominant organization(s). Organizations
m a y support the imposition of regulatory mandates if they believe they will enhance
interorganizational stability, for example, through the imposition of tariff barriers/import
quotas (Aldrich, 1979) or through the restriction of entry of competitors (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). Conversely, organizations m a y combine to defeat or weaken proposed
mandates, for example, by dint of their perceived deleterious effect on regional economic
development. It is also noteworthy that the mandators (government including its
associated regulatory agencies) and the mandated are not discrete interacting systems; as
Olsen (1981) observed ".... governmental agencies and organized interests are seldom
homogeneous units". A corollary is that the interpenetration of the regulators and
regulated m a y lead to the emergence of mandates that reflect the interests of its architects
at the expense of other stakeholders. It is within the emergent context of the mandate that
the regulatory change elements of C o o k et al's (1983) uncertainty dimension would be
located. It follows from the above discussion that the emergence of mandates will in part
be a function of the interaction between the intentions of the legislature and the
voluntaristic intentions of the target organizations. The extent to which the latter are taken

into account will be reflected in the form, implementation and subsequent impact of the
mandate.

Mandate Form
The substantive focus of mandates is truly extensive, covering a vast array of social,
political and economic issues that will tend to vary from state to state, from nation to
nation in terms of the techniques used to secure organizational and interorganizational
compliance. Burstein (1991) refers to these mandates as policy domains: components of
political systems that are established around substantive issues such as old age pensions,
equal employment opportunity, emergency, health, nuclear power and criminal justice.
From an interorganizational perspective, a number of the more significant
techniques by which legal-political mandates are formed include broad statutory standards,
administrative regulation, licensing and governmental exercise of power as a consumer and
source of credit and supply (Cranston, 1987). Broad statutory standards are commonly
those standards that are applied to wide sections of society and penalties are reactively
imposed for subsequent deviation, such as in criminal law. Administrative regulation
tends to be more specific in its application through more direct targeting of particular
groups or organizations, products or processes. Major forms of administrative regulation
include compelled disclosure of information (e.g. standardised contracts between parties to
an agreement), the imposition of detailed standards (e.g. in product safety), and the control
of trade practices. Licensing enacted through registration, certification and licensing
proper is a legal-political form that m a y serve variously to set limits on or confer prior
approval for an activity, or develop or allocate resources. In its role as a consumer and as a
source of credit and supply, government m a y promote compliance with legal aims by
employing instruments such as tax incentives, subsidies, grants and standard contracts
(Cranston, 1987:12-21).

Analysis of the above mandate forms points to a number of issues concerning their
efficacy and the subsequent interorganizational relations that arise. Failure by legislative
drafters to anticipate the law in action, for example, avoidance behaviour by target
organizations through "loopholes", m a y lead to subsequent problems of enforcement.
Mandate form m a y provide the regulatory agency with a significant amount of discretion.
Such discretion or choice in the manner and extent to which the mandate is enforced m a y
lead the agency to create and follow its o w n policy in place of and perhaps counter to that
mandated by the legislature. W i d e discretion m a y also manifest itself in agency
uncertainty about h o w to enforce the mandate which in turn can lead the "regulated"
organizations exercising their o w n discretion concerning compliance. Conversely, narrow
agency discretion m a y limit the regulatory capacity to respond to changes in the mandated
domain.
Uncertainty in mandate form also arises out of its lack of clarity (Cook et al, 1983;
Grabosky and Sutton, 1989; Zald, 1978). Such a lack of clarity m a y arise out of
ambiguous language used to frame mandate provisions (e.g. the use of the term
"reasonable") and through high complexity derived from attempts at legal precision and
certainty.
Intended or unintended impediments to mandate efficacy found in form point not
only to the likelihood, but in m a n y cases, the necessity for mandated interorganizational
relations to draw upon voluntary bases of interaction. Often, organizations will need to
resort to interpretation and assessment of the underlying spirit and intention of mandates in
attempts to implement "fuzzy" provisions (Zanko and Williams, 1992). This extends the
assertion by Leblebici and Salancik (1982:230) that analysis of mandated
interorganizational relations requires an investigation of the working rules, by recognising
that such rules will be comprised of the formal (mandated) and the informal (voluntary).
However, contrary to Leblebici and Salancik, this means that mandated I O R also require

an analysis of the resultant networks, since it cannot be assumed that mandates invariably
define and structure the network nor define the exchange conditions and parties.

Mandate Implementation
Enforcement
T h e efficacy of mandates is also determined by their implementation.
Implementation concerns can be divided into two broad categories: enforcement by the
regulatory agency(ies) and, compliance by the target organizations. With regard to
enforcement, the primary interorganizational relations are considered to be those that arise
between the regulator(s) and the regulated. Such enforcement will be a function of its
design, the nature of the enforcing agency and the enforcement context (Cranston, 1987;
Zald, 1978). Enforcement design refers to the form it should take (namely, whether to
confer responsibility to the executive or an independent regulatory agency), the level of
enforcement discretion in rule-making entrusted to the regulator and the sanctions to be
employed. In terms of efficacy, choice of form, it has been argued, favours the
independent agency in that "the decisions required are m u c h more appropriately arrived at
by the impartial and objective processes available and such bodies using independent
powers of expertise and judgement, and freed from the inevitable political considerations
which govern departmental decision-making" (Wettenhall and Bayne, 1984:81).
However, if such agencies are entrusted with wide enforcement discretion then, apart from
the possible advantages of flexibility in novel enforcement tasks, such discretion m a y
make the agencies more amenable to capture by the regulated (Tomasic, 1985) and to
accusations of flouting mandate certainty, and formal equality and adherence to mandate
purpose (Cranston, 1987). The sanctions available to the regulator m a y be positive
(reward for compliance) or negative (punishment for non-compliance). The greater the
extent to which a sanction and its application potential are perceived by the regulated as
strong, the easier it will be to enforce the mandate.

The nature of the enforcing agency affects the implementation of mandates through
its surveillance patterns, its available resources and the background and predisposition of
its staff (Zald, 1978). Surveillance m a y be reactive (complaint based) or proactive. A n
overemphasis on reactive surveillance m a y lead to an unrepresentative and inappropriate
focus by the regulatory agency on identified organizations at the expense of more
problematic actors against w h o m complaints m a y not have been made. T h e level of
human and financial resources available to an enforcing agency m a y serve as a constraint
on mandate implementation and the extent to which it can interact with its regulated
domain. The background of agency staff and their predisposition to control of the
regulated m a y also affect mandate enforcement in the sense that, as regulators, they m a y
have c o m e from the regulated domain or m a y subsequently seek employment within it and
therefore will limit their enforcement actions so not to undermine or disadvantage their
prior or prospective interests. The greater the extent to which such "capture" exists, the
more likely it is that the regulated will retain choice of freedom of action not only between
themselves but with the regulator.
The enforcement context also affects mandate implementation. The regulatory
agency's task environment m a y influence the agency to adjust its enforcement policies and
practices to align, for example, with political pressures for economic efficiency in place of
originally mandated social equality. The regulated are another major contextual influence
on the regulators (Zald, 1978). Apart from the notion of "capture" mentioned earlier, the
regulated m a y also seek to influence enforcement actions of the regulator either directly,
through persistent promotion of their particular position, or indirectly via the media or
political sources (Cranston, 1987).
Given the above, it cannot be assumed that mandates will be enforced rigorously
and uniformly, and that interorganizational compliance will depend on such formal
exercise of regulatory power. Indeed, research has found that regulatory agencies have
variously adopted an array of enforcement strategies which allows them to be characterised

within a range from particularistic non-enforcement through to rulebook enforcement
(Braithwaite, Walker and Grabosky, 1987:344). The former type is associated with agency
promotion of self-regulation by the target organizations through voluntaristic and
cooperative processes such as negotiation, consultation and compromise. T h e latter
regulatory agency type is more closely aligned with traditional adversarial c o m m a n d and
control that implies less interorganizational choice of action. In an extensive study of
Australian 96 business regulatory agencies, Braithwaite et al (1987) found that the
predominant style of enforcement fell in between the above two types and w a s
characterised as perfunctory, and tentative. These agencies were merely "going through
the motions; they are neither aggressively adversarial nor captured and close to industry:
they do not generally matter so m u c h for it to be worth industry's while to seek either to
capture or corrupt them...." (Braithwaite et al, 1987:340). Such w e a k and indifferent
regulator/regulated relations beg the question as to the source(s) of incentives for
compliance. Proposed attempts to deal with this and related regulatory problems have
centred on responsive regulation strategies characterised by delegation to and fit with
particular industries (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). Ideas suggested include: pyramidical
tit-for-tat regulatory strategies; tripartism through involving key public interest groups in
regulatory design and enforcement;

enforced self-regulation and partial industrial

intervention. Interestingly, the last three of these are built around the implicit notion of the
interorganizational field as the primary regulator.

Compliance
Compliance by target organizations is the second major category to be considered
in the efficacy of mandate implementation. While it is acknowledged that compliance will
in part be a function of the relations between the regulators and the regulated, the primary
interorganizational relations are considered to be those that arise between the regulated,
since mandate compliance is not uniquely dependent on its enforcement. Under these

conditions, mandate compliance is a function of form, mandate importance, and
compliance readiness and capability (Zald, 1978). Organizations will be better placed to
comply with a mandate if its form is clear and explicit. However, as discussed earlier,
often this is not the case. Efforts to achieve legal certainty m a y be traded off for
complexity which in turn leads to compliance uncertainty. Alternatively, compliance
discretion embodied in loosely framed mandate provisions can also lead to compliance
uncertainty as organizations strive to m a k e sense of what specifically is required by the
legislature, such as precisely with w h o m and in what manner mandated interaction should
take place. Frequent changes to mandates m a y also create compliance uncertainty in target
organizations as they seek to unlearn old provisions and learn and adapt to the new.
Mandate importance refers to the perceptions held by the regulated about the
relevance of the mandate to their strategies and operations. In bearing a significant burden
as a consequence of the legislative explosion in the latter half of this century (Walker,
1988), organizations are faced with laws that compete for their attention and limited
resources.

T h e greater the degree to which these laws are perceived by target

organizations as strategically or operationally important, the more likely it is that they will
comply with them. With regard to mandated IOR, differing perceptions of mandate
importance held by the relevant interacting organizations m a y lead to problems with
compliance symptomised by difficulties, if not overt conflict, in coordinating their
activities. A n example of such differences is often found in the mandated industrial
relations between employer organizations and trade unions.
The compliance readiness and capability of the regulated refer to their ideological
readiness, organizational capacity and power to resist regulatory agencies (Zald, 1978:98).
Compliance readiness and capability influence the efficacy of mandate implementation in
that if organizations are not ready, for example, due to a lack of resources, or strongly at
odds with the aims and purpose of the law, then compliance is less likely. In other words,
these organizations will exercise choice whether or not to implement the mandate, or what

extent if they do. In mandated IOR, organizations will probably have differing levels of
readiness which, as in the preceding discussion on importance, m a y be experienced as
suboptimal compliance.

Mandate Impact
Finally, the efficacy of mandates is determined by their impact, or h o w well they
perform in relation to their intent. Raelin (1980:61) refers to the impact of mandated I O R
as network distributional balance which he defines as a comparison of "the actual
distribution of the dimensions of influence and domain in the network with the normative
distribution stipulated by the mandate". Assessing the impact of mandates is problematic
for a number of reasons. A s Cranston (1987:32-33) notes "....[t]he intended effects of
legislation m a y be ambiguous or conflicting; the actual effects m a y prove beneficial to
those w h o initially opposed it; and even partial implementation of goals m a y be a
considerable success in light of the difficulties of achieving them". Furthermore,
interorganizational performance m a y be erroneously perceived as and attributed by
regulators to effective mandate enforcement, when in fact it pre-dated the law. Indeed, it is
quite c o m m o n for legislation to be modelled on voluntaristic (inter)organizational "best"
practice.
Apart from the intended effects of mandate implementation, often unexpected and
unintended effects arise. For example, mandated occupational health and safety m a y
indirectly lead to the creation of regional groups/associations of organizations that seek to
help each other through information and solution sharing. Or, an environmental protection
law that bans logging in certain forests m a y inadvertently bring together adversely affected
communities, unions and employer groups to form a cohesive and more powerful
opposition. Given the potential threats to mandate efficacy that m a y arise at various points
of their origin, formation and implementation, it is hardly surprising there will often be
difficulties in valid and reliable assessment of impact.

In summary, then, it is argued that there is significant variation in the substantive
focus and efficacy of mandates. With respect to focus, this is simply recognition that
differentiated, complex societies spawn different laws to address various sectional needs
for social and economic control. So far as mandate efficacy is concerned, the likely
presence of m a n y potential threats to its achievement suggests that it is inappropriate
universally to assume domain consensus, or that all parties will k n o w of each other's
existence. It is more apposite to consider mandates as partially efficacious and in doing so,
to acknowledge that the resultant I O R will be a function of the interdependence between
voluntary and mandated contingencies. In other words, w e are presented with a concept of
the partial mandate.

2.8 Partially Mandated Interorganizational Relations
Earlier, IORs externally imposed by law were conceptualized as a mandated legalpolitical network where, according to Raelin (1980:58) "the mandate is an expression of an
interorganizational decision shaped by .... an institutional effort imposed on a set of
organizations by the larger society". However, given the preceding discussion it is clear
that in complex bodies of legislation such mandates m a y not be sufficiently explicit in
delineating the means or the participation of the requisite organizations and actors to deal
with the particular problem. This uncertain situation m a y be further exacerbated when the
problem is defined in a manner that renders its complete operationalization impossible, as is
the case with occupational rehabilitation. Under these circumstances the actual I O R will be
a hybrid of those mandated. They will tend to reflect the explicit and implicit aspects of the
network mandate, in addition to any voluntary contingencies that m a y be in force. The
explicit aspects will tend to be derived from specific provisions in the law; the implicit
aspects will tend to be largely a function of the wider framework of the law in which the
I O R mandate is found, perceptions of the underlying spirit and intention of the law, and
operational interpretations of the problem. Therefore, Raelin's concept of a mandated

legal-political network can be modified to take account of the above, whereby the mandate
is an expression of an interorganizational decision shaped by an institutional effort
explicitly and implicitly imposed by the larger society. In this sense, it m a y be regarded as a
partial mandate.
Those parts of the network that are explicitly mandated to coordinate their activities
will contrast with those that are implicitly mandated to participate; they m a y well be
inconsistent or in conflict with one another. Organizations and actors that are implicitly
mandated will be less likely to perceive an obligation to be subjected to the strictures of
interorganizational coordination, since it is not explicitly required. Interorganizational
coordination is defined by Mulford and Rogers (1982:12) as "the process whereby two or
more organizations create and/or use existing decision rules that have been established to
deal collectively with their shared task environment" However, it is more probable in the
case of partial mandates that some form of ad hoc agreement to cooperate with the
coordinated elements of the network will arise on the basis of a voluntary exchange of
resources. Therefore, in partially mandated interorganizational networks it is expected that
the explicitly mandated components will display attributes associated with coordination and
implicitly mandated components will display attributes more closely associated with
cooperation. A s noted earlier (refer to section 2.5), according to Mulford and Rogers
(1982), the processes of cooperation and coordination are quite different according to a
number of criteria, including rules and formality, goals and activities emphasized,
implications for linkages, personal resources, and threat to autonomy.
Based on the above distinction, significant differences between explicitly and
implicitly mandated components are considered likely to exist along at least six dimensions.
These are: formalization (Mulford and Rogers, 1982; Whetten, 1982); density or
connectedness (Whetten 1982; Aldrich and Whetten, 1981; Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers,
1976); intensity (Whetten, 1982); stability (Whetten, 1982); threat to autonomy (Mulford

and Rogers, 1982); and concern for outcomes (Mulford and Rogers, 1982). These are
presented and discussed as formal propositions for empirical testing.
Proposition 1: Formalization refers to the degree to which the parties involved in
the network formally agree upon their I O R (Whetten, 1982). The formalization of relations
in partially mandated legal-political networks will be more highly developed for those
members who are explicitly identified. The process of interorganizational coordination
involves the creation and/or use of existing decision rules. A legal-political mandate
establishes these decision rules through specific provisions in the law, regulations, and
guidelines, and serves as a motivator for the organizations identified to comply with the
mandate requirements. However, w h e n the mandate is partial, those organizations explicitly
identified will tend to formalize their relationships in congruence with the mandate only at
a more localized operational level, through specific policy statements, written contracts, and
procedural statements. The purpose of such formalization will be to assist the organizations
fulfil their legal obligations.
Conversely, those network members implicitly identified in the partial mandate will
be less likely to perceive a legal obligation to subject themselves to the coordination
process, since they are not clearly specified in the decision rules. Consequently, the
motivational strength of the partial mandate will be weaker for these members. This is
likely to manifest itself in their reduced disposition to formalize relations with other
network members.
Proposition 2: Density is concerned with the extent to which network members are
directly linked to one another (Whetten, 1982). In line with the preceding discussion on
formalization, the decision rules for a partially mandated interorganizational network are
likely to be more mutually binding on those organizations that are explicitly identified in
the mandate than those implicitly identified. Legal requirements for the former group to
coordinate their activities will lead to a greater focus on joint outcomes than for the latter
group, where such requirements m a y not exist or where they are vague. Thus, the

interdependence created between the explicitly identified members supports the view that

network density (connectedness) will be higher for them than for those implicitly identif
Those implicitly identified will be more likely to pursue their individual goals and

activities, since for them there is no clear network mandate. Consequently, lower levels o
formalization and a stronger emphasis by members on individual goals and activities
suggest this group will be less densely connected (or dense) in the legal-political
interorganizational network.
Proposition 3: Given that explicitly identified members of partially mandated legalpolitical networks are more likely to have higher network density and more highly
formalized relations than their implicitly identified counterparts, it follows that the
resources (informational and financial) committed by the explicitly mandated members to
their network relationships will also be greater than by those implicitly identified. In

words, the intensity of their relations will be stronger in terms of the amount of resourc
exchanged and the frequency of their exchange (Whetten, 1982).
Proposition 4\ The stability of the relations between network members refers to the
predictability of their IOR over time (Oliver, 1990; Aldrich and Whetten, 1981). Given the
environmental uncertainty associated with meeting the requirements of a complex partial
mandate (e.g. lack of necessary knowledge and expertise) and their commitment to
exchange resources through formalized arrangements, explicitly mandated members are
more likely to seek greater stability in their IOR than are implicitly mandated network
members.
Proposition 5: Explicitly mandated network members will tend to perceive a greater
threat to their autonomy through subordination of certain organizational operations/goals
to superordinate goals embodied in the interorganizational components of the mandate. In
effect, the law acts as a potential brake on explicitly identified members' discretion to
independently without negative consequences.

Proposition 6: Finally, it follows from the discussion on the preceding dimensions
that explicitly mandated network members will demonstrate a higher concern for outcomes
associated with mandate compliance. Motives for such concern include: avoidance of
penalties for failure to comply with the law, securing an efficient return on resources
invested in maintaining and enacting the I O R (commitment of resources also suggests a
heightened sense of ownership in network activities and outcomes), and a desire to ensure
that lost autonomy does not correspond to a loss of control.
The four phase process model outlined for the assessment of interorganizational
mandate efficacy and the six propositions concerning partial mandates are to be tested
empirically using the policy domain of occupational rehabilitation in N e w South Wales,
Australia.

2.9 Summary
The systematic review of the research literature pertaining to interorganizational
problems such as mandated occupational rehabilitation has led to a number of key
observations. First, from an environmental analysis perspective, a community level of
analysis that accounts for both technical and institutional characteristics was considered
appropriate. Second, based on an assessment of four dominant theories of organization environment relations, organizational ecology theory was found to be the most suitable in
terms of its emphasis on structural and processual explanations of network phenomena
embedded in their social context. Third, in noting that this thesis takes I O R research into a
new arena, and that interorganizational coordination and cooperation are the key processes
to be analysed, it w a s also considered necessary to bear in mind that conflict and
competition m a y exist in and influence the aforementioned settings. Fourth, it was argued
that by using multiple levels of analysis, understanding of the study's primary unit, the
network, would be enhanced. Fifth, an examination of the bases of I O R led to the clearly

established need for more research into the nature of mandated interorganizational
relations.
Given the above observations and following a deeper analysis of research into
mandated IOR, a four phase process model of legislative efficacy was proposed that
pointed clearly to the idea that mandates are partially efficacious. Using this concept of
partial mandates, a set of six propositions were set out for testing within the context of the
above model of legal efficacy.

Chapter 3
Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter a conceptual model and a number of propositions were
presented concerning the implications of mandating interorganizational relations through
public policy. This chapter addresses the research design and methodology for empirically
testing this theoretical framework.
A predominantly qualitative approach was followed using case study research as the
methodological basis (Section 3.2). Context based research into interorganizational
relations that draws upon multiple sources of evidence is well served by the case study
method.

A distinguishing feature of this chapter is that it sets out explicitly the

methodological structures, procedures and instruments used to conduct the research. This
is in contrast to a significant amount of qualitative research whose methodology is vague
and therefore, possibly unreliable.
The case study design selected for this research was embedded and multiple case
(Section 3.3). Embeddedness refers to the notion that the primary unit of analysis, the
interorganizational occupational rehabilitation network, is examined and explained in terms
of the sub-units of which it is comprised and the legal-political context of which it is a part.
T w o cases were selected for this study: the private sector, heavy manufacturing domain,
and the public sector, tertiary education domain. Selection of two diverse functional fields
permitted comparison across cases and a preliminary indication of the theory's external
validity. T h e two cases were bounded by a number of criteria: areal, employer size,
rehabilitation case sampling. All key constructs were operationally defined.
Following a pilot study (Section 3.4), the main empirical research employed a wide
array of data collection sources: documentation, interviews, participant observation,
archival records and physical artifacts (Section 3.5). The first two of these were the

principal sources. The advantage of multiple sources of evidence were scope for
triangulation and strengthened construct validity. Potential biases associated with entering
a network level field study were discussed. Informant selection and the issues surrounding
confidentiality in this research were also outlined.
Multiple sources of data were submitted to numerous analytic strategies and
techniques (Section 3.6). The three overarching analytic strategies used in guiding the
specific techniques were a reliance on the theoretical model, development of a processual
case description and following a three stage comparative analysis framework.

The

techniques that served to unfold the cases and assess them in relation to the theory were
chronology, content analysis, pattern making, triangulation, displays and network analysis.
These were examined and discussed in relation to the relevant stages of the whole case.

3.2 General Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative approach based on Yin's (1989, 1993) case study
research methodology. There are two sets of reasons for using qualitative methodology: a
research gap (or opportunity) in the empirical literature and, more importantly, the
methodological requirements of the theory of partially mandated interorganizational
relations First, the research gap in the empirical literature is based on a consistent call by a
number of researchers for IORs to be analysed in their context, with a focus on processes,
and taking historical development into account. In other words, embedded IORs and I O R
processes have been neglected. It would seem that this neglect is not so m u c h a function of
the "soft" nature of qualitative research;

rather, it is more the result of dominant

quantitative paradigms in organizational research.
Consequently, Rogers (1986) advocates a social action perspective in
interorganizational network analysis. This entails studying the network in its institutional
context with rich descriptions and explanations unique to the particular setting. This is
consistent with Benson's (1982), Galaskiewicz's (1985), and Whetten's (1982)

recommendations for contextualization of interorganizational relations. Stern (1979:264-5)
argues that application of network analysis to a context such as regulatory activity could
lead to an improved interorganizational model of regulation. H e further contends that over
and above measurable determinants of network structure it is necessary to assess I O R
processes, political interests, historical development and environment. From a regulation
point of view, this means focusing on the interaction of target organizations as well as
relationships between target organizations and control agents.
Context based I O R research that addresses processes (Whetten, 1981), examines
actors' motives and the working rules under which they operate (Galaskiewicz, 1985;
Leblebici and Salancik, 1982) and accounts for the importance of history in I O R
development (Zeitz, 1980) is best served using a qualitative methodology. Such an
approach permits more readily than quantitative methods analysis of detailed phenomena as
well as exploration of problems about which little is known (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
The second and more important set of reasons for adopting a qualitative
methodology is due to the nature of the research problem and the associated theoretical
model. The concept of partially mandated interorganizational relations is derived through a
systematic process model of legal-political efficacy comprised of four phases: emergence,
form, implementation and impact It involves examination of mandatory and voluntary
phenomena that take place within an emergent legal-political context. This includes
determination and assessment of the structures and processes that occur in the collective,
organizational ecology of mandated occupational rehabilitation. Qualitative methods are
well suited to the examination of such organizational problems embedded in their context
(Gummesson, 1991; Strauss, 1987; Yin, 1989). Further, to test this model and its
propositions involves drawing upon multiple sources of evidence such as legislation, case
law, interviews, video films, annual reports, participant observation. These are most readily
analysed using qualitative techniques.

While it is acknowledged that there are a number of qualitative methods such as
grounded theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and
Corbin, 1990), ethnography (Fetterman, 1989; V a n Maanen, 1988), action research
(Rapoport, 1970), semiotics and hermeneutics (Kirk and Miller, 1986), case study research
(Yin, 1989) is the methodology employed in this particular study. Yin's approach to case
study research falls within the framework of the scientific method in that it entails the
development of propositions (hypotheses), the collection and analysis of empirical data and
the development of conclusions based on the analysis. According to Yin (1989:23) a case
study is....
"an empirical inquiry that:
•

investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when

•

the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in
which

•

multiple sources of evidence are used."

The study of partially mandated occupational rehabilitation networks meets the criteria
embodied in the above definition. Legal-political mandates are currently the subject of
much research and discussion by policy and legal scholars (Ayres and-Braithwaite, 1992).
Interorganizational networks are also currently receiving significant research attention
(Powell, 1990). The boundaries between the primary unit of analysis (the occupational
rehabilitation network) and the regulatory context are blurred. For example, the regulatory
agency can be viewed as both part of the legal-political context as well as the occupational
rehabilitation networks that arise. Equally, other organizations in the network m a y be part
of an emergent legal-political context through, for example, their representation by
professional and trade associations on policy and law review committees. Finally, as
mentioned earlier, the nature of the theoretical model dictates that multiple sources of
evidence are used.

3.3

Case Study Design
The case study design sets out the analytic framework, related research aims and

methods used in the study following modifications made as a result of the pilot study (refer
to the next section 3.4). The above are derived from the conceptual model and theoretical
propositions given in Chapter 2. Case selection criteria, the key unit of analysis and
operationalization of concepts are also discussed.

Emergence of Mandated Occupational Rehabilitation
There are two main aims in determining the emergence of mandated occupational
rehabilitation. These are:
(i)

to establish and examine the historical environmental context within which
mandated occupational rehabilitation has emerged in N e w South Wales from social,
political and economic perspectives. This includes an analysis of the emergence of
the occupational rehabilitation mandate in interorganizational terms, for example,
the interaction between the legislature and key interest groups.

(ii)

to identify the patterns, frequency and the nature of changes to the occupational
rehabilitation mandate that have occurred prior to and in the five years following the
promulgation of the N e w South Wales Workers' Compensation Act 1987 (source of
the mandate). This is to include associated structural and procedural changes, for
example, to the WorkCover Authority (enforcing agency) and rehabilitation
guidelines.

The methods used in establishing and assessment of mandate emergence are:
•

archival analysis at the WorkCover Authority (for example, legislative reform
papers; position papers submitted by key groups interested in workers'
compensation and rehabilitation reform such as employers, unions medical and
legal professions. WorkCover Authority annual reports; press releases).

•

analysis of other significant federal and state government inquiries into
workers' compensation and occupational rehabilitation.

•

interviews with key informants involved with relevant legislative change.

Form of the Occupational Rehabilitation Mandate
The aims in examining mandate form are:
(i)

to analyse the form and content of the legislation, regulations and guidelines in order
to determine:
•

the explicitly mandated organizations and their respective duties/obligations;
and, de facto, those organizations involved directly in occupational
rehabilitation w h o are not explicitly mandated;

•

the level of regulatory agency and target organizations' discretion embodied
within mandate provisions;

(ii)

•

mandate clarity and complexity; and

•

potential "loopholes" and subsequent enforcement problems.
to m a k e an initial assessment of the extent to which mandate emergence has
influenced mandate formL

^ ^

The method used to analysis mandate form is content analysis of legislation,
regulations and associated guidelines (to be compared subsequently with perceptual data
on mandate form derived from informants' interviews and documents).

Implementation of the Occupational Rehabilitation Mandate
There are two major categories of implementation: enforcement and compliance.

Mandate Enforcement
With regard to mandate enforcement the aims are:
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(i)

to establish and assess the following factors that are considered to influence the
efficacy of agency (WorkCover) enforcement:
•

enforcement strategy and design;

•

nature of the agency; and

•

enforcement context.

(ii) to examine and compare the interorganizational relations between the regulatory
agency (WorkCover Authority) and the target elements (explicitly and implicitly
mandated organizations) in each case* that have developed over the five years
ending June 30, 1992.
*Note: two cases are examined using a Type 4 design (Yin, 1989): multiple case
and embedded. Case structure and selection criteria are discussed in full towards
the end of this subsection.
T h e methods used for data collection and analysis include semi-structured
interviews with the aid of guiding questions, content analysis of documents, reports
and correspondence, and comparison between cases.

Mandate Compliance
With respect to mandate compliance, the main aims are:
(i)

to establish, assess and compare the occupational rehabilitation network relations
between the target elements (explicitly and implicitly mandated organizations) in
and between the cases that have developed in the five years ending 30 June, 1992.

(ii)

to determine if there are significant differences between explicitly and implicitly
mandated organizations in and between the cases. T o assess, in particular, if there
are significant differences between the explicitly and implicitly mandated
organizations in terms of the following variables:

•

network definition;

•

perceptions of mandate form;

•

importance of mandated activity;

•

readiness and capability;
and the following dimensions contained in the theoretical propositions:

•

formalization;

•

network density;

•

intensity;

•

stability;

•

threat to autonomy: and

•

concern for outcomes.

Data collection and analysis methods include semi-structured interviews with
informants, participant observation over a four year period, content analysis of documents,
reports and correspondence.

The Cases
According to Yin's (1989) typology of basic case study design types, a Type 4 case
design was used in this study. A Type 4 case design is one which has multiple cases and is
embedded. In this project two cases were used. They are embedded in Yin's (1989:49-50)
sense, that is, they involve more than one unit of analysis.
The rationale for using a multiple case design is based on the intention to produce
evidence that is more compelling and robust than the single case (Yin, 1989). Multiple
cases also provide the opportunity for comparison not just between organizations in a case
but also between cases. They also permit the adoption of a literal replication logic (Yin
1989:53) to test if each case predicts similar results and so broaden the analytic
generalization. This is in line with Lammers' (1988) argument for the use of comparative
studies in understanding complex interorganizational control systems.

The cases in this particular study are embedded because they involve three units of
analysis: the organization, the interorganizational network and the regulatory context.
Although the primary unit of analysis is the network, the actions and outcomes that occur
at this level can only be determined and understood through establishing what takes place
at the organizational level (in a sense from an organization set perspective) which in turn is
influenced by regulatory (institutional) pressures to a greater or lesser extent (Whetten,
1982).
The two cases selected are:
Case 1:

Case 2:

•

private sector domain

•

heavy manufacturing industry

•

relatively hazardous work environment

•

self-insured workers' compensation.

•

public sector domain

•

tertiary education industry

•

relatively safe work environment

•

externally insured workers' compensation.

A s can be seen, the above cases differ in a number of important respects: general
economic sector, industry type, occupational health and safety profile and the locus of
control over workers' compensation insurance. The purpose in selecting two diverse
functional fields is to assess if the theoretical propositions hold, that is, if they are
replicated. If so, then the theory will have higher external validity than if only one case
had been employed.
The cases are also bounded by a number of c o m m o n conditions:
•

excluding the central offices of regulatory agency (WorkCover Authority),
both domains are to be located in the Illawarra Region of N e w South Wales.
This areal criterion (Scott, 1992) takes into account the need to set
geographic boundaries on the study due to resource and time constraints. In

addition, the Illawarra Region is one of the major social and economic areas
in Australia. The author also resides in the Illawarra and is relatively
familiar with region and the domains under study.
one major employer (> 1,000 workers) to be selected from each domain.
The employer organization is the source of the injured employees to be
rehabilitated. Large organizations were selected in order to ensure access to
a cross-section of rehabilitation cases.
the employer organization, in conjunction with the insurer, to provide details
of three lost-time injuries that are workers' compensation claims and that
have involved occupational rehabilitation. The three cases are representative
of those involving a rehabilitation provider in that they included:
•

a simple, straightforward case,

•

a difficult, yet successful case,

•

a difficult and contested (not necessarily litigated) case.

using the employer's and insurer's claims management and rehabilitation
files (computer and hard copy) and whilst maintaining the employee's
anonymity, all organizations involved in each injury were identified and
listed. For reasons of confidentiality the lists given at Appendix 8 identify
only the number and titles of the professions and businesses involved in the
cases. A n additional level of confidentiality was built into the case design by
aggregating the organizations involved into a single list. Actual names are
not given.

T h e section on data collection deals with the issue of

confidentiality in more detail.
each rehabilitation case must have involved at least one doctor and one
rehabilitation provider organization so as to provide an interorganizational
network involving implicitly and explicitly mandated organizations that goes
beyond medical treatment.

Such cases (and networks) are a

disproportionately major workers compensation cost (WorkCover Review
Committee, 1989).
•

as with the overall study, the two main cases are to concern networks that
arise within the five year period following the promulgation of the N e w
South Wales Workers Compensation Act, 1987: 1 July 1987 to 30 June,
1992.

•

the occupational rehabilitation cases are to relate to workplace injury/illness
sustained during the first five years of the Workers' Compensation Act,
1987.

Impact of the Occupational Rehabilitation Mandate
With regard to the impact of the mandate, the aims are to determine h o w well the
mandate has performed in relation to its intent in the five years ending 30th June, 1992:
•

at a policy (state) level, and

•

at the operational (network) case study levels.

Methods used in data collection and subsequent analysis are informants' perceptions
derived from interviews, and objective performance data m a d e available from reports and
records in the enforcement agency and the target organizations.

Operationalization of Research Concepts
This subsection discusses the operational measures used for the concepts under
study. In qualitative research, operationalization of variables is not so m u c h concerned
with calibration of measures for quantitative purposes: the extent to which something is
present. Rather it is intended to assist in achieving reliable and valid qualitative
observations that identify the presence or absence of phenomena (Kirk and Miller, 1986).
The operational statements for concepts given below are designed to enhance reliability in
two ways. Firstly, they form part of the explicit design and procedures of this study.

Second, they enhance what Kirk and Miller (1986:42) refer to as "synchronic reliability"....
"the similarity of observations with the same time period". This is achieved through
comparison of different sources of data tapping the same concept. The statements are also
designed to assure substantial construct validity through triangulation of methods
wherever possible.
The operational statements for the concepts are as follows:

Partial Mandate
Definition:

A n expression of an interorganizational decision shaped by an institutional
effort explicitly and implicitly imposed by the larger society.

Operations: Explicit components include specific provisions in the law, regulations and
associated guidelines formalizing the interorganizational decision.
Implicit components include:
•

wider framework of the law in which the interorganizational mandate
is found. For example, actors involved in I O R m a y not be referred to
in the specific mandate provisions but are referred to elsewhere in the
law for other reasons.

•

spirit and intention of the law. The aims of the mandate m a y lead to
participation by actors not explicitly mentioned in the provisions e.g.
medical specialists.

•

operational interpretations of the problem which the mandate seeks
to address. A n idealised, highly complex or vague definition of a
problem contained within a mandate will lead to network members
forming their o w n operational version. This in turn will guide their
actions and the type of relations they establish in the network.

Network
".... the totality of all the units connected by a certain relationship [....] and is

Definition:

constructed by finding the ties between all organizations in a population
under study, regardless of h o w the population is organized into organizationsets or action sets or dyads" (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981:387).
Operations:

All the organizations identified to be involved in each case, using the
employer's and insurer's workers' compensation claims management and
rehabilitation files.

Interorganizational Coordination
Definition:

"The process whereby two or more organizations create and/or use existing
decision rules that have been established to deal collectively with their
shared task environment" (Mulford and Rogers, 1982:12).

Operations:

Confirmation of the six theoretical propositions discussed in Chapter 2.

Interorganizational Cooperation
Definition:

"The presence of deliberate relations between otherwise autonomous
organizations for the joint accomplishment of individual operating goals"
(Shermerhorn, 1975:847).

Operations:

Confirmation of the six theoretical propositions outlined in Chapter 2.

Formalization
Definition:

The extent to which a relationship is formally agreed upon by the parties
involved (Whetten, 1982).

Operations:

Policy statements singly or jointly endorsed by parties involved.
Written contracts or exchange of letters between the parties involved.

Procedural statements specifying involvement between the parties involved.

Density (or Connectedness)
Definition:

The extent to which members of a network are directly linked to one another
(Whetten, 1982).

Operations: Informants' statements about the existence of linkages between their
organization and others identified in the case study.

Intensity
Definition:

The extent of organizations' resources committed to the relationship
(Whetten, 1982).

Operations: A m o u n t and frequency of written and oral information exchange reported by
informants; and financial transactions among organizations.

Stability
The extent to which relations between organizations within each case remain

Definition:

the same over the five years ending 30 June, 1992.
Operations: Informants' reported experiences of change in relations with other
organizations.
Informants' reports on multiplicity (redundancy) of relations with other
organizations.

Threat to Autonomy
Definition and
Operations: The extent to which network members report a loss or risk of loss of selfgovernance (independence) in their relations with other organizations in the
network.

Concern for Outcomes
Definition and
Operations:

The extent to which network members express concern for the outcomes of
network activities.

Enforcement Design
Definition and
Operations:

Documentary evidence and informants' perceptions of the form of
enforcement, the level of enforcement discretion in rule-making and the
reward/punishment sanctions employed by the regulatory agency
(WorkCover) in the five years to end June, 1992.

Nature of the Agency (WorkCover Authority)
Definition and
Operations:

Documentary evidence and informants' perceptions of agency surveillance
patterns, staff and finances used, and educational and work experience of
agency staff over the five years ending 30 June, 1992.

Enforcement Context
Definition and
Operations:

Documentary evidence and informants' perceptions of the influence on the
regulatory agency of those being regulated and the significant political,
social and economic pressures during the five years ending 30 June, 1992.

The above operational definitions form the basis of the guiding questionnaires given
at Appendices 1-6 inclusive.

3.4

Pilot Study
A pilot case study was undertaken prior to the main field study. The pilot was

designed and conducted to assess substantive and methodological issues at the case
(domain, interorganizational network) level. The pilot was not conducted on the regulatory
context, since this context was to be part of the main study. A number of criteria were used
in the selection of the pilot case. First, it was broadly representative of the case structures
to be used in the main study:
•

public sector domain

•

local government industry

•

moderately hazardous work environment

•

self-insured workers' compensation

•

employer organization > 1,000 workers

•

based in the Illawarra Region.

Second, one of the author's former students, a senior executive in the employer
organization offered access to the organization for research purposes. Third, geographic
proximity of network organizations to the author's place of work kept time travelling to a
reasonable level.
The pilot case study sought to address the following specific field issues: logical
ordering of entry procedures, understandability and feasibility of the guiding questions, and
interview format. These were examined over a period of two months ending in March,
1993, involving 12 interviews with 7 individuals from four organizations (see Table 3.1).

Organization

Informant
Position

Employer Human Resource Manager
Employee Services Coordinator
Safety Officer
Workers' Compensation Officer
Trade Union

Regional Official

Medical Practice

General Practitioner (Proprietor)

Rehabilitation Provider

Occupational Physician (Director)

Table 3.1 Informants Used in Pilot Study
In addition, documentary evidence such as rehabilitation policies and procedures, injury
reporting proformas, service and quality statements were gathered.
The pilot study assisted in the refinement of a number of procedures and important
modification to the guiding questionnaire. With regard to entry, it confirmed the
appropriateness of initially approaching the employer organization and then the insurer to
participate in the study. In this particular case, employer and insurer were one and the
same. Without their agreement to participate essential details on other organizations'
involvement would not have been possible, since the fullest rehabilitation records are
generally with the employer and insurer. The logic of providing informants with a verbal
presentation on the nature and aims of the study, then a copy of the guiding questionnaire
together with a written project outline was also confirmed as appropriate. This study is
relatively complex in terms of its interorganizational network focus; to address any early
concerns prior to asking questions and embarking on other data searches was clearly
necessary.
Refinements to the data collection procedures centred mainly on concerns about
confidentiality. A number of the informants were not willing to discuss actual named

cases for reasons of privacy, law and professional ethics. For this reason, the
questionnaires and the rehabilitation case sampling frame were modified to ensure this
confidentiality. (Confidentiality is discussed in more detail in the section on data
collection). O n c e confidentiality w a s assured, use of a tape recorder for interview
recording was generally unproblematic.
The major alteration to the case design arose through examination and use of a
guiding questionnaire designed for use in semi-structured interviews with compliance
informants (given in Appendices 1, 2, 4, and 5). At the time of the pilot it was intended to
sample randomly rehabilitation cases from compensable lost time injuries that occurred
over a five year period. In discussions with the workers' compensation officer w h o
administered the relevant insurance arrangements, to do this would be excessive in terms of
time it would take: ...."it would be a m a m m o t h task". Computer data bases did not permit
analysis of the 1,200 files (lost-time workers' compensation claims). This problem gave
rise to the agreed alternative of a structured sample representing three different
occupational rehabilitation types, as discussed in Section 3. It was agreed by the
employer/insurer (and subsequently confirmed in the main study) that the above alternative
was both feasible from a data retrieval perspective and representative of occupational
rehabilitation cases involving a rehabilitation provider.
Other significant changes m a d e to the study design as a consequence of the pilot
included the addition of a question on the nature of dealings between organizations and the
direction of referral patterns between them (Appendices 1 and 4, question 14). Finally,
given that the duration of semi-structured interviews undertaken varied quite markedly
between informants (from 45 minutes to 2 1/2 hours) it was considered necessary to advise
prospective informants of a m i n i m u m expected duration prior to securing an interview.

3.5

Data Collection

This section examines the following aspects of data collection: data sources,
entering the field, informant selection, confidentiality and those evidentiary features

enhance the study's validity and reliability. A characteristic of case study methodolog
the scope to use a variety of sources of evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this particular
study five principal sources of evidence were used: documentation, archival records,

interviews, participant observation and physical artifacts. These sources were used in t
analytic framework as shown in Table 3.2 (refer also to Section 3.3 for conceptual aims
and methods). Each of the methods used is discussed below.

Documentation
Documentation was a major source of evidence in all steps of the empirical study.
The principal forms this information took include: green papers, government enquiries,

case files, annual reports, newsletters, press releases, policies and procedures, profor
Analytic
Category

Source
of Evidence

Mandate Emergence

Documentation
Archival Records
Interviews

Mandate Form Documentation
Physical Artifacts
Mandate Implementation:
Enforcement

Documentation
Archival Records
Interviews
Physical Artifacts

Compliance Documentation
Interviews
Participant-Observation
Mandate Impact Documentation
Interviews
Archival Records
Table 3.2 Sources of Evidence in Analytic F r a m e w o r k

independent evaluation reports, m e m o s , minutes of meetings, corporate brochures and
associated public relations literature. These documents were accessed primarily through
public and private libraries and as a consequence of direct personal contact with
informants. Apart from its value as a source of information in itself, documentation also
served as a useful means of corroborating evidence gathered from other sources (including
other documents) and vice versa. However, there were occasions when documentation and
other evidentiary sources, such as interviews, did not converge (triangulate) even though
they were supposed to be tapping the same concept or relation. For example, a number of
doctors believed they had a legal responsibility under the workers' compensation legislation
to rehabilitate injured workers. The law (in this sense, the document) is silent on this
matter. Such disconfirmation of expected reliability leads the researcher to explore "....
h o w multiple, but s o m e h o w different, qualitative measurements might be true" (Kirk and
Miller, 1986:42). These explorations are undertaken in the case presented in the following
four chapters.

Archival Records
Archival records were not a major source of evidence in this study. They
were accessed primarily from a private library and workers' compensation insurers. Their
form included statistical records of workers' compensation and occupational rehabilitation
performance indicators, and computerised lists of accounts held by the insurer in relation to
each of the occupational rehabilitation cases. In this latter instance, the author did not have
direct access to the lists; they were analysed by an informant from the employer
organization and the insurer in the presence of the author to determine the organizations to
w h o m payments had been m a d e for work billed. These lists triangulated the details and
papers held on the case files (also not sighted directly by the author). The potential value
of these accounts paid lists w a s recognised due to the author's pre-understanding
(Gummesson, 1991) of occupational rehabilitation through five years' direct work

experience m this field together with several years of regular contact with actors involved
in this activity, such as health professions, managers, medical practitioners, lawyers, trade
unions and injured workers.

Interviews
Together with documentation, semi-structured interviews were the major
source of data collection. Appendix 8 shows the number of organizations, informants and
interviews held by case. Excluding the pilot, a total of 51 organizations participated in this
study with 73 informants giving their time for 76 interviews. O f these interviews, two
were conducted by telephone due to the informants' other commitments. The remainder
were face-to-face interviews held at times and places of the informant's choosing. These
interviews were semi-structured or as Fetterman (1989:48) puts it, these are ".... verbal
approximations of a questionnaire with explicit research goals". In this study, guiding
questionnaires were used. Appendices 1-6 inclusive set out the questionnaires used in
interviews with informants. Questionnaires in Appendices 1-3 inclusive were for the
researcher's (the author's) use. The questions posed are the same as those contained in
Appendices 4-6 inclusive which were given to informants (respondents) at the interview.
The differences between the two groups of questionnaires are:
•

the researcher's questionnaire contains prompts to assist in interviewing;

•

the researcher's questionnaire also identifies the theoretical constructs on
which questions seek to elicit data.

It was considered appropriate not to overburden respondents with too m u c h paper.
In fact, during interviews informants only occasionally referred to their copy of the
questions. All participating informants were asked the questions contained in Appendices 4
and 5: these relate to mandate compliance and impact. The questionnaire at Appendix 6
concerns mandate enforcement and w a s used only with informants from the regulatory
agency, WorkCover.

The interviews were semi-structured in that the guiding questionnaires are m a d e up
of predominantly open-ended questions. The intention was to allow informants to
elaborate on their responses, not only to describe but also explain. The interviews lasted
approximately 1 1/2 hours, although the range was from 10 minutes through to 2 1/2 hours.
Not surprisingly, those informants w h o perceived their involvement in occupational
rehabilitation as peripheral were generally the least disposed to give up their time for
interview. There were only three interviews ( 4 % of total) that lasted less than 1/2 hour.
Consequently, there was opportunity to explore the questions in some depth. The largest
proportion of interviews were conducted with a single informant, although there were some
instances where the participating informant elected to have a colleague present. There
were six occasions ( 1 2 % of all participating organizations) when interviews were held with
two persons in attendance. The reasons put forward by the informants for having two
persons present were: distinct and yet overlapping responsibilities in the problem domain,
shortness of tenure (ie. less than 5 years) in the organization. Since access to these
organizations might otherwise have been foreclosed and given that the reasons offered
were improblematic in terms of likely biases in response, their data have been retained in
the study.
T w o methods of recording the responses to the interview were employed: tape
recording and written note taking. Note taking was used in all interviews, regardless of
whether a cassette tape recorder was used. Certain parts of the interview, namely
identification of organizations with w h o m the informant had dealings (Appendices 1 and 4,
questions 13 and 15) were more easily noted by hand on a list of named organizations in
each case. Interviews with informants from 30 of the participating organizations ( 6 0 %
were recorded with a Sony T C M 1000A Cassette- Corder. This is a compact and relatively
unobtrusive piece of equipment; it did not appear to inhibit informants' responses. It was
made clear to informants w h o chose to have their interview taped that their responses
would be treated as confidential (most requested this) and that, if they wished, the machine

would be stopped at any point. F e w informants availed themselves of this; then only when
some libellous accusations against individuals in the organizations were to be made.
Informants were under no compulsion to have interviews taped; the choice was theirs. Not
all informants were given the choice of having their interview taped. There are a number
of reasons. First, some respondents spoke very quietly and some with a very thick accent.
Recording some of these voices and then subsequently transcribing them proved
problematic early in the study. Decisions to offer informants an option were at the
researcher's discretion. Second, some informants chose to be interviewed in locations such
as by a beach or across a shop counter that did not lend themselves for recording. Third,
the researcher's judgement informed other circumstances for not offering the tape as an
option, such as informants w h o claimed to be in a hurry (but often were not). Where
interviews were not taped, the main notes taken by the researcher were dictated into the
tape machine as soon as possible after the interview. T w o advantages accrued from this
approach. First, written notes were enhanced by the researcher's recall of the interview.
Second, dictated notes could be transcribed in the same manner as for the taped interviews,
thus providing for the same format, computer disk storage and retrieval. These similarities
facilitated setting up a systematic interview data base for subsequent data coding, retrieval
and analysis using the N U D I S T (Non-numerical, Data Indexing, Searching and Theorizing)
qualitative analysis computer software.

Participant Observation
A fourth method of data collection used in this study was participant observation.
The author was an active m e m b e r of an occupational health and safety committee at the
employer organization in Case 2 (tertiary education) from 1988 through to and beyond the
period under study - the five years to end June, 1992. H e was also a founding and active
member of the Rehabilitation Co-ordinators' Association of the South Coast and Tablelands
from December 1988 through to and beyond the study time frame. Meetings were held

monthly and bi-monthly respectively. There were a number of research purposes served
by attending these meetings.

First, they imbued the author with additional and

contemporaneous theoretical sensitivity. Theoretical sensitivity is defined by Straus and
Corbin (1990:46) as ".... the ability to recognise what is important in data and to give it
meaning". For example, regular attendance at and participation in the occupational health
and safety meetings provided insight into the significance of occupational rehabilitation
over time in relation to other occupational health and safety matters in the employer
organization in Case 2. With the Rehabilitation Coordinators' Association, attendance
provided the author with the opportunity to listen to and discuss the difficulties and
challenges encountered by a number of coordinators in discharging their responsibilities,
and meet with other rehabilitation experts w h o m a d e presentations from time to time, and
to m a k e contact with all of these various practitioners. This last point was particularly
useful in securing access to field sites. Second, participation in the Rehabilitation
Coordinators' Association provided insight into h o w an interorganizational organization
forms, takes direction and maintains itself. Third, participation in the above groups
provided the author with copies of their minutes which were useful in document analysis.

Physical Artifacts
The fifth and final source of evidence was physical artifacts. This category was
somewhat limited in its applicability for this study. Nevertheless, the artifacts were two
videos produced for the WorkCover Authority and designed to facilitate understanding
rehabilitation processes, roles of the people involved and the importance of team efforts.

Entering the Field
Entry warrants consideration as part of the data collection methodology in two
respects:

entry into the network and entry into organizations.

Entering an

interorganizational network in a qualitative study as an individual investigator inevitably

means entering at one point in the network (this need not be the case for a research team
which might enter a field simultaneously at a number of different points). Choice of the
initial entry organization m a y lead to a supposition of bias by following an organization-set
perspective in analysis through implicit conferral of focal organization status on the initial
entry organization. Thus, research findings, and interpretations and conclusions m a y be
misleading through this subtle shift in the unit of analysis. T o overcome this problem and
its attendant dangers requires:
(i)

an awareness by the researcher of possibility of such bias;

(ii)

explication of the initial entry criteria, including their justification for the network
study. For example, a primary source of information about the network, geographic
proximity, ease of access;

(iii)

adherence to clearly delineated network analysis procedures.

In this particular study, the first above point is obviated. With regard to the second, as
mentioned earlier in discussion of the pilot study, the initial point of entry at the domain
level w a s the employer organization, and then the insurer. This w a s because the fullest
rehabilitation records tend to be with the employer; and without that organization's
agreement to participate a network study of this nature would be futile T h e third point,
delineation of analysis procedures is dealt with in Section 3.6.
Entry into organizations is concerned with the steps taken to gain access to data.
Apart from participant observation, the author gained entry into organizations by following
the procedure set out in Table 3.3:

•

Using the lists generated through examination of the rehabilitation
cases, and relevant telephone directories, contact key informants by
telephone.

•

At this time, provide a brief verbal outline of the study and then either
arrange to meet at informant's preferred time and location for further
presentation, interview and other data collection or send cover letter
together with a copy of the project outline and the relevant guiding
questionnaires (refer to Appendices 7, 1 and 2 respectively).

•

Meet with informant, provide a copy of the abovementioned project
outline and questionnaires, m a k e a more detailed presentation of
study, address any questions or concerns the informant m a y have (for
example, confidentiality and benefits) and conduct interview as well
as gathering any documentary evidence..

Table 3.3 Procedure Used for Gaining Entry into Organizations
Informant Selection
Informants were selected according to two sets of criteria: one for the regulatory
agency and the other for the case studies. Informants from the regulatory agency,
WorkCover Authority, were chosen on the basis of their direct involvement in the
emergence, implementation, or assessment of the impact of the occupational rehabilitation
mandate. Consequently, eight informants were interviewed whose roles ranged from
overall managerial responsibility for occupational rehabilitation services at a head office
(state) level through to regional advisory services covering a defined territory which
includes the Illawarra region. The advantage of having multiple informants is that they
allow for reliability checks of data across different informants and thus avoid the potential
problems associated with relying on a single informant making judgements on an
organization and network wide phenomenon (Kumar, Stern and Anderson, 1993).
Informants in the two cases were selected on the basis of the lists generated from
the occupational rehabilitation files and records, which identified the organizations and the

names of the persons within those organizations directly involved in some form of service
delivery. So far as the cases are concerned, the majority of organizations ( 7 2 % of the total
w h o participated) were accessed through a single informant. This was wholly appropriate
given that this was the n a m e d person in the rehabilitation cases, w h o also was the
proprietor/ owner of the practice or business. Therefore, these individuals would be
qualified to speak for their organizations. Notwithstanding the above, there were 13
organizations in the cases ( 2 6 % of total participation) where two or more informants were
interviewed. Apart from those instances where informants sought to have a colleague in
attendance at an interview (8 organizations), the remainder tended to be the larger more
complex organizations such as the employer organizations (more than 1,000 employees)
and government agencies.

Confidentiality
Another important issue to be considered under data collection is that of
confidentiality. This research study sought information that participating organizations in
the cases almost unanimously considered to be confidential. The pilot study confirmed the
author's belief that having access to the case details of n a m e d injured workers was
impractical.

This belief w a s based on prior professional experience, participant

observation at the Rehabilitation Coordinators' Association meetings and contact with
various occupational health professionals (former students). In effect, doctors are most
reluctant to disclose specific details about their patients, employers about their employees,
unions about their members, health professionals about their clients, and insurers about
their legal claims. These constraints are further embraced by privacy provisions in N e w
South Wales that almost have the force of law, in addition to the various professional codes
of conduct and ethics.
In order to gain the trust of informants, confidentiality of sensitive research data
required attention (Lee 1993). T w o techniques for preserving confidentiality were

employed in this study. The first was to withhold from the investigator, at his request, the
names of the injured workers whose cases were used to elicit the participating
organizations. T h e second technique used was to aggregate into a single list for each of the
two case studies, those organizations involved in the three rehabilitation cases. T w o
corollaries of assuring this confidentiality were:
(i)

the injured person (employee/patient/client/member etc.) was not directly included
in the study. However, a valuable perspective on network behaviour w a s foregone,
an issue that is discussed in the conclusions to this study (see Chapter 8);

(ii)

because of the first corollary, interviews with informants were conducted at the
level of a stratified convenience sample rather than in relation to a specific case.
The subsequent primary network analysis was also undertaken at this level.

In addition to the issue of securing confidentiality of data, a large number of informants in
the study agreed to interview only on condition that their identities and those of the
organizations they represented remained anonymous. T o this end, apart from the
regulatory agency, WorkCover Authority, all organizations names have been withheld.
Furthermore, all informants' comments and observations are reported anonymously.

Contribution to Reliability and Validity
The final aspect of this section on data collection concerns the contribution that the
data collection strategies employed m a k e to the study's reliability and validity. According
to Yin (1989) there are three principles of data collection that can assist in establishment of
a case study's construct validity and reliability. These are using multiple sources of
evidence, creation of a case study data base and maintaining a chain of evidence.
In dealing with each of these in turn, this study is characterised by its wide usage of
multiple sources of evidence. Five main sources are used and it is also shown in Table 3.2
and in Section 3.3. (where methods are aligned with study design and operations) that these
sources, are used widely to develop ".... converging lines of inquiry

: (Yin, 1989:97).

Throughout the study comparable items from these different sources are used as tests on
one another, thereby addressing potential problems of construct validity. Triangulation as
an analytic tool is discussed in more detail in the next section.
It is argued that a formal, retrievable data base greatly increases case study
reliability in that other investigators are able to review the primary evidence independently
of any reports by the original investigator. This study achieves this principle in two ways.
First, a computerised data base is employed which systematically stores the transcripts of
all interviews held with informants as well as codes these according to theoretical
construct. In addition to computer coding of transcripts, key evidence from other sources is
also coded and indexed. Second, case study documents, computer disks, interview tapes,
video films and case study notes are also carefully and systematically filed in cabinets and
boxes.
The third data collection principle for strengthened reliability and construct validity
is maintenance of a chain of evidence that permits "....the derivation of any evidence from
initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions" (Yin, 1989:102). Documents
, interviews and other observations are widely quoted in the study. Both computer and
hard copy data bases contain the actual evidence collected. These are consistent and in line
with the case study design (refer to Section 3.3). Finally and most importantly, the case
study design is the link in the chain between the theory and the field.

3.6 Data Analysis
The final section of this chapter discusses the analytic strategies and techniques
used in the study. The challenge is to incorporate the data acquired from multiple sources
in systematic empirical research (Gephart, 1993). It is widely accepted that there are few
fixed strategies for analysis in case study research. In this particular study, three
overarching analytic strategies were employed that guided the use of specific analytic

techniques. These strategies are reliance on the theoretical model, development of a
processual case description and following a three stage comparative analysis framework.
The analysis relies on the theoretical model because this study was designed
following Yin's (1989) formulation for case study research which dictates that the
propositions guide the data collection methods and in turn the analytic techniques. In other
words, analysis is essentially theory driven. For example, analysis of mandate emergence,
a process of change over time, is appropriately undertaken using chronology, a form of
time series analysis.
The second overarching analytic strategy is ".... the development of a descriptive
framework for organizing the case study" (Yin, 1989:107). This is where chapters of a
study serve as a means for its organization and structure. In this study, the fieldwork is
reflected in chapters that coincide with the analytic framework for determination of
mandate efficacy: emergence, form, implementation and impact (refer to chapters 4-7
inclusive) Yin suggests that descriptive framework strategy is an alternative, but less
preferable, one to that of theoretical propositions. However, in this study both general
analytic strategies are employed.
A three phase comparative analysis is the third general strategy applied. The three
phases are respectively within case comparisons made between case subunits, comparisons
made between the cases (given this a multiple case study) and finally comparisons made
between case and theory. These phases are interactive in the sense that analysis involves
cross-referral between them. Typically, however, the starting point for data analysis
commences within the single case. Based on comparisons between the actual phenomena
(in this instance, the relations between mandated and non-mandated organizations),
comparisons can then be m a d e between the case and the theory. If there is coincidence
between theory and the case explanations, then internal validity of the case is strengthened
or confirmed.

B y undertaking cross-case comparisons, that is, comparing actual

phenomena in separate cases, and then relating these to the theory, replications m a y be
found thus enhancing external validity.

Analytic Techniques
Bearing the above general strategies in mind a number of specific analytic
techniques were used. These are chronology, content analysis, pattern matching,

triangulation, displays and network analysis. The analytic techniques used according to t
stage of the proposed theoretical framework are shown in Table 3.4 below. Each of the
techniques is discussed in turn.
Theoretical
Stage

Analytic
Technique

Mandate Emergence

Chronology
Content Analysis
Triangulation
Displays

Mandate Form

Content Analysis
Triangulation
Displays

Mandate Implementation:
Enforcement

Compliance

Mandate Impact

Content Analysis
Pattern Matching
Triangulation
Displays
Network Analysis
Content Analysis
Pattern Matching
Triangulation
Displays
Network Analysis
Content Analysis
Pattern Matching
Triangulation
Displays

Table 3.4 Analytic Techniques Used by Theoretical Stage
Note: the above techniques are subsumed within the overarching analytic strategies of:
reliance on the theoretical model, a descriptive framework and three phase
comparative analysis.
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Chronology
"Life is chronology" according to Miles and Huberman (1984:100). O n e of the
major strengths attributed to qualitative methodologies and case study research in particular
is the capacity to collect and study data over the course of time. Chronology is essentially
a systematic historical ordering of prior events according to their dates; it is a form of time
series analysis. This provides the researcher with the opportunity to establish causal events
during the period under study. A s G u m m e s s o n (1990:89-90) puts it "history is a diagnostic
instrument that helps us to put a problem in its context and environment. It supplies a
thread and helps us to create order among a mass of data; it provides patterns. N o two sets
of circumstances are ever entirely identical although there is often a general pattern that
recurs frequently". From an analytic point of view the goal is to compare the actual
chronology with the theory. In this study, emergence of the mandate, it is argued, will
influence subsequent stages of mandate formation, implementation and impact.
Chronology permits the assessment of this proposition. B y developing an event history of
legislative, structural and procedural changes in the mandate, by identifying and looking
into the involvement of key interest groups and organizations, a clearer picture of the legalpolitical context of occupational rehabilitation networks will be achieved. This is
consistent with Strauss and Corbin's (1990:145) notion of capturing process.
S o m e of the tactics employed in compiling the mandate chronology include
identification and analysis of milestones (Gummesson, 1991) that is, critical events in its
emergence, and time-ordered matrices (Miles and Huberman, 1984) which permit seeing
when events occurred.

Content Analysis
Content analysis is employed throughout this study. It is a "research method that
uses a set of procedures to m a k e valid inferences from text. These inferences are about the

sender(s) of the message, the message itself, or the audience of the message" (Weber,
1990:9). Content analysis in this study classifies units of text into categories based on the
response by informants to categorical questions and by attribution of other data sources to
the relevant category. The categories used are derived from the theoretical framework and
its associated constructs discussed in chapter 2. Content analysis thus enabled triangulation
of textual evidence from a variety of sources, for example, transcribed interviews, law,
policies, procedures and newsletters. Furthermore, it also enabled triangulation of textual
data with data from other sources, for example, statistical reports, participant observation
and video films. In the above ways, content analysis assisted in establishing construct
validity.
The content analysis of transcribed interviews and notes of interviews held with
informants was undertaken with the assistance of a computer software package called
Q.S.R. N U D I S T 3.0 (Non-numerical Unstructured, Data Indexing, Searching and
Theorising). This software allowed for efficient storage, retrieval, coding and indexing of
data in line with the theoretical framework so that patterns in the data could be discovered
and explored. Appendices 9a and 9b set out the index codes and node titles for mandate
enforcement and compliance respectively. These codes and node titles correspond to the
case study structures and, with mandate enforcement, they also embrace the categorical
questions given in Appendix 3. For example, Index C o d e 1112 Implementation
Enforcement Central Enforcement Design will have assigned to it online and offline text
drawn from transcribed interviews and related documentary sources that concern the nature
of enforcement design at the WorkCover Authority head office in Sydney. The index
codes and node titles for the categorical questions about mandate compliance are contained
in Appendix 10. These were used for coding interviews and other data in conjunction with
the index tree in Appendix 9b.
T w o related advantages to accrue from the use of N U D I S T for context analysis
were that the rules for coding the text were explicit and that the program provided high

reliability in the application of coding to the text (Weber, 1990). The text unit of analysis
was the paragraph (where a paragraph m a y range from a single to multiple sentences). Offline documents were human-coded. The text unit of analysis permitted exploration of the
meaning of a single word in the mandate to the interpretation of a several paragraph
procedure on employers establishing contact with other organizations in occupational
rehabilitation. A n example of the text units (paragraphs) and index codes for an online
interview transcript is given at Appendix 11. Thus text unit 89 is coded as pertaining to
(now refer to Appendix 9a)
11223 Implementation Enforcement Local Enforcement Design Sanctions
11231 Implementation Enforcement Local Enforcement Design Surveillance.

Pattern Matching
Pattern matching is another analytic technique used in this study. Considered by
Yin (1989) to be one of the dominant, preferred modes of case study analysis, pattern
matching is concerned with establishing whether there is a match between empirical
observations as well as a match between theory and empirical findings. In pattern
matching, the comparative analysis strategies discussed at the beginning of this section are
particularly relevant. B y comparing variables and outcomes in and between cases and then
with theory, expected patterns will be confirmed or disconfirmed. Confirmation of
expected patterns within a case lead to strengthened internal validity; confirmation of
expected patterns between cases leads to strengthened external validity. Disconfirmation
requires a review of theory and/or method.

Triangulation
A s mentioned elsewhere, triangulation is a technique that is widely used in this
study. It is the process of "testing one source of information against another to strip away
alternative explanations and prove a hypothesis" (Fetterman, 1989:89). In addition to the

development of indices for providing convergent evidence and thereby strengthened
construct validity (Jick, 1979), triangulation is of especial value in qualitative
interorganizational network analysis.

Assessment of what is happening at an

interorganizational network level requires an understanding of the part played by individual
organizations with respect to the phenomena under study. It also entails procurement of
data from each organization on perspectives and relations with other organizations in the
network. In analysing these data, support for propositions at the network level will be a
function of triangulated measures (such as different organizations' perception of say,
mandate importance) that agree with or do not contradict the proposition (Miles and
Huberman, 1984:234).

Displays
Displays are also used as an analytic tool in this study. According to Miles and
Huberman (1984:79) a display is a ".... special format that represents information
systematically to the user". The process of presenting data in an ordered and concise
manner through charts, tables and matrices forces analysis and comparison of the relevant
phenomena within and between cases. A variety of displays are employed throughout the
study. Examples include time-ordered, conceptually clustered and impact matrices, and
event listing (Miles and Huberman, 1984).

Network Analysis
Finally, network analysis is a technique that was used in this study to examine and
assess the two cases (heavy manufacturing and tertiary education domains) involved in the
implementation of the occupational rehabilitation mandate. The network analysis focused
on complete networks (Marsden, 1990), that is on data gathered for all the ties linking
organizations in each case subject to the boundary specifications (areal and time) given in
the case study design in section 3 of this chapter. Unlike the bulk of research on networks

which rely on surveys and self-report questionnaires (Marsden, 1990; Whetten, 1982) the
network analysis in this study was based primarily on semi-structured interviews with
informants, and on documentary evidence. A s mentioned earlier, these interviews were
conducted with guiding questionnaires.
The network analysis followed two orientations, one quantitative, the other
qualitative. There is a relatively well established literature on quantitative network analysis
(Aldrich and Whetten, 1981; DiMaggio, 1986; G a m m , 1981; Knoke and Kuklinski,
1982; Paulson, 1985). Using matrix representations (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981; Knoke
and Kuklinski, 1982) together with descriptive statistics, the quantitative network analysis
focused primarily on the six dimensions on which mandated and non-mandated
organizations were proposed to differ. In contrast, qualitative interorganizational network
analysis is not as well prescribed. Given this situation, analysis was interpretive. Network
level phenomena were explained through developing an understanding of h o w individual
organizations (network sub-units) interacted or were perceived to interact with one another
within the legal-political context. It was by assembling these observations into various
conceptual clusters at a network level that overall network themes and patterns emerged.
The N U D I S T software was particularly useful in this analysis through managing the
volume of records (in excess of 70 interview transcripts), retrieving this data coded
according to theoretical category, and providing analytic flexibility to "interrogate" the data
for further themes (Richards and Richards, 1987).

3.7 Summary
This chapter has established that the empirical study of partially mandated
interorganizational relations is most appropriately undertaken using case study research.
Concerns about the vagueness and potential unreliability of m u c h qualitative research were
addressed by setting out the research design and methodology in a systematic and detailed
manner. In doing so, this permits the reader to follow the rationale for case construction,
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the chain of evidence drawn from multiple sources and the safeguards put in place to
enhance the study's validity and reliability.

Chapter 4
Emergence of Mandated Occupational Rehabilitation

"The recent reforms to the workers compensation system
have been the most radical since the inception of the
Workers Compensation Act in 1926.
"The rehabilitation of injured workers is n o w a central
feature of the Workers Compensation system".
(Guidelines for workplace-based

occupational

rehabilitation programmes, 1987:1).

4.1 Introduction
A s mentioned in the previous chapter, there are two main aims in determining the
emergence of the occupational rehabilitation mandates:
(i)

to establish and examine the historical environmental context within which mandated
occupational rehabilitation has emerged in N e w South Wales from social, political
and economic perspectives;

(ii)

to identify the patterns, frequency and the nature of changes to the occupational
rehabilitation mandate that have occurred prior to and in the five years following the
promulgation of the N e w South Wales Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the source
of the mandate).
Following the economic and social strains it placed on the industrial community for

much of the 1980s, the N e w South Wales workers' compensation system underwent
profound and rapid legal, procedural and structural changes from mid 1987 onward as
successive State Governments sought to mitigate this burden. O n e complex body of
legislation was replaced by another complex body. It was within this changing legal
environment that the major parties involved in rehabilitation attempted to fulfil their
obligations, legal or otherwise. In doing so, they were faced with uncertainty as their
procedural boundary-spanning routines were often to be no sooner learnt than disrupted by

additional regulations, guidelines, handbooks and WorkCover administrative structure.
Three major conceptual shifts occurred as a result of the changes to the N e w South
Wales workers' compensation system. First, occupational rehabilitation was established as
a fundamental self-regulatory component of occupational health and safety and workers'
compensation management, particularly in reducing the duration of absence from work.
Previously such an approach in N e w South Wales was the purview of only a small number
of organizations. Second, it w a s recognized that an effective and efficient workers'
compensation and rehabilitation system was contingent upon its integration with the
performance criteria and regulatory administrative structures for occupational health and
safety. Hence the establishment of the WorkCover Authority. Third, input into policy
making in the WorkCover system followed a multiparty approach ahead of tripartism, whilst
tripartism was retained at an operational workplace level. Finally, at the mandate level, the
implications of occupational rehabilitation mandate emergence for interorganizational
relations are argued to rest primarily in the need for the interacting parties to learn and adapt
to a complex, uncertain and variable set of legal, procedural and structural circumstances.
Pursuant to the above aims and following the above outline, this chapter has been
organized into three sections. The first section sets out the legislative and social context in
N e w South Wales that led up to the promulgation of the occupational rehabilitation mandate
on 1 July 1987. Issues examined include the growing general focus on occupational health
and safety, economic and social pressures for change to the workers' compensation system
and the reform options that led to the "radical" n e w legislation. In acknowledging that
emergence in social affairs is a continuing process rather than a once-and-for-all activity, the
second section identifies the legislative and social context within which the mandate was
implemented. Additions and changes to relevant laws, agency (WorkCover) restructuring,
performance reviews, the involvement of key interest groups, and the development of case
law in occupational rehabilitation are discussed.
The third and final section assesses the potential implications for interorganizational

relations at an operational rehabilitation network level that arise out of the first two sections
of the chapter. Given the dynamic nature of emergence with its focus on contextual change,
naturally the issues covered in this chapter will in part overlap with some of those contained
in the analyses of mandate form, implementation and impact (the following three chapters).
The processual nature of mandate efficacy dictates that such overlap exists since what
emerges over time are its form, implementation and impact. However, for the purposes of
this study, overlap will be acknowledged while analytic repetition minimised.

4.2 Rehabilitation Prior to the Workers Compensation Act 1987
During the first half of the 1980s a number of legislative changes and innovations
were introduced into the fields of occupational health, safety, rehabilitation and workers'
compensation in N e w South Wales. In order to appreciate the later changes in law that
brought about the occupational rehabilitation mandate from 1987 onwards, it is important to
recognise that during this earlier period there had been a tendency by the State Government
to treat the above fields as separate and uncoordinated policy domains. This view would
progressively change at a State level until by 1989, separately administered legislation was
integrated in terms of enforcement and administration through the establishment of the
WorkCover Authority. From its inception, the WorkCover system, primarily brought about
by the Workers Compensation Act 1987, recognised and sought to reinforce the interrelated
nature of prevention (occupational health and safety), occupational rehabilitation and
workers' compensation. The general thrust of such interrelatedness is seen where a poor
record of workplace injuries and illness leads to higher workers' compensation premiums,
which can be mitigated to some degree through successful efforts at rehabilitating injured
workers. However, as already mentioned, this was not so in the early 1980s. In this
section, then, although the primary focus will be on workers' compensation and
occupational rehabilitation, it is also necessary to take account of early developments in
occupational health and safety law since it will be argued these bore some influence on the

emergence of the rehabilitation mandate.

Occupational Health and Safety Legislation
A n extensive review of occupational health and safety laws in N e w South Wales by
the Williams Commission of Inquiry (1981) found that they were inadequate in the
prevention of occupational injury and illness, a trend which continued into the early 1980s.
For example, the number of reported injuries and illnesses had been growing in the ten year
period ending 1977. The number of reported accidents causing three or more days' absence
was 115,537 for the 12 months ending 30 June, 1977. For the year ended 30 June, 1982,
145,120 new cases of work-related incapacity of three or more days' duration were reported.
This represented more than a 2 5 % increase in just five years (Workers' Compensation
Commission of N e w South Wales, 1985). A corollary of poor workplace health and safety
performance are increased workers' compensation premiums. Table 4.1 below shows this
quite clearly.

Year ended
30 June

Estimated
Cost

Wages
Paid

1977

401,052,900

14,385,173,000

2.79

1978

403,894,600

15,791,671,000

2.56

1979

420,077,500

17,944,017,000

2.34

1980

412,978,200

20,040,043,000

2.06

1981

513,794,700

23,231,087,000

2.21

1982

703,200,500

25,047,895,000

2.81

1983

959,016,600

27,358,301,000

3.50

1984

1,006,177,700

28,862,718,000

3.49

Table 4.1

Cost on each
$100 of wages paid

Cost of Workers' Compensation 1977-1984

Source: Workers' Compensation Commission of N e w South Wales (1985:12 adapted).
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However, the above statistics understate the size of the problem. Unreported
injuries, time lost of less than 3 days' duration are not included in the accident figures.
Equally, the social and economic costs of replacing absent staff, operating overtime, lost
production and administration costs are not included in the accident figures. Combining the
perception of deteriorating performance with Williams' strident criticism of the existing body
of health and safety laws in terms of their fragmentariness, lack of cohesion, inadequate
coverage and complexity, there were strong grounds for reform.
In response to the above, the State Government introduced the N e w South Wales
Occupational Health and Safety Act in 1983. The 1983 Act adopted a general performance
standard approach in m u c h the same vein as the British Health and Safety at W o r k etc. Act
1974 that had been recommended by the influential Robens Report (1972). General duties
of care for health and safety at work were imposed on employers and employees, provision
was m a d e for the participation of employees (in larger organizations) through workplace
committees and the use of specialist advice was promoted. The 1983 Act embodied a
principle of self-regulation on the assumption that management and employees shared a
c o m m o n interest in reducing the incidence and severity of work hazards. A corollary of selfregulation is that it supported justification for lower dependence on law enforcement (by an
inspectorate) as a means of control (Braithwaite and Grabosky, 1985; Brooks, 1988). At
the time of its introduction, this form of broad, self-regulatory legislation was considered
novel and pioneering (Brooks, 1988).

In providing for union involvement in the

establishment of workplace safety committees, the Act was an early Australian example of
legally-politically mandated relations between organizations (employers and unions) in the
occupational health domain. Based on the State Government's claim of success with this
law, the principle of self-regulation in mandated interorganizational relations subsequently
re-emerges when the rehabilitation provisions in the 1987 workers' compensation reforms
were proposed.

In addition to pulling together the provisions contained in various industry-specific
acts and regulations under the umbrella of its general performance standard, the Occupational
Health and Safety Act 1983 also established the Occupational Health, Safety and
Rehabilitation Council. This Council was a peak tripartite body (representing employers,
unions and government) charged with the responsibility of researching, advising and making
recommendations to the State Government on health, safety and rehabilitation of all persons
in all places throughout the State. The Council is of particular interest in two respects. First,
its tripartite composition underscores a consultative approach adopted by successive
Governments towards the development and implementation of health, safety, rehabilitation
and workers' compensation policy. Second, outside of inquiries m a d e in the 1960s and
early 1970s, the Council was the first to undertake an extensive examination of the role
played by occupational rehabilitation in workplace injuries (this report is examined in more
detail later in this chapter). However, it differed from those earlier reports in that it had a
direct effect on assuring the importance of rehabilitation as an injury mitigation strategy in
workers' compensation reforms.
In the first half of the 1980s the State Government's claim that its legislative
occupational health and safety strategies were successful were justified because: ".... there
were 218 fatalities in 1984/85 - the lowest since at least 1965 - whereas in 1981/82 there
were 306. Similarly, the total number of workers' compensation claims reported for
1984/85 w a s 223,069, a reduction of 2 0 % over 1981/82 w h e n 279,842 cases were
reported" (New South Wales Government Premier's Department, 1986:10). While the 1983
Act will have heightened awareness of occupational health and safety among m a n y employer
organizations and stimulated compliance behaviour, it would be misleading to attribute the
above improvement trend solely to legislative initiatives. Employer commitment to
occupational health and safety might also be found in a desire to retain or improve
productivity or competitiveness through the reduction of unit labour costs associated with
injury and disease, to strengthen established ties with trade unions, and to be seen by the

wider community to be "doing the right thing". These incentives of efficiency, stability and
legitimacy, important contingencies in interorganizational relationship formation (Oliver,
1990), underscore the potential significance of voluntary reasons for tackling workplace
accidents.
The 1983 Act and its Robens Report origins also has its detractors. Criticisms have
included: safety committees' lack of legalrightto make decisions (Creighton, 1984); failure
of the Government to enforce the Act effectively for example in terms of number and quality
of inspectors (Braithwaite and Grabosky, 1985) the need for specificity in legislation
(Brooks, 1988), the dangers inherent in depending on safety specialists (Dawson, Clinton,
Bamford and Willman, 1985), and an overriding dependence on consensus (Quinlan and
Bohle, 1991). Overall, however, the 1983 Act would appear to have stimulated a greater
awareness and commitment by N S W industry to occupational health and safety, more so in
the areas of accident and injury prevention than in rehabilitation.
Prior to 1987, concern for the rehabilitation of injured workers within the context of
the 1983 Act was expressed principally through the findings of an extensive survey
conducted during 1985 by the Rehabilitation and Handicapped Persons Committee
established by the tripartite Occupational Health, Safety and Rehabilitation Council in
accordance with Section 10 (i) of the 1983 Act. This section states that the Council shall
establish ".... a committee for the purpose of assisting it to exercise its functions in relation
to the rehabilitation of injured persons and to handicapped persons". In effect, therefore, the
Council was empowered by the Act with carrying out investigations, making reports and
recommendations for the designing and setting up ".... an integrated rehabilitation system for
injured workers in the State". (Occupational Health, Safety and Rehabilitation Council of
N e w South Wales, 1986:2).
Based on submissions representing in excess of 145 unions and 5,000 individual
employers, the report recommended wide ranging reforms in order to overcome issues of
concern and perceived barriers to the rehabilitation and re-employment of injured persons.

The issues of concern identified were conflicts between curative medical care and
rehabilitation, artificial separation of bodily ("real") from mental ("unreal") disorders,
overemphasis on compensability of injury, conflicts between divergent rehabilitation goals,
and legal compensation goals and perpetuation of the sick role through lack of alternative
duties at the workplace. The major barriers identified included a lack of commitment by all
parties concerned to the concept and value of rehabilitation, delays in the provisions of
rehabilitation services, a lack of coordination between the various groups involved in
rehabilitation, inadequate rehabilitation facilities, the adversarial legal process, difficulties in
achieving reasonable returns to work, and vested interests w h o are not explicitly identified.
For example, the reasons underlying a lack of commitment were considered to be due to a
lack of understanding by all parties as to what rehabilitation is let alone what role it should
play, mistrust among m a n y parties as to the motives of others, and the ability to pass on
higher premium costs to other social sectors. These reasons are levelled at the overall
workers' compensation system. It is noteworthy that they are interorganizational in nature.
Similarly, lack of coordination within the system was seen as arising essentially out of
interorganizational field pathologies ...." lack of communication between the treating
doctors, employer, employee and insurer" "... the fragmentation of medical and vocational
treatment" "... conflict between medical specialists" "... lack of understanding and
communications between rehabilitation professionals and employers....". The proposed
changes were directed largely at processes and structures embraced by workers'
compensation law (to be discussed in the following section). A n underlying theme of the
report was the need for an integration of occupational health, safety, rehabilitation and
workers' compensation, where the latter two fields were traditionally viewed by State
Governments as separate from occupational health and safety. Such integration was
substantially achieved as a result of major reforms to workers' compensation law in 1987
and by further legislative changes m a d e in 1989. In fact, this report signalled the tenor of
rehabilitation changes that would be adopted by the State Government and enacted in
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workers' compensation legislation.

NSW Workers Compensation Act 1926
Turning to workers' compensation in the years leading up to the 1987 reforms, the
Workers Compensation Act 1926 determined h o w the system should operate in N e w South
Wales. Workers' compensation is a form of insurance payable by employers (in N S W ) as a
premium to cover costs of compensating employees for any work-related illness or injury
they m a y incur during the normal course of employment. Under the 1926 Act this insurance
also included unlimited c o m m o n law cover, considered by many to be a major barrier to
effective rehabilitation. The administrative functions of the system under the 1926 Act were
performed respectively by the State Compensation Board following the replacement of the
N S W Workers' Compensation Commission late in 1984 and the subsequent separation of
judicial functions to the Compensation Court of N e w South Wales. This separation could be
viewed as an early attempt to distance the legal professions from workers' compensation
policy and operations at a time when the c o m m o n law component of premiums was seen to
berisingsteeply.
U p to 1985, premiums charged by insurers were largely a function of market
pressures and risk assessment where:
"Substantial and unrealistic discounting by insurers vying for market dominance
created a volatile commercial environment. This not only threatened the ability of the
insurance industry to meet the cost claims, but also discriminated between employers
in similar industries whose premiums varied and took no account of work injury
experience." (Premier's Department, 1986:71).
In 1985, amendments to the 1926 Act introduced, among other things, a system of
maximum insurance premiums which served to remove the above practice. Premiums were
to be calculated and charged using the employer's work injury and claims cost experience in
line with gazetted rates and statutory formulae administered by the Insurance Premiums
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Committee of the State Compensation Board. This reform was the first step in the State
Government's moves to integrate the 1983 Occupational Health and Safety Act with the
Workers' Compensation system in place at that time. A direct linkage was established
between accident prevention measures as reflected in the cost of claims and the insurance
premiums to be charged. Implicitly rehabilitation was encouraged as a means of shortening
the time lost from work and reducing the attendant costs. The aim was to provide a clear
incentive for employers to minimise the incidence and duration of absence arising from
workplace injury. At the sametime,this incentive was further reinforced by the requirement
for the first $500 of each claim's cost to be met by the employer, independent of the
insurance contract. The above intervention had limited impact. The cost of workers'
compensation payments and insurance premiums continued to rise.
There was a growing concern among employers and insurers about the system.
Employers in N e w South Wales felt their competitiveness and their capacity to maintain
employment levels were being eroded due to their workers' compensation oncosts that at the
time were higher than anywhere else in Australia. Insurers increasingly considered that there
was no commercial gain to be m a d e from underwriting a workers' compensation system
whose cost was far outstripping inflation. The trade unions, for so long the proponents of
improved benefits for their injured members, were also showing a growing concern about
the potential "export" of jobs out of N e w South Wales to other states with lower workers'
compensation premium rates and the risk of not attracting n e w employment-generating
investment. For example, during the period 1979/80 to 1984/85 workers' compensation
payments increased from $349 million to $838 million. This represented an average annual
increase of 1 9 % at a time when general inflation was running at 10 percentage points less.
Furthermore, on basis of actuarial advice it was projected that if the system under the 1926
Act were to continue, then these costs would double by 1989 (Premier's Department, 1986).
This increase was despite the introduction of Government strategies (the Occupational Health
and Safety Act 1983 and safety performance - based premium setting established in 1985)
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that were considered to be succeeding in terms of the number of fatalities and serious
accidents, as shown in Table 4.2. It was found that the duration of incapacity had
significantly increased during the above period.

Year Ended
30th June

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Total Claims
Payments
($M)

349
417
510
640
722
838

Number of New
Claims and
Re-opened Claims

Deaths in Year
from Claims in
Previous Column

272,700
275,400
279,800
244,800
223,300
223,100

320
319
306
299
250
218

Table 4.2 N S W Workers' Compensation Scheme:
Selected Statistics, 1980 to 1985
Source:

Premier's Department, 1986:9.

In response to the above problem, the Government commissioned a Green Paper,
N S W Workers' Compensation Scheme: Options for Reform. Published in September
1986, this discussion paper sought to identify the causes for the "crippling" costs of an outof-control workers' compensation system and to outline alternative changes which might be
made.. The issues considered to be instrumental in the system's malaise were: the adversary
system, benefit delivery, rehabilitation, funding, distribution of costs between employers,
wage declaration and the role of insurers. The first three of these were the most commonly
associated with the system's high cost and naturally the focus of the proposed reforms.
The adversary system was considered to be highly litigious leading to a protracted
process both in redemptions and at c o m m o n law. The system was regarded as encouraging
".... an over-use of the legal and medical professions resulting in unnecessary high service
costs". (Premier's Department, 1986:22). Furthermore ".... the increasing emphasis on
lump s u m compensation had led to the extension of the duration of claims, the
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encouragement of lesser claims, fraudulent and exaggerated claims and a lack of
encouragement of rehabilitation". (Premier's Department, 1986:19). Clearly, the "vested
interests" alluded to earlier in the Rehabilitation and Handicapped Persons Survey, 1985
were the legal and medical professions.
Benefit delivery was considered to provide little incentive for early rehabilitation
because payments in the first six months of incapacity were too high w h e n compared with
other systems. It w a s also felt that the workers' compensation system was subsidising the
Federal Government's social security system, through the provision for partially
incapacitated workers to be deemed and compensated as if totally incapacitated in certain
circumstances.
Rehabilitation was recognised as not receiving appropriate emphasis in the State
workers' compensation system:
"... partly because of the lack of a co-ordinated and adequately capitalised
rehabilitation structure, but more significantly, it results from the inherent disincentive
to rehabilitation in the lump sum orientation of the workers' compensation system.
"Because of this disincentive only a few insurance companies have seriously
concerned themselves with rehabilitation initiatives and the injured worker is therefore
unlikely to be approached to undertake vocational or social rehabilitation." (Premier's
Department, 1986:37).
The Green Paper went on to outline four sets of costed reform options designed
variously to arrest the economic and social hardship experienced under 1926 Act during the
1980s. Regardless of the option(s) accepted, the State Government's explicit aims for the
new system were to:
"1.

provide an efficient and effective system of compensation to incapacitated
workers at a cost the community can sustain;

"2.

emphasise rehabilitation and restoration to full vocational potential;

"3.

improve work practices to reduce the incidence, duration and severity of injury
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and disease." (Premier's Department, 1986:17.)
O f particular significance was the elevation of rehabilitation from a seldom used postinjury afterthought to a central component of an intended, integrated system of prevention,
rehabilitation and compensation. This shift will be discussed in the following subsection.
A s might be expected, the reform options were the subject of m a n y and varied written
submissions to the State Government by interested parties. O n a more active level, the
labour unions, particularly those in the Illawarra (the location of the case studies) strenuously
opposed the proposed reforms because of the apparent severe reduction in their injured
members' benefits under the n e w scheme. Regional strike action and mass meetings in
Wollongong, the major city in the Illawarra, characterised this transition period.
However, it w a s noted that rehabilitation was ".... one area where there was
unanimity". (Minister for Industrial Relations and Minister for Employment, 1987:21). In
addition to the aforementioned rationale for introducing occupational rehabilitation, further
grounds are to be found in its use by the Labor State Government of the day as a legitimation
device with its sponsoring unions for some less palatable cuts in injured workers' benefits.
It sought to maintain cooperative I O R with the unions through what Ring and V a n de V e n
(1994:97) refer to in their process framework of cooperative I O R development as a
"repetitive sequence of negotiation, commitment, and execution stages, each of which is
assessed in terms of efficiency and equity". Increasing efficiency in workers' compensation
meant primarily reductions in the level of benefits payable to injured workers, in particular
withdrawal of access to c o m m o n law claims for damages. T o achieve this without
encountering resistance from the labour unions with w h o m it had historically had multiple
close ties, the Labor Government needed a trade off: workplace-based rehabilitation. Under
the reform proposals employers, the traditional supporters of Labor's political opponents,
would be seen to gain lower workers' compensation premia at the expense of the unions
members' loss of benefits. B y mandating rehabilitation obligations to employers (in
consultation with the unions), the State Government sought to offset any perceived
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imbalance and so restore equity in its cooperative I O R with its partner unions. However,
according to one informant (a former union official) this did not happen: "They [the unions]
were told that yes, ok, c o m m o n law would be taken away, there would be this, there would
be that introduced in this new system. But, on the other hand, what would even it up would
be the fact that rehabilitation would be really seriously considered in each and every case.
And of course that was never done".
Taking the above into account, in April 1987 the State Labor Government settled on
the form the n e w workers' compensation legislation would take and the N S W Workers'
Compensation Act 1987 was promulgated to commence on 30 June, 1987. The major
features of this Act are discussed in section 4.3. Underpinning these changes was an attempt
to bolster the tripartite nature of policy making in the workers' compensation, health and
safety domain and as such promoting the interests of Government's key partners: workers'
(through their unions) and employers.

Occupational Rehabilitation
The foregoing discussion on occupational health and safety and workers'
compensation shows occupational rehabilitation to be a latecomer in occupational hazard
control strategies in N e w South Wales. This is confirmed by a closer examination of
occupational rehabilitation itself. The original Workers Compensation Act 1926 contained
provision for the rehabilitation of disabled workers in the form of access by the then
Workers' Compensation Commission to funds for this purpose. However, as noted in the
report of an Inquiry in 1970 into the Feasibility of Establishing a System for Rehabilitation of
Injured Workers' in N e w South Wales tendered by Justice Conybeare, it was 43 years
before these funds were drawn upon by the Commission. This report, the first of its kind in
N e w South Wales, also drew attention to problems and solutions similar in nature to those
made m u c h later by The Rehabilitation and Handicapped Persons Survey in 1985. The
problems identified were essentially a lack of facilities and appropriately qualified
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rehabilitation personnel, a lack of early or effective medical intervention and an overemphasis
on compensation at the expense of complete rehabilitation. Solutions recommended included
expansion of existing facilities and establishment of n e w ones, training of personnel qualified
in rehabilitation, workers' compensation to be contingent on worker participation, more
employer involvement, and increasing awareness through the dissemination of information
about rehabilitation. That the issues of concern and recommendations between the two
reports were so similar is testimony to the general lack of significant action regarding
occupational rehabilitation by the State Government during that 15 year period. Even the
findings of the extensive 1974 Report of the National Committee of Inquiry on
Compensation and Rehabilitation in Australia (also similar to Conybeare's report) had little
effect on rehabilitation infrastructure and regulation in N e w South Wales.
The main action undertaken by the N S W Government from 1970 to 1984 in respect
of occupational rehabilitation and in response to the Conybeare Report was the establishment
in 1974 of a Rehabilitation Service within the Workers' Compensation Commission.
Services were largely centralized through a Sydney based department and a Newcastle
branch, unlike the post 1987 focus on workplace rehabilitation. Activities included: public
seminars, information services, counselling injured workers, development and coordination
of rehabilitation programs, family assistance and job placement assistance. In 1980,
legislation was passed requiring insurers to refer injured employees to the Rehabilitation
Department once they had received workers' compensation for 12 weeks. O f the 31,514
injured workers referred to the Department from September 1980 to end June 1984, a little
over 2 0 % had been contacted by the Department. O f these only a small proportion went on
to an active rehabilitation program administered by the Rehabilitation Department. Clearly,
the Department was under-resourced and this is highlighted by the following:
"During 1983-1984, 5,610 cases were referred to the Rehabilitation Department. A
large proportion of the department's resources was involved in screening referrals to
ascertain those w h o could best benefit from the service, 769 cases were contacted and

117
163 of the respondees elected to become actively involved in the rehabilitation
program. During this period, 64 injured workers were returned to the workforce and
. 51 were significantly assisted in adjusting to their disablement." (Workers'
Compensation Commission of N e w South Wales, 1985:32).
The success rate measured in terms of return to work was poor, barely 1%. In the
author's o w n experience as a personnel manager for a large national company (which set up
an occupational rehabilitation program 5 years prior to its requirement by law) during the
early 1980s, delays in the Rehabilitation Department contacting injured workers were as long
as 18 months after the statutory referral by the insurance company. Such delays following
injury are not conducive to successful rehabilitation (Ganora and Wright, 1987) and together
with a compensation system that appeared to reward continuing incapacity ahead of
rehabilitation, it is hardly surprising that success would be thin on the ground. Interestingly,
the Workers' Compensation Commission (1985) mentioned that it was conducting an
experimental program involving employers more closely in the rehabilitation process.
However, no results of that study were subsequently published.
A s discussed earlier, it took spiralling compensation costs and an enthusiastic
committee set up by the Occupational Health Safety and Rehabilitation Council of N e w South
Wales to create awareness and stimulate a meaningful review of occupational rehabilitation.
Following the Rehabilitation and Handicapped Persons Survey, 1985 and the 1986 Green
Paper on Workers' Compensation reform, a working party representing the rehabilitation
profession, trade unions, industry and the State Government was established in December
1986 to formulate proposals for implementing the Green paper initiatives. Based on
rehabilitation principles of early intervention and active cooperation between employer and
employee, the Working Party advocated "workplace-oriented rehabilitation" (Minister for
Industrial Relations and Minister for Employment, 1987:21). In effect, it recommended a
self-regulatory approach similar to that embodied in the Occupational Health and Safety Act,
1983: "the development and implementation of rehabilitation programs becomes the joint
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responsibility of management and workers in the workplace" (Minister for Industrial
Relations and Minister for Employment, 1987:21).
Therehabilitationreforms introduced in the Workers Compensation Act 1987, drew
upon these findings. At about the same time as the Working Party was established, the State
Compensation Board commissioned a comprehensive survey of rehabilitation services in
N e w South Wales to be undertaken by a firm of consultants. The aim was to establish an
operational framework for the development of rehabilitation services for injured employees
under the changes signalled for the forthcoming Workers Compensation Act 1987.
Published in April 1987, the report made a number of observations similar to earlier reports
including: workers' compensation and occupational rehabilitation are interrelated policy
issues, and that occupational rehabilitation is a very secondary consideration, (a point also
supported by the Department of Industrial Relations and Employment's Advisory Committee
on Prices and Incomes (1986)). This latter point was reinforced by noting that 4 % of
workers' compensation claims involving three days or more off work accounted for
approximately 4 7 % of the costs of compensation (Consultants for Health Services, 1987). A
large number of recommendations were put forward, some accepted, some not. Improved
data analysis, better informed employees and an accredited rehabilitation provider system
were taken up by the State Government. Independent case and claims management and a
core network of rehabilitation services for the state were not accepted since they contradicted
the workplace and self-regulatory focus.
It was also early in 1987 that the Australian Colleges of Occupational Medicine and
Rehabilitation Medicine published their Guidelines on Principles and Practice for
Occupational Rehabilitation. A fairly large pamphlet of 36 pages, this could be regarded,
among other things, as a pitch to secure a major role for these medical specialities in
forthcoming legislative reforms.
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4.3

Rehabilitation After the Workers Compensation Act 1987
The five years following the promulgation of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 is

a period characterised by significant change in terms of further legislative reconfiguration,
restructuring of enforcement agencies, improving financial performance of the WorkCover
scheme, a new State Government, the onset of a severe economic recession and a shift away
from tripartism in WorkCover policy making. The appropriate starting point for an
assessment of these changes and their relevance for the occupational rehabilitation mandate is
the Workers' Compensation Act 1987.

NSW Workers Compensation Act 1987
The 1987 Act introduced a new system called WorkCover to be administered jointly
by the State Compensation Board and State Department of Industrial Relations. Ironically,
while WorkCover signified an integrated approach to health, safety, rehabilitation and
workers' compensation, this was not reflected initially in the agency structures charged with
achieving this aim. The State Compensation Board looked after workers' compensation and
the vocational retraining component of occupational rehabilitation; health, safety and the
large part of rehabilitation was under the Department of Industrial Relations and
Employment
The most significant changes in the 1987 Act occurred in the following areas:
benefits, c o m m o n law, rehabilitation, dispute resolution, occupational health and safety, and
insurance arrangements. It was through these changes that the State Government sought to
achieve effective control over the workers' compensation system. These changes are
discussed below.
Benefits were structured with the intention of emphasising and promoting
rehabilitation, which WorkCover regarded as the principal means of reducing the duration of
incapacity. Compensation rates for the first 26 weeks of total incapacity were set at levels

which signified an effective reduction in pay. (Minister for Industrial Relations and Minister
for Employment, 1987.) Payments to partially incapacitated workers were made contingent
upon either their returning to work as soon as possible or undergoing rehabilitation and/or
vocational retraining, or seeking suitable employment. Formerrightsto redeem future losses
were replaced by a severely restrictedrightfor certain categories of workers to commute
future compensation payments.

The Table of M a i m s (now k n o w n as the Table,

Compensation for Permanent Injuries) was expanded to provide lump sump payments for a
greater range of permanent disabilities and to take pain and suffering into account. The range
of medical, rehabilitation expenses were also extended. Also, the 1987 Act abolished the
right of workers to claim damages at c o m m o n law against an employer, where that worker
had recourse to compensation under the new Act (Marks and McLean, 1992).
The main rehabilitation reforms to arise out of WorkCover included the requirement
for all places of employment to establish approved workplace-based rehabilitation programs
within a specified time period. These programs were to be developed by management and
unions using guidelines issued by The State Compensation Board of N e w South Wales and
the Occupational Health, Safety and Rehabilitation Council of N e w South Wales, and the
N e w South Wales Department of Health. A system of accreditation of medical and allied
rehabilitation service providers was also put into place. Medical certification was
standardised. The Division of Rehabilitation Services was transferred from the State
Compensation Board (formerly the Workers' Compensation Commission) to the Department
of Industrial Rehabilitation and Employment to put into effect the rehabilitation provisions of
the 1987 Act through information dissemination, standards development and formalised
evaluation and monitoring procedures. For example, during the first 12 months of
WorkCover's operation, a large number of awareness programs and seminars were run
statewide for industry and the workforce.

The Guidelines for Workplace-Based

Occupational Rehabilitation Programs (Occupational Health, Safety and Rehabilitation
Council of N S W , State Compensation Board of N S W , N S W Department of Health, 1987)

were finalized and distributed. These activities were preparatory to the commencement date
of 1 January, 1989, for employers with 20 or more staff to have rehabilitation programs in
place.
The adversarial system was specifically targeted for change. Dispute resolution
procedures were streamlined through the introduction of Review Officers to assist in more
informal and therefore speedy disposal of disputes rather than refer to the more formal,
protracted proceedings at Commissioner and Compensation Court stages. The role of
independent medical panels in disputed matters was also extended.
A s part of the WorkCover strategy (of the aims identified earlier) the N S W
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 was amended such that m a x i m u m fines for
offences were doubled and in certain cases imprisonment of offenders could be involved.
Additional staffing resources were also committed to improve the preventive component of
WorkCover.
The 1987 Act also changed the role of insurers from that of underwriter to one of
fund manager. While they were to continue to be responsible for administering premium
collection, claims payment and fund involvement, fund managers were not required to accept
risk. In addition, the industry-based component of insurance premium calculation was
modified to provide for a degree of cross-subsidisation across industries in recognition of the
additional burden carried by certain sectors.

WorkCover Review
Within less than 12 months of its enactment, the newly elected Liberal/National
Government, having succeeded its Labor predecessors early in 1988, undertook to conduct a
complete review of the 1987 Act and the WorkCover system. Workers' compensation was
still a very sensitive subject. For example, based on a pre-election survey of 500 randomly
selected N S W member organizations, the Chamber of Manufactures (1988), a major industry
association, earmarked workers' compensation premiums as the State Government issue of

greatest concern and requiring urgent attention.
The WorkCover review was undertaken by a Committee provided for under Section 8
of the 1987 Act, ironically a section subsequently repealed following the review report in
1989. This section stipulated the establishment of a tripartite Committee represented by
Government, employers and unions. However, the Government augmented the Committee
with representatives from a number of different organizations and professions. These are
given in Table 4.3. This shift from three party to multi-party representation was designed to
reflect the wider set of constituencies affected by workers' compensation and perhaps also to
dilute the relative hegemony of the trade unions in State level policy making. The study of
occupational rehabilitation networks in the Illawarra-(see chapter 6) confirms this multi-party

Organization Number of
Representatives
Employers Federation of N e w South Wales
Metal Trades Industry Association of Australia
The Master Builders' Association of N e w South Wales
Australian Chamber of Manufactures (New South Wales Division)
Labor Council of N e w South Wales
L a w Society of N e w South Wales
Bar Association of N e w South Wales
Insurance Council of Australia Limited
Medical Profession
Rehabilitation Profession
Attorney General's Department
N e w South Wales Treasury
State Compensation Board
Department of Industrial Relations and Employment

Table 4.3 Representative Organizations on the 1988/89 New South Wales
W o r k C o v e r Review Committee
Source:

WorkCover Review Committee (1989).

character. This restructuring of the Committee was also the first attempt at a N S W policy

level to disband the tripartite approach that characterised the occupational health, safety
compensation and rehabilitation domains.
Commencing in August 1988, the Committee tabled its report in April 1989. 220
formal public submissions were received from interested organizations and individuals
broadly reflecting the composition of the Committee:
150

employers or employer organizations

8

self-insurers

7

unions

20

medical and rehabilitation professionals

20

other professionals (including 2 from solicitors)

15

personal submissions (WorkCover Review Committee, 1989:17).

The review was wide-ranging albeit descriptive rather than analytic in its examination of
issues. Recommendations were presented essentially as statements of varying preference by
the interested parties since consensus was largely impracticable. For example, with
occupational rehabilitation some Committee m e m b e r s were more concerned about
withholding application of rehabilitation guidelines to small business (employers), others
about the need to regulate rehabilitation costs and services (legal profession, insurers,
employers). With respect to benefits and c o m m o n law in particular, differences of view
were even clearer. The unions, the legal profession and insurers were generally in favour of
reintroducing access by injured workers to c o m m o n law. O n the other hand, employers
were opposed to this on the grounds of its discouraging rehabilitation. In fact, with the
exception of prevention, all other areas reviewed were subject to varying degrees of
contention. Yet in a separate submission on industrial relations change, the Labor Council of
N e w South Wales (1988) called for more prosecutions as a means of bolstering prevention,
not a chosen employer strategy. The multi-party nature of the Committee with its often
diverse and opposed interests, left unresolved the possibility of presenting a c o m m o n set of
recommendations.
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Legislative Changes

to

WorkCover

Shortly after the above review, and in one instance even during its conduct, there
followed a spate of legislative and administrative changes to the WorkCover system. It is
unclear as to whether thefindingsand recommendations of the Review Committee stimulated
the changes introduced in the following few years. W h a t is clear is that change was
introduced primarily on the basis of the very satisfactory financial performance of the
WorkCover system over the full five years following its inception. A s the then Minister for
Industrial Relations and Employment, the Honourable John Fahey M P was quoted to say in
a press release (20 July 1989): "I have always said that additional benefits were only
possible if the actuarial report indicated that they could be afforded". In the first twelve
months of operating, WorkCover performance in terms of insurance premiums, far
outweighed expectations. Actuarial targets adapted by the State Compensation Board for the
1987/88 financial year were 3.2% of wages; actual cost was estimated to be 2.6%. The
impact of the financial surplus associated with this underage provided the State Government
with the latitude to introduce a series of reforms. M u c h was made by the Government of the
$295 million to be returned to injured workers in subsequently improved benefits. The
legislative changes m a d e since the introduction of the 1987 Act, including new regulations
and guidelines, that relate directly to occupational rehabilitation are given in Table 4.4 below.

Legislation
* Workers Compensation Act 1987 (as amended)
Statute L a w (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No. 2) 1987
Workers Compensation (Amendment Act) 1988
Workers Compensation (Compensation Court) Amendment Act 1988
Workers Compensation (Benefits) Amendment Act 1988
* WorkCover Administration Act 1989
Workers Compensation (Amendment) Act 1989
* Workers Compensation (Benefits) Amendment Act 1989
Statute L a w (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No. 2) 1990
Workers Compensation Legislation (Amendment) Act 1991
Workers Compensation (Amendment) Act 1991
Workers Compensation Legislation (Amendment) Act 1992
Workers Compensation (Amendment) Act 1992

Regulations
Workers Compensation (General) Regulation 1987
Workers Compensation (Review Officers) Regulation 1987
Workers Compensation (Savings and Transitional Provisions) Regulation 1987
Workers Compensation (Insurance Premiums) Regulation 1987
Workers Compensation (Fees and Costs) Regulation 1988
Workers Compensation (Dust Disease) (Amendment of Schedule) 1988
* Workers Compensation (General Rehabilitation Programs) Regulation 1988
Workers Compensation (Savings and Transitional) Regulations 1989

fGuidelines
Guidelines for Workplace-Based Occupational Rehabilitation Programs 1987
Interim Standards for Workplace Based Rehabilitation Providers 1988
Draft Guidelines for Rehabilitation Providers, Employers, Rehabilitation Coordinators,
Insurers and Unions: Confidentiality of Rehabilitation Clinical Records 1988
Provider Reporting Arrangements 1989
Handbook for Rehabilitation Coordinators 1990
Vocational Retraining Handbook 1990
WorkCover Medical Practitioners Handbook 1990
Guidelines for Vocational Retraining Proposals Under Section 153 1991

Guidelines for Continuing Sponsorship Under Section 153 1990
Guidelines for Purchase of Equipment Under Section 153 1991
Rehabilitation Procedures: Guidelines for Insurers and Rehabilitation Providers 1992
* Directly pertain to occupational rehabilitation.
f The guidelines listed above represent only those which directly concern occupational
rehabilitation. There are m a n y other WorkCover guidelines not shown here that do not
impinge on rehabilitation.

Table 4.4

Workers' Compensation Legislation, Regulations and Relevant
Guidelines Introduced in the 5 Year Period Ending 30th June,
1992.

Sourced from: WorkCover Authority Annual Reports 1988-1992, Annual Report of the
Department of Industrial Relations and Employment 1987-88, Annual
Report of the State Compensation Board 1987-88, and primary documents.
The legislative changes made shortly after the 1989 WorkCover Review were in the
areas of c o m m o n law, benefits, dispute resolution and administration. The reintroduction of
the c o m m o n lawrightof injured workers to claim damages against an employer, typically
regarded as an anti-rehabilitative provision (Clayton 1986), was circumscribed by a severely
restricted eligibility threshold based on the level of disability. In the main, the levels of other
benefits were increased in respect of death, unemployed partially incapacitated workers and
the Table of Compensation for Permanent Injuries. O f particular relevance was the extension
of benefits for persons undertaking occupational rehabilitation to 52 weeks from 26.
Changes to dispute resolution saw the return of jurisdiction to determine workers'
compensation disputes to the Compensation Court. Changes in WorkCover Administration
are discussed later in this section.
Reference to Table 4.4 indicates there was a significant amount of legislative activity
in workers' compensation over the five year period ending in June 1992. The Chairperson
of the WorkCover Authority in the 1989/90 WorkCover Annual Report referred to the "very
significant" changes and the amount of "unprecedented change for WorkCover". The

changes and additions to law regulations and guidelines represents an uncertain, unstable
legislative context so far as occupational rehabilitation was concerned. Although the
legislative changes to occupational rehabilitation over the five year period were few, the
number of legally underpinned guidelines and handbooks on rehabilitation promulgated by
WorkCover were many. However, given that occupational rehabilitation and workers'
compensation are legally linked through the distribution of benefits to workers and payment
of various service providers, then uncertainty and instability in other aspects of workers'
compensation m a y direct attention away from rehabilitation to the assimilation of n e w rules
and procedures.

Administrative Changes to WorkCover
Not only was there significant reform of workers' compensation and occupational
rehabilitation, but the agencies initially charged with administering the WorkCover system
were subjected to a series of restructuring endeavours. In turn these affected the sections
charged with responsibility for occupational rehabilitation. The changes are discussed
below. A s mentioned earlier, at the onset of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, the
WorkCover system was administered by two separate agencies: the State Compensation
Board and the Department of Industrial Relations and Employment. This arrangement was
to remain in place until July 1989. However, it was not in response to the WorkCover
Review Committee that occupational health, safety, rehabilitation and workers compensation
would be brought under the steerage of one agency. Rather, in October 1988 the Minister
for Industrial Relations and Employment pre-empted any deliberations by the active Review
Committee by announcing the disbanding of the State Compensation Board and its
replacement with a n e w Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Authority (Sydney
Morning Herald, 13 October 1988). The n e w Authority which came into being on 1 July
1989 was a restructuring exercise whereby the occupational health, safety and rehabilitation
units of the Department of Industrial Relations were transferred to the n e w Authority. For

the first time then, after the earlier calls for administrative integration, accident prevention,
compensation and rehabilitation were brought together under one roof. The title of this
authority was according to the Minister, Mr. John Fahey, "....designed .... to signify the
integral nature of rehabilitation in any modern workers' compensation scheme" (News
release, 17 N o v e m b e r 1988). Yet only six months after its inception the Workers
Compensation and Rehabilitation Authority dropped rehabilitation and compensation from its
title and became the WorkCover Authority, a name it has maintained to the present time.
In addition to the underlying logic of planning and administering interrelated accident
prevention, rehabilitation and compensation under a single authority, there was clear attempt
to abandon the tripartite approach to policy making in these arenas. First, by sacking the
members of the State Compensation Board in October 1988, the Minister for Industrial
Relations and Employment indicated that"... the n e w directors will not be representative of
purely sectional interests in the current manner" (News release, 17 November 1988). That
current manner was tripartite: employers unions, and insurers. The members subsequently
appointed in M a y 1989 represented insurers, the legal and medical professions, employers
and unions. Second, in the transition to becoming the WorkCover Authority, the
Occupational Health, Safety and Rehabilitation Council lost its policy making functions and
was reconstituted to perform only an advisory role to the Authority's Board of Directors. A s
suggested earlier, at the back of this shift away from tripartism w a s the Liberal
Government's intention to reduce the union movement's influence in policy making to levels
well below those it had enjoyed under the Labor Government in the previous decade or so.
The traditionally antagonistic relationship between the State Liberal Government and the
union movement was captured in a series of strongly worded press releases issued by the
Minister for Industrial Relations and Employment from December 1988 to August 1989.
Faced by unions hostile to his proposed changes to WorkCover, ".... M r . Fahey claimed
"This package of reform rectifies the injustices and overturns sordid Sussex Street (Labor
Council Head Office) deals" (News release, 3 M a y 1989); M r . Fahey said that the Union

Movement had been unrealistic and hypocritical in the Workers Compensation debate. H e
said that they had peddled lies such as 'the Government eroding workersrights'.... "(News
release, 16 July 1989). In later submissions m a d e to the State Government for changes to
WorkCover, the Labor Council of N e w South Wales (1993:2) criticised the "abolition of
tripartism". While tripartism was abandoned at the policy making level, discussions held
with key members of peak organizations (over and above those interviewed in the two case
studies) representing the unions, rehabilitation providers, insurers and the medical
professions confirmed that WorkCover Authority maintained a consultative approach in
policy development. Further, legislated tripartite provisions for the establishment of
workplace-based rehabilitation programs and occupational health and safety committees were
not altered by the Government. The picture arising from this analysis is the abandonment of
tripartite policy making largely at the expense of the unions in favour of multi-party
consultation by the W o r k C o v e r Authority while retaining tripartism at operational
industry/workplace levels.
From 1990 onwards, the WorkCover Authority set about becoming and behaving
more like a private sector organization. It conducted a Strategic Organization Review leading
to major changes to internal management and structures; it developed a draft corporate plan
and a five year information systems plan. Occupational rehabilitation was to form a key part
of the Authority's legal functions, espoused mission and objectives:

"Mission
T o prevent work related injury and illness and their social and economic impacts by:
•

improving health and safety in the workplace

•

rehabilitating injured workers

•

compensating injured workers and their dependants
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"Objectives
•

T o improve health and safety in workplaces

•

T o reduce the social and economic impact of work related injuries and illness

•

T o promote the rehabilitation of workers w h o suffer w o r k related
injury or illness

•

T o ensure workers compensation benefits and premiums are equitable, affordable
and responsible

•

T o ensure all injured workers promptly receive the benefits to which they are
entitled." (WorkCover Authority, 1992:1).

Of particular significance in the post 1990 restructuring of the self-funding, commercial
oriented WorkCover Authority was the decentralization of prevention, rehabilitation and
compensation operations to one-stop-shop offices in major regional centres and districts
throughout N e w South Wales.

This took place during 1991.

Thus, what was

predominantly a Sydney, head office based statutory authority developed into an
organization that sought to make itself more accessible to its public.

Changes to Occupational Rehabilitation Administration
The foregoing discussion on directional and structural changes has focused on issues
at the agency level. These changes had an impact on the structure and operation of the
agency units charged with implementation of occupational rehabilitation. Immediately
following the introduction of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, the Division of
Rehabilitation Services was transferred from the State Compensation Board into the
Department of Industrial Relations and Employment and came under the responsibility of the
Coordinator of Occupational Health, Safety and Rehabilitation Services. Reporting to a
director, the Division comprised three branches as shown in Figure 4.1 below:

Director

Advisory
Branch

Accreditation
Branch

Manager
Accreditation
Officers

Figure 4.1

1
5

Manager
Industry Advisors
Mediation Officers
Education Officer
Public Relations
Officers

Data & Policy
Branch

5
2
1

Manager
1
Policy Advisor 1
Special Projects
Officer
1

2

Division of Rehabilitation Services (as at April 1989)

Source: Internal Department of Industrial Relations and Employment document

The vocational retraining unit (formerly part of the Division of Rehabilitation Services)
remained within the State Compensation Board and came under the Division of

Compensation Services. The main activities of the Division of Rehabilitation Services in t
first two years of the WorkCover system were conducting awareness programs for industry
and the workforce, distribution of the Guidelines for Workplace-based Occupational

Rehabilitation Programs, training rehabilitation coordinators, funding employer associatio

and unions to assist in information dissemination,, setting up accreditation guidelines fo

rehabilitation providers and assessment of subsequent applications, and the development of
accreditation provider monitoring and reporting systems. This period saw the Division's
major dealings taking place with employers, unions and employees.
With the creation of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Authority in mid
1989 and then the WorkCover Authority at the beginning of 1990, all occupational

rehabilitation units were contained within a single agency. However, vocational retraining
was kept under a newly created Workers' Compensation Insurance and Fund Management

Division while Rehabilitation Services was located in the n e w Risk Management Division.
These n e w Divisions formed part of WorkCover's Strategic Organization Review. From
mid 1989 to mid 1991, rehabilitation services continued to focus on providing advice and
assistance to industry, workers, unions and the public in general. For example during the
1989/90 financial year 72 training seminars were conducted, a total audience of 10,047 was
reached, and 11,140 telephone enquiries were received (WorkCover Authority, 1990).
Rehabilitation providers started to provide performance data to the Authority which formed
the basis for their arms-length monitoring by the Accreditation Branch. In September 1989,
Rehabilitation Services began to publish a newsletter "Provider Press" which as its name
implies was targeted at the 120 plus accredited rehabilitation providers statewide. In addition
to general information provided on WorkCover and published research, Provider Press gave
feedback on general provider performance such as return to work rates and numbers of cases
handled. Further, increased attention was directed at the development and publication of
guidelines and handbooks intended to assist with the implementation of the rehabilitation
mandate (refer to Table 4.4). These guidelines and handbooks fitted in with WorkCover's
more flexible regulatory form underlying its "intention to develop a co-operative relationship
with industry" (WorkCover Authority, 1991:6).
With the onset of a fairly severe economic recession in N e w South Wales in the late
1980s and into the early 1990s, increased attention and resources in rehabilitation were
directed at vocational retraining. Vocational retraining was used to assist severely and other
injured workers unable to return to their pre-injury jobs by providing funds for training
courses to improve the chances of gaining suitable alternative employment. Thus .... "the
number of people retrained increased by 6 3 % from 267 approved applications in 1989-90 to
435 in 1990-91" (WorkCover Authority, 1991:22). The commitment to vocational
retraining continued to grow; guidelines were published to assist with applications (see
Table 4.4); staff numbers in this section were increased. In 1991-92, at 677 there was a
5 6 % increase in the number of approved retraining applications compared with the previous

year.
In 1990 the WorkCover Authority participated and jointly funded a one year pilot
program designed to assist injured workers in country N e w South Wales to get alternative
work in response to a problem perceived by the N S W Labor Council. Set in the rural area
of Bathurst, Orange and Blayney, the program was also supported by the Employers
Federation

of N S W ,

the N S W

Labor

Council

and

Comcare

(Federal

Government/Commonwealth employees' equivalent of WorkCover). The project was
intended to facilitate retraining and redeployment for injured workers through which they
might be offered alternative work in another organization if no alternatives were available in
the first employer. Incentives for initial training and rehabilitation were to be met by the
Fund Manager, that is, the insurer (Orange Bathurst Blayney Pilot Project, 1990). Through
an employer survey it was found that the projects were beset by concerns that hindered its
launch. Problems identified included difficulties in transferring staff and skills from one
employer to another, fears of injured workers seeking additional compensation for
aggravation of existing injuries or through n e w ones and the inadequacy of free work trial
incentives (Bathurst Orange Blayney ( B O B ) Pilot Program Progress Report, 1991). This
project was a failure in terms of its aims; it was not extended elsewhere. It served as a
salutary exercise in the operational, legal and economic barriers to interorganizational
network formation in difficult rehabilitation circumstances.
In a further attempt to target the unemployed and partially incapacitated workers, the
State Government, through the WorkCover Authority, launched a program called JobCover
in February 1992. Perhaps in response to the question of incentive levels arising out of the
Bathurst Pilot, the JobCover Program provided incentives to employers in the form of up to
12 months' free workers' compensation insurance. In the first five months of operation,
2,000 employees were engaged under the program.
T w o important rehabilitation initiatives taken in the latter stages of the study time
frame were the establishment of a Board level Rehabilitation Sub-Committee and the

devolution of advisory services to regional and district offices in 1991. Created following
the recommendation of the WorkCover Review Committee in 1989, the Board level
subcommittee focused in its four reported meetings of potentially long term injured workers.
Deliberations on these were not completed within the time frame of this study. However, it
is of interest that in organizational terms (WorkCover Authority) occupational rehabilitation
was receiving active Board level consideration. A s found in research on workplace health
and safety effectiveness in the United Kingdom, words in the form of the mission statement
and objectives backed by senior management deeds underscore a capacity to create
significant organizational commitment to health, safety and rehabilitation through control and
allocation of financial and human resources (Dawson, Poynter and Stevens, 1983).
In structural terms, WorkCover Authority commitment to occupational rehabilitation
during 1991 and the first half of 1992 was somewhat mixed. O n the one hand, there was
effectively a transferral of staff from the advisory branch (see Figure 4.1) of the Division of
Rehabilitation Services to advisory roles in regional offices for handling local queries on
rehabilitation and workers' compensation; hence their position titles as R e c o m Officers.
Also, the vocational rehabilitation branch received additional staffing to assist with the
greatly increased workload associated with retraining applications and activities. O n the
other hand, at about the same time as the above regionalisation took place, what remained of
the Division of Rehabilitation Services was subsumed under a Projects, Information and
Education Services Branch. These were the accreditation and data policy branches of the
Division and they, like the advisory branch, also experienced a reduction in staff numbers
compared with 1989. In a sense, it would seem that their role and their capacity in
implementation of the occupational rehabilitation mandate had diminished.

WorkCover System Performance
Finally, in examining the emergence of the occupational rehabilitation mandate it is
important to have some notion of h o w the various structural, legislative and administrative

changes in the WorkCover system have been reflected in performance (the issue of mandate
impact is examined more thoroughly in Chapter 7). Based on WorkCover corporate
performance indicators (WorkCover Authority, 1991, 1992) there were indications of
improving overall system performance. Table 4.5 shows the change in average premium
rates since the introduction of WorkCover in 1987.

Year

% of Wages

1987/88

2.47

1988/89

2.45
2.24

1989/90
1990/91
1991/92

Table 4.5

1.93
1.80

Average N S W Workers' Compensation Premium Rate
as a Percentage of Wages

Source:

WorkCover Authority, 1992

From being the Australian State with the highest workers' compensation premium rates,
N e w South Wales turned round to enjoying the status as one of the lowest. This also meant
that progressive improvements in benefits for injured workers contained in much of the
legislative change could be readily afforded. The precise reasons for the above
improvement, and in particular the contribution of occupational rehabilitation, remain unclear
and as such they warrant a detailed study. Falling numbers of lost-time workers'
compensation claims would certainly appear to have played some part (see Table 4.6).

No. of W o r k Injuries

Year
1987/88
1988/89

114,270)

1989/90
1990/91
1992/92

108,757)

114,151) l
58,050) 2
53,402)

l

Worker injuries involving three or more days of incapacity.

2

Work injuries involved five or more days of incapacity (change in statistical reporting to
conform with nationwide system).

Table 4.6 Lost-time Workers' Compensation Claims
Source:

WorkCover Authority Annual Reports 1988-1992

Conversely, the rate of rehabilitation provider case closures resulting in return to
work (refer to Table 4.7) appeared to deteriorate from the time records began to be kept,
with a minor turnaround in the March and June 1992 quarters. Given that only a small,
albeit costly, proportion of total lost-time cases are handled by rehabilitation providers in
anyone
Return to W o r k Rate %

Quarter

Table 4.7

September

1989

79

December

1989

79

March

1990

72

June

1990

78

September

1990

74

December

1990

75

March

1991

68

June
September

1991

66

1991

65

December

60

March

1991
1992

June

1992

70

Rate of Rehabilitation Provider Case Closures Resulting in
Return to W o r k

Source:

66

Provider Press (1989-1992)
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year, approximately 6%, it is not safe to infer that overall rehabilitation performance was
slipping. For example, the duration of the cases involving rehabilitation providers m a y have
fallen. Equally, lowering return to work rates m a y have reflected greater difficulty in
employers' ability rehabilitate their o w n injured workers due to the economic recession of
the late 1980s and early 1990s bringing about reduction in the scope for alternative work.
A search of the relevant case law indicated no involvement of the courts in
judgements and interpretations of the occupational rehabilitation mandate during the first five
years of WorkCover. This includes no prosecutions by WorkCover in this regard. It is
unclear if this is because the mandate is uncontentious or that problems are resolved without
resorting to the courts or that there is an unwillingness to prosecute or address disputed
matters. A tentative conclusion would suggest that for the most part, self-regulated
occupational rehabilitation was unenforced. This issue is examined more fully in Chapter 6.
T o summarise this section, the first five years of the WorkCover system have seen
substantial additions, changes and refinements to workers' compensation legislation,
associated regulatory instruments, and to the agency charged with its implementation. These
changes also included the continuing emergence of the occupational rehabilitation mandate
and the means for its implementation. Inevitability, they have implications for the
interorganizational relations that arise between the regulatory agency (latterly WorkCover)
and the target organizations, as well as those between the target organizations themselves.
These are discussed in the next section.

4.4 Implications for Interorganizational Relations
Perhaps the major implication for interorganizational relations with respect to the
emergence of the occupational rehabilitation mandate is the need to learn and adapt
continuously to a complex uncertain and variable set of changing legal, procedural and
structural circumstances. T h e legal and procedural circumstances were themselves

influenced by inteorganizational policy analysis and development (cf. WorkCover Review
Committee). This need to learn and adapt is seen to affect both the regulatory agency(ies)
and the explicitly and implicitly mandated organizations in a number of ways. These are
usefully examined according to three steps of Cranston's (1987) process model of legislative
efficacy: mandate form, implementation and impact. Before doing this, it is important to
recognise that these three steps are not linear in nature.
A s was demonstrated through the analysis in this chapter form, implementation and
impact at the policy level interact, overlap and follow one another in a non-linear fashion.
For example, the impact of a better than expected financial performance led WorkCover to
initiate mandate reforms in 1988 and 1990 to improve the level of benefits for injured
workers receiving rehabilitation. The impact of economic recession on employment levels
stimulated the State Government to emphasise vocational retraining more strongly. A shift
from tripartism to multi-party involvement in policy consultation and development such as in
the WorkCover Review w a s an early signal from Government to the unions that their
previously dominant role would diminish. This is the nature of emergence in social affairs:
it is not emergence that emerges in the model of legislative efficacy, it is form(s),
implementation and impact.
The main implications of the emergent form of the occupational rehabilitation mandate
for interorganizational relations concern the creation of I O R where previously there were few
and the need for interacting parties to learn and m a k e sense of n e w laws and regulations not
just once but as they change. Prior to the 1987 Act it is generally accepted there was little
organizational and therefore, interorganizational activity aimed at rehabilitating injured
workers. Subsequently, legislating for occupational rehabilitation provided a stimulus for
I O R based on self-regulatory principles previously employed in occupational health and
safety. Those organizations that participated in rehabilitation would need to determine the
degree of their commitment to dealings with others in terms of staff, time and financial
resources within the broad parameters of the rehabilitation mandate. In addition, they would

be required to c o m e to terms with possibly n e w sets of circumstances, for example, an
employer having to work with a rehabilitation provider organization to develop a
rehabilitation plan which in turn is discussed and agreed with the injured worker's union.
. Usually, n e w regulations and guidelines need to be learned and understood, in a
sense internalized by organizations, for them to be implemented reasonably effectively.
With the occupational rehabilitation mandate, learning by organizations refers not only to
what is required of them individually, for example, the development of internal alternative
duty procedures. It also entails learning what is required of them in relation to other
organizations. In these circumstances, it also becomes important to understand what the
mandate requires of the others, so that the I O R can be conducted in an appropriate
"mandated" manner. Thus the learning requirements of interorganizational mandates are
seen to be potentially more complex than those targeting individual organizations. In partial
mandates this learning needs to extend beyond the formal prescriptions to account for the
activities of those implicitly involved in the mandated activity.
Since the rehabilitation mandate was formulated according to self-regulatory
principles, I O R would be characterised by uncertainty as organizations sought to m a k e sense
of h o w to regulate themselves and each other within a context of vaguely specified legal
requirements. Hence, the subsequent issue by WorkCover of handbooks and guidelines on
"how to" rehabilitate from a number of perspectives (see Table 4.4), with the intention of
reducing this uncertainty. However, by dint of the volume and frequency of their issue,
additional uncertainty in I O R was probably created through yet further regulatory agency
prescriptions to absorb. Chapter 6 addresses the issue of target organizations' responses to
mandate form at greater length.
The major implications of the emerging approaches to mandate implementation for
IOR focus only on those relations arising between WorkCover and the target organizations,
since this chapter's analysis was at the mandate (State) level rather than the local, operational
network. This latter level is examined in Chapter 6. The implications are that internal
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organizational structures and activities m a y have a significant bearing on implementation,
and that changing mandate form and agency priorities will influence implementation. B y
restructuring WorkCover administration into one regulatory agency from two reduced the
number of agencies that target organizations would need to deal with for rehabilitation
purposes. From WorkCover's perspective, a single authority permitted better coordination
and integration of implementation strategies for occupational health, safety, rehabilitation and
workers' compensation. However, the amount of effort and internal reorganization
necessary for an amalgamation of staff from different agencies and the redirection of the
WorkCover Authority to a commercially oriented, private sector style corporate operation of
necessity directed energy away from external relations with target organizations.
Regionalization of occupational rehabilitation and workers' compensation advisory
services would lead to closer and more frequent interactions between the agency and local
organizations. O n the other hand, the disappearance of the Division of Rehabilitation
Services and the reduction in the size and prominence of the remaining central office
rehabilitation functions (accreditation and data policy) led to weaker ties with target
organizations at this level. Emerging mandate implementation also influenced
interorganizational relations through progressively more information provided by guidelines
and handbooks on what rehabilitation entailed, a point m a d e earlier. In one sense, this
information could be viewed as uncertainty reducing by more fully explicating what should
take place between organizations. In another, it could be regarded as uncertainty increasing
through complexity-heightening layers of rules and suggestions making it more difficult to
determine what to do.
The implications of emerging mandate impact for interorganizational relations arise
through its feedback into and influence on changes in form and implementation. Thus the
social and economic impact of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 was such that it led to
major legislative reforms that emphasised the rehabilitation of injured workers and, as noted
earlier, this provided for mandated interorganizational relations in rehabilitation.

Subsequently, measures of impact (such as average premium rate and return to work rates)
would provide a basis for changes in law, n e w regulations, and shifts in agency priorities.
For example, increased funding for vocational retraining and the associated lift in
applications would involve more interaction between the applying organizations (usually
rehabilitation providers) with tertiary education institutions such as T.A.F.E. (Technical and
Further Education).

4.5 Summary
In this chapter the emergence of the occupational rehabilitation mandate w a s
examined. Its interwoven relationship with occupational health and safety together with
workers' compensation were identified and analysed in legal and agency structure terms both
prior to and in the five years following the mandate's introduction in 1987. T h e mandate
emerged as largely unenforced and self-regulatory, with the implications for I O R arising out
of the need for organizations to learn and adapt not only to a complex, uncertain and variable
set of circumstances facing themselves but also to appreciate h o w these circumstances affect
others insofar as they influence their resultant IOR.

Chapter 5
F o r m of the Occupational Rehabilitation M a n d a t e

"Occupational rehabilitation is the restoration of the
injured worker to the fullest physical, psychological,
social, vocational and economic usefulness of which they
(sic) are capable. It is all about getting injured workers
back on the job as quickly as is safely possible".
(Guidelines

for workplace-based

occupational

rehabilitation programmes, 1987:4).

5.1 Introduction
This chapter has two main aims. The first is to analyse the form and content of the
legislation, regulations, guidelines and W o r k C o v e r handbooks directly related to
occupational rehabilitation, in order to determine:
(i)

the explicitly mandated organizations and their respective duties/obligations; and de
facto, those organizations involved directly in occupational rehabilitation w h o are not
explicitly mandated;

(ii)

the level of regulatory agency and target elements' (explicitly mandated organizations)
discretion embodied within mandate provisions;

(hi)

mandate clarity and complexity; and

(iv)

potential "loopholes" and subsequent potential implementation problems.
Explicitly mandated organizations are confirmed as employers, unions, rehabilitation

providers and the W o r k C o v e r Authority.

It also becomes clear that the nature of

occupational rehabilitation extends beyond mandated organizations and will involve
significant others. O f these, treating medical practitioners and insurers are considered to
comprise a potentially important type of extra-mandatory control with regard to progress of
rehabilitation and authorisation of rehabilitation expenditure respectively.
Apart from the rehabilitation providers, the mandate confers a large amount of

discretion upon the regulatory agency, employers and unions in its interpretation. This
discretion is derived from specific prescriptions within the mandate but perhaps more so
from its looseness, vagueness and general lack of clarity. These latter three characteristics
probably reflect the problems inherent in attempts at regulating legally-politically complex
multi-party interorganizational relations.
The second aim of this chapter makes an initial assessment of h o w mandate form
might interact and influence mandate implementation and impact. It is suggested that with
rehabilitation providers, mandate form permits the WorkCover Authority to exercise closer
control over their activities. With respect to employers and unions it is argued that form
would lead to unenforced, if not unenforceable, mutual regulation a m o n g target
organizations as well as with other non-mandated organizations directly involved in
occupational rehabilitation. This leads to the view that the open-ended, partial nature of the
mandate, and the particular interorganizational character of occupational rehabilitation
requires the involvement of not only explicitly mandated but also implicitly mandated
organizations.
The above aims recognise that "legislative form tells a great deal about legislative
efficacy" (Cranston, 1987:10), an issue discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. In pursuing
this line, Cranston directed his analytic focus at the actual form on the statute books. These
are taken to include the law itself and any associated statutory regulations. However, in this
study, it was considered necessary to include guidelines and handbooks devised and issued
by the WorkCover Authority since they are used as a means for explicating the form and in
some instances giving form to the statutory provisions. T h e legislation, regulations,
guidelines and handbooks that comprise the analytic focus of this chapter are listed in Table
5.1.
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Legislation
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (as amended)
WorkCover Administration Act 1989
Regulations
Workers Compensation (General Rehabilitation Programs) Regulation 1988
Guidelines
Guidelines for Workplace-Based Occupational Rehabilitation Programs 1987
Interim Standards for Workplace Based Rehabilitation Providers 1988
Draft Guidelines for Rehabilitation Providers, Employers, Rehabilitation Coordinators,
Insurers and Unions: Confidentiality of Rehabilitation Clinical Records 1988
Guidelines for Vocational Retraining Proposals Under Section 153 1990
Guidelines for Continuing Sponsorship Under Section 153 1990
Guidelines for Purchase of Equipment Under Section 153 1991
Rehabilitation Procedures: Guidelines for Insurers and Rehabilitation Providers 1992
Handbooks
Handbook for Rehabilitation Coordinators 1990
Vocational Refraining Handbook 1991
WorkCover Medical Practitioners Handbook 1991
Table 5.1 Legislation, Regulations, Guidelines and Handbooks Directly
Related to Occupational Rehabilitation (Table 4.4 modified)

The following five sections of this chapter set out to achieve the two stated aims and
explain their findings more fully. The first of these (Section 5.2) examines the form of the
legislative provisions specific to occupational rehabilitation. The next three sections deal
with the form of regulations, guidelines and WorkCover handbooks respectively. Finally, in
Section 5.6 the implications of mandated occupational rehabilitation form for
interorganizational relations are discussed, with due regard to the interactions between
WorkCover Authority and those organizations explicitly mandated, as well as the interactions
between explicitly and implicitly mandated organizations.
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5.2

Legislation
There are two Acts that directly concern occupational rehabilitation in N e w South

Wales:

T h e Workers Compensation Act 1987 (as amended) and the W o r k C o v e r

Administration Act 1989. Each of these will be dealt with in turn. It should be noted that in
the previous chapter, a third Act, the Workers Compensation (Benefits) A m e n d m e n t Act
1989 was identified as being of direct relevance to occupational rehabilitation (see Table
4.4). This Act which, inter aha, increased benefits levels to injured workers on rehabilitation
and defined rehabilitation services for billing purposes, was incorporated into the above
mentioned 1987 Act as one of a series of legislative amendments m a d e in the years since its
promulgation. Therefore, analysis of the 1987 Act includes the 1989 Benefits A m e n d m e n t
Act.

Workers Compensation Act 1987
A s mentioned in the previous chapter, it was the Workers Compensation Act 1987
that provided for the rehabilitation of employees in respect of work-related injuries and
illness. O f its 282 sections and 6 schedules, only ten sections directly concern rehabilitation.
Four of these sections comprise Part 6 of the 1987 Act, which establishes the basic platform
for workplace-based rehabilitation. T h e remaining six sections relate to compensation
benefits payable to the injured worker and to service providers during occupational
rehabilitation. The specific sections are:
Part 6 - Rehabilitation of Injured Workers
Section 152.

Rehabilitation programs to be established by employers

Section 153.

Vocational re-education etc. provided by the Authority

Section 154.

Rehabilitation counsellors

Section 154A.

Rehabilitation etc. not admission of liability

Part 3 - Compensation-Benefits
Section 38.

Partially incapacitated unemployed workers compensation as if totally
incapacitated

Section 38A.

Definitions: Section 38

Section 4 0

Weekly payment during partial incapacity

Section 59.

Definitions

Section 60. Compensation for cost of medical or hospital treatment and
rehabilitation etc.
Section 63A.

Rates applicable for occupational rehabilitation service.

These will be examined following the order in which they are listed.

Section 152. Rehabilitation programs to be established by employers
A s thetitlesuggests, this section provides that employer organizations are to establish
rehabilitation programs. However, the details on h o w to set up and operate such programs
are not given; they are referred to regulations and guidelines (which will be discussed in the
later sections of this chapter). However, Section 152 does stipulate the involvement of
certain oganizations in establishing rehabilitation programs: employers, industrial unions
(where represented), the W o r k C o v e r Authority and accredited rehabilitation providers.
Furthermore, Section 152 (2) (c) provides for the disclosure of information on rehabilitation
programs through their display or notification at workplaces.
Overall, this section indicates that occupational rehabilitation programs are to be an
interorganizational activity, the regulatory details of which are delegated primarily to the
WorkCover Authority for formulation and administration. Unlike so m a n y other terms in the
1987 Act, occupational rehabilitation is not defined either in S.152 nor any other for that
matter. It required the development of guidelines to give form to this "central aspect" of the
1987 Act.

Section 153. Vocational re-education etc. provided by the Authority
This section sets up arrangements for the W o r k C o v e r Authority to operate and fund
re-education and rehabilitation schemes. T h e details for such funding and the nature of the
schemes are ceded to the Authority.
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Section 154. Rehabilitation counsellors
The W o r k C o v e r Authority is given the capacity to appoint rehabilitation counsellors
to assist with running rehabilitation programs, monitoring injured workers' progress in
rehabilitation and consulting with employers about returning injured employers to work and
inspecting workplaces for rehabilitation purposes. A m a x i m u m penalty of $2,000 m a y be
imposed where such counsellors are hindered or obstructed in their inspections. O f all the
sections in Part 6, this is the only instance (Section 154 (5)) where a negative sanction is
applicable.

Section 154A. Rehabilitation etc. not admission of liability
A s Marks and M c L e a n (1992:431) noted, this section acts as a positive incentive for
employers to rehabilitate injured workers by providing that such rehabilitation activities do
not constitute an admission of liability under the 1987 Act and as such render them liable to
pay additional compensation.

In summary, Part 6 of the 1987 Act appears to be loosely framed in ways that are
uncharacteristic for the larger proportion of the 1987 Act, a point examined in the
discussions of sections 38 and 38A. This looseness gives the W o r k C o v e r Authority the
scope and discretion to determine policy details through regulations and guidelines.

Section 38. Partially incapacitated unemployed workers compensated as if totally
incapacitated
Section 38A. Definitions: Section 38
Section 38, backed by definitions set out in 38A, contains the primary economic
incentive for rehabilitation to take place so far as employers and employees are concerned.
As the section title suggests, if a partially incapacitated worker requests and is not provided

with rehabilitation ("suitable employment") by the employers, then that worker is entitled to
be paid at increased rates up to a m a x i m u m of 52 weeks. This means that an employer
organization m a y find itself paying more for its workers' compensation insurance if it either
refuses to provide or does not have rehabilitation available. Besides having an injured
employee even partially functional at work and thereby securing some meaningful output,
research suggests that early rehabilitation also promotes better chances of recovery and
consequently lower overall compensation costs (Ganora and Wright, 1987; Pati, 1985). In
this way, the form of this section provides an efficiency motive (Oliver, 1990) for employer
organizations to deal with other parties involved in the injured worker's case. For the
employee, failure to request or unwillingness to participate in rehabilitation would lead to
payment of benefits at lower levels than otherwise.
In contrast to the four abovementioned sections that m a k e up Part 6 of the 1987 Act,
Sections 38 and 3 8 A are m u c h more precise and detailed in their provisions. They embody
the legal certainty considered necessary to control the level and duration of compensation
payments to eligible injured workers. However, this certainty is achieved at the expense of a
complex and relatively lengthy set of conditions. For example, Sections 38 and 38 A take up
more than five pages of the 1987 Act compared with a little over two for those in Part 6.

Section 40. Weekly payment during partial incapacity
This section sets out in detail the provisions for make-up pay to injured workers w h o
are partially incapacitated. In doing so, it seeks to provide employees with an incentive to
return to work on rehabilitation. However, for workers w h o are affected by longer term
incapacity, this incentive is moderated by the level of make-up being subsumed after 26
weeks by a statutory rate that is often lower than the award-based rate.

Section 59. Definitions
The definitions given in this section relate to the compensation payable for medical,

hospital and rehabilitation expenses. O f particular interest are those that concern hospital,
medical or related treatment and occupational rehabilitation services. A n attempt is m a d e to
distinguish between treatment and rehabilitation for compensation and billing purposes.
Prior to the introduction of amendments to the 1987 Act by w a y of the Workers
Compensation (Benefits) A m e n d m e n t Act 1989, the distinction between treatment and
rehabilitation was far from clear, so m u c h so that medical treatment was defined under the
then Section 59 to include "treatment by w a y of rehabilitation". Subsequently, this clause
was removed and occupational rehabilitation service defined (see Appendix 12). While this
makes billing by service providers more straightforward, it does not seem to resolve the
issue that treatment m a y and sometimes does include rehabilitation and vice versa. Thus,
under section 59 treatment by a medical practitioner m a y well be proffered by a rehabilitation
specialist, out of a hospital rehabilitation centre, as w a s the case in one of the injuries
examined in this study. This operational overlap and blurredness assumes importance when
it is recognised that medical practitioners are not explicitly required by the legislation to be
involved in occupational rehabilitation.

Section 60. Compensation for cost of medical or hospital treatment and rehabilitation etc.
This section provides the economic incentive for medical treatment and rehabilitation
service providers to become involved with an injured worker's case and thus with other
involved parties by requiring the employer, usually through the fund manager, to pay for
these duly verified costs.

Section 63A. Rates applicable for occupational rehabilitation service
This section stipulates the conditions associated with the amount payable for
rehabilitation services, defined under guidelines and regulations discussed later in this
chapter. These are somewhat vague in that reasonableness is the principal test for the
provision of such services. It is also interesting to note that the rehabilitation cost review

point is set at $1,200 compared with $10,000 for medical and related treatment (Section 61).
The tighter control (detailed in regulations and guidelines) implied in this lower figure
reflects the concerns and suspicions about possible rehabilitation provider over-servicing
reported by the 1989 WorkCover Review Committee (see Chapter 4).

WorkCover Administration Act 1989
This legislation (the 1989 Act) was introduced primarily to constitute the WorkCover
Authority and define its functions. It is within these functions set out in Sections 12 and 13
that the Authority is mandated to "ensure the efficient, effective and equitable rehabilitation
and compensation of persons injured at work ...." (WorkCover Administration Act 1989,
Section 12 (2) (b). Section 13 indicates h o w the Authority is to implement the above
rehabilitation mandate. This includes encouraging research into rehabilitation strategies,
providing high quality education and training, assisting in the establishment and operation of
general rehabilitation programs and plans, and monitoring the operation of rehabilitation
arrangements. The general thrust of these implementation functions is that of the helping and
facilitative rather than enforcing regulatory agency; there is no mention of prosecution or
inspection. This view is supported and extended to additional interorganizational aspects of
rehabilitation that take place between target and nontarget organizations, where the Authority
is:

"(d) to foster a co-operative consultative relationship between management and
labour in relation to the health, safety and welfare of persons at work;
"(e)

to encourage liaison between employers, insurers, accredited rehabilitation

providers, medical practitioners and other health professionals in the interests of early
and effective rehabilitation of injured workers;" (WorkCover Administration Act,
1989, Section 13).
These two subsections identify the major interest groups in occupational rehabilitation, and
that WorkCover needs their interorganizational participation for success in these endeavours.
Yet, as will be shown later in this chapter, not all of these interest groups are mandated to be

involved in rehabilitation. Also, fostering and encouraging cooperative relations are not
explained in precise terms; these are left to the discretion of the WorkCover Authority.

In summary, the 1989 Act, inter alia, sets occupational rehabilitation as a key
WorkCover Authority objective and delineates a set of functions that connote with a helping
and somewhat paternalistic implementation strategy. The extent to which this is so is the
subject of the next chapter.

5.3 Regulations
Workers

Compensation

(General Rehabilitation Programs)

Regulation

1988

The Workers Compensation (General Rehabilitation Programs) Regulation 1988 is,
as its title suggests, the major regulation covering the introduction of occupational
rehabilitation in N e w South Wales. Foreshadowed by the 1987 Act, this regulation was
subjected to six sets of amendments in less than 2 years following its commencement. The
two main parts of the Regulation concern the establishment of rehabilitation programs and
the accreditation ofrehabilitationproviders respectively.
The major aspects of the part concerning general rehabilitation programs stipulate the
time frame for their establishment, m a k e a clear distinction between requirements for small
employers compared with large employers, and provide for penalties for identified offences.
With respect to penalties for large employers, failure to establish a program m a y attract a
m a x i m u m penalty of $2,000 and a m a x i m u m of $1,000 w h e n there is a failure to display or
notify a rehabilitation program. The form of these penalties does not address the failure of
employers to implement a rehabilitation program. Like the 1987 Act, the 1988 Regulation is
silent on the implementation of rehabilitation. In addition, the Regulation refers to the
workplace guidelines for the meaning of a general rehabilitation program.
The part of the Regulation that deals with the accreditation of rehabilitation providers
sets out the major criteria by which applications for accreditation are to be determined, the

classes of certificates that m a y be granted, conditions of certification and associated
administrative details. This certification is a form of licensing regulation whereby the
WorkCover Authority is provided with the scope to control the quantity and quality of
rehabilitation providers in the State. This form of regulation appears to establish a potentially
closer direct regulatory relationship between the WorkCover Authority and rehabilitation
providers than with other parties involved in occupational rehabilitation. The standards
referred to in the Regulation by which accredited rehabilitation providers and their services
are to be assessed are set out in the following section of this chapter.

5.4 Guidelines
Guidelines, as part of the occupational rehabilitation mandate, c o m e in a range of
forms. There are those that are prescribed by the legislation and regulations relating directly
to occupational rehabilitation; there are those that without prior statutory reference seek to set
out more fully procedures for complying with parts of the legislation, and there are those that
aim to clarify certain reporting and authorisation procedures with a view to improving
working relations between identified parties and so improve the levels of rehabilitation
services. Prima facie, the distinction between these three forms is not a sharp one. Their
wording is similar in m a n y respects, although the content varies. For example, ambiguous
conditional verb tenses contrast with the legal certainty of the imperative. Thus, the
guidelines contain m a n y "shoulds" and few "musts". "Shoulds" imply morally constrained
choice; "musts" do not. Furthermore, the W o r k C o v e r Authority does not distinguish
between the different types of guidelines. This subsection discusses these and other issues
of form within each of the guidelines relevant to the occupational rehabilitation mandate.
These are:
Prescribed by Mandate:
Guidelines for Workplace-Based Occupational Rehabilitation Programs 1987
Interim Standards for Workplace-Based Rehabilitation Providers 1988

Not Prescribed, Procedures for Mandate Compliance:
Provider Reporting Arrangements 1989
Draft Guidelines for Rehabilitation Providers, Employers, Rehabilitation
Coordinators, Insurers and Unions: Confidentiality of Rehabilitation Clinical
Records 1988
Guidelines for Vocational Retraining Proposals Under Section 153 1990
Guidelines for Continuing Sponsorship Under Section 153 1990
Guidelines for Purchase of Equipment Under Section 153 1991
Not Prescribed, Relationship Clarification:
Rehabilitation Procedures: Guidelines for Insurers and Rehabilitation Providers
1992.

Guidelines for Workplace-Based Rehabilitation Programs 1987
Foreshadowed and authorised by the 1987 Act and the 1988 Regulation, these
guidelines are the main platform for the establishment of workplace-based rehabilitation
programs in large employer organizations, that is, those with 20 or more employees
(WorkCover issued separate guidelines on occupational rehabilitation for small business in
1990. Since the case studies in this thesis involve large employers, the small business
guidelines are not relevant here. However, it is worthwhile noting that these are based on
the 1987 guidelines and overall are much simpler in form and requirement).
The 1987 Guidelines define occupational rehabilitation for the first time:
"Occupational rehabilitation is the restoration of the injured worker to the fullest
physical, psychological, social, vocational and economic usefulness of which they
are capable. It is all about getting injured workers back on the job as quickly as is
safely possible" (Guidelines for workplace-based occupational rehabilitation
programmes, 1987:4).
This definition is a curious mixture of idealism and pragmatism. The first sentence seeks
total restoration of the worker via a combination of modalities and yet h o w it is to be
operationalised in full is not explained elsewhere in these or other guidelines. Indeed, this
sentence signals the potential complexity of rehabilitation networks of organizations pursuing

different restoration goals (Zanko, 1988). Fulfilment of all of the above restoration criteria is
Utopian. This seems to be in rather stark contrast to the second part of the definition which
acts as a practical qualification for the above: get the worker back on the job. Without this
qualification, the definition would be obscure. This notwithstanding, it is evident that
rehabilitation m a y involve a complex set of restoration processes and organizations.
Employer organizations and, where applicable, unions are the primary targets of the
1987 Guidelines. Employers are required to develop rehabilitation programs based on the
guidelines and unions are to be consulted by employers in this development. T o be effective
from the beginning of 1989, the Guidelines set out the basic m i n i m u m elements to be
considered in the establishment of a workplace-based occupational rehabilitation program.
These comprise six policy commitments and six procedures. The policy commitments cover
issues such as prevention, early commencement of rehabilitation, early return to work,
providing suitable duties/employment, and protection of injured workers' rights under
rehabilitation. T h e procedures address the designation and role of rehabilitation
coordinators, identifying agreed accredited rehabilitation providers, individual rehabilitation
plans, providing suitable duties, consultation and dispute resolution mechanisms.
All the above commitments and procedures are supported by explanatory points for
the employer organization to consider in setting a rehabilitation program. However, such
considerations are prefaced by loosely framed requirements:
"It is recognised [....] that the circumstances of employers and their workplaces differ
widely and that they will be required to respond differently to the legislative
requirements based on their o w n circumstances, experiences and needs. These
guidelines contain core elements that should be addressed in s o m e w a y by all
employers. The exact wording and approach will be a matter for the employer in
consultation with the workers and, where applicable, any industrial unions of
employees representing those workers" (Guidelines for workplace-based
occupational rehabilitation programmes, 1987:2).

It is seen that significant flexibility and discretion are conferred upon the employer

and the unions in h o w to formulate a rehabilitation program at a local, operational level. This
means that any attempts at enforcement by WorkCover could focus only on the core elements
and then, given the scope for their interpretation conferred on the employer, only in a
permissive manner. Apart from the obvious inference from the above arrangements that
there was no intention by the State legislature that such programs would be enforced
(examined fully in the next chapter), it might also be surmised that it is both very difficult
and often undesirable to attempt legal certainty and precision in relational matters between
organizations. Thus, relational terms used throughout the 1987 Guidelines such as
"consultation", "cooperation", "liaison" and "participation" are left undefined and as such,
amenable to wide interpretation.
A number of other points clearly emerge from these 1987 Guidelines. First, they are
more concerned with the establishment of rehabilitation programs by employers than with
their implementation. Second, while both employer organizations and applicable unions are
explicitly mandated to set up these programs, the employer organization is regarded as
central to rehabilitation. This is based on the identification of the employer-designated
rehabilitation coordinator as ".... a key person in the rehabilitation process ...." and ".... the
focal point for all contact, liaison and review ...." (Guidelines for workplace-based
occupational rehabilitation programmes, 1987:23). This requirement emphasises the
workplace-based intent of the 1987 Act. Third, the Guidelines acknowledge that
occupational rehabilitation is an interorganizational phenomenon over and above the
consultations to take place between employers and unions. Implicit in its definition, this
view is more clearly delineated in the statement of principles and in a number of the
commitments and procedures. Organizations identified include WorkCover Authority itself,
accredited rehabilitation providers, health care professionals, insurers, interpreters, treating
doctors and local community resources. Finally, this multiparty involvement with the
injured person foretells of multiple and concurrently overlapping roles demanded of the
worker which sometimes m a y be in conflict. For example, the injured person is the

employer s employee, the doctor's patient, the union's member, the provider's (and other
health professionals') client, the insurer's claimant, the partner's spouse. Given the absence
of hard and fast regulations, this situation provides fertile ground for negotiation and
compromise.

Interim Standards for Workplace-Based Rehabilitation Providers 1988
The primary target of the interim standards are, as their title states, rehabilitation
providers. A s with the above 1987 Guidelines these interim standards are underpinned by
Section 152 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1987, and the Workers Compensation
(General Rehabilitation Programs) 1988. These standards, which were still "interim" at the
time of writing, identify eight principles that are considered essential for effective
occupational rehabilitation services to be offered by rehabilitation providers. These
principles are similar to the policy commitments and procedures in the 1987 Guidelines and
are broad service objectives covering commitment to rehabilitation, understanding workplace
environments, industrial sensitivity, a multi-disciplinary approach, involvement of treating
doctors, professional codes, organizational competence and ethical practices. Each of these
principles is defined by a set of standards which ...."give an explicit description of the
requirements for quality and effectiveness of a service" (Interim Standards for Workplace
Based Rehabilitation Providers, 1988:2). For example, the principle of understanding
workplace environments has eight standards which, inter alia, require that the provider
knows the workplace rehabilitation program, understands worker perceptions of work,
recognises workplace hazards, communicates with the employer's officers and unions and
visits the workplace. F r o m an interorganizational perspective, this principle and its
standards seek to create strong knowledgeable relations between the provider and employer
through multiplex relations with the rehabilitation coordinator and significant others using
written, verbal and importantly, physical face-to-face contact. Furthermore, the principle
directs the bulk of the effort in relationship formation and maintenance on the provider.

The overall tenor of the Interim Standards reinforces the above point; that is, the
provider organization is to adopt an outward looking perspective in its service delivery rather
than view itself as the focus of the rehabilitation process. Rehabilitation plans are
encouraged to be developed jointly by the provider, the rehabilitation coordinator, the
doctors, the unions and the worker. The provider is to leam the language, culture and
working rules of employer organizations and unions, and should bring together the requisite
professions to deal with the particular problem as well as m a k e any necessary interdisciplinary referrals. Further, rehabilitation providers are to operate within the scope of
medical practitioners' advice and their paid involvement in rehabilitation is subject to insurer
acceptance of liability. W h a t emerges from this analysis of the Standards' form is that the
outward-looking rehabilitation provider is constrained by non-mandated organizations in
seeking to fulfil its mandated obligations.
Compared with the 1987 Guidelines, the actions stipulated are more certain. Verbs
more commonly employ the third person imperative tense. For example, "[t]he rehabilitation
provider must have a knowledge of broad organizational industrial arrangements within the
organization...." (Interim Standards etc. 1988:5). Greater legal certainty tends to m a k e
intended enforcement easier (Cranston, 1987), and in examining these standards it can be
inferred that the WorkCover Authority is more concerned with direct control of rehabilitation
provider activities than those of employers and unions as set out in the 1987 Guidelines.

Provider Reporting Arrangements 1989
The Provider Reporting Arrangements are a clearly laid out and unambiguous set of
monthly reporting requirements for providers to submit to the WorkCover Authority's head
office Division of Rehabilitation Services. The two sets of data: case closure and case load
reports, were to be compiled into a database for monitoring as well as giving regular
performance feedback to providers. B y clearly delineating a detailed reporting format, the
1989 Arrangements establish a strong interorganizational information link between the

rehabilitation providers and the regulatory agency, WorkCover. This linkage facilitates
monitoring and control by WorkCover over provider activities.

Draft Guidelines for Rehabilitation Providers, Employers, Rehabilitation
Coordinators,
Clinical Records

Insurers

and

Unions:

Confidentiality

of

Rehabilitation

1988

These draft guidelines are not prescribed by legislation and statutory regulations, but
endorsed by the Occupational Health, Safety and Rehabilitation Council of N e w South
Wales, part of the WorkCover Authority. Unlike the 1987 Guidelines referred to earlier,
they do not require compliance as such. Rather they seek ".... to assist..." organizations
involved in rehabilitation ".... to maintain a proper balance between injured workers' rights
to confidentiality, on the one hand, and employers', insurers' and unions' need to access
information essential to the management of workers' rehabilitation programs, on the other"
(Draft Guidelines etc. 1988:1).
A s the title suggests, these 1988 Guidelines acknowledge that occupational
rehabilitation is a multi-party problem involving the communication of sensitive and
confidential information about the injured person between the organizations and people
involved.

T h e demands of confidentiality m e a n s that interorganizational and

interprofessional communication is likely to be less open than otherwise.

This

communication occurs in a context where different organizations will tend to use different
technical languages and jargon to explain their perceptions, diagnoses and prognoses of the
injured worker/patient/client. Such differences are likely to increase the potential for
misunderstanding differences as to appropriate action and consequently conflict.
The confidentiality guidelines do not engender nor exacerbate the above conditions
since they are intended to be an aid rather than requirement. They do, however, bring the
issues into sharper relief. Indeed, by targeting providers, employers, coordinators, insurers
and unions w h o in turn will exchange information with other medical and health
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professionals, the W o r k C o v e r Authority tacitly accepts that rehabilitation is strongly
influenced by parties other than explicitly mandated employers, unions and providers.

Guidelines for Vocational Retraining Proposals Under Section 153 1990
Guidelines for Continuing
Guidelines for Purchase

Sponsorship
of Equipment

Under
Under

Section 153
Section 153

1990
1991

These guidelines are clustered together because they all relate to Section 153 of the
Workers Compensation Act 1987 which provides for the establishment of and funding for
vocational re-education and rehabilitation schemes for injured workers. The guidelines set
out sponsorship criteria and application procedures for employers or providers to follow,
after they have received written confirmation from the insurer in support of the rehabilitation
plan. Once more, it is seen that explicitly mandated organizations' activities in rehabilitation
are circumscribed by nonmandated organizations; in this instance by the insurer.
Organizations seeking funds for the purpose of vocational retraining or for the
purchase of ergonomic equipment will be drawn into relations with additional organizations
beyond those mentioned in previous subsections. For example vocational retraining m a y
bring employers or providers into contact with public or private education institutions to
assess courses and possibly m a k e arrangements for the injured worker to meet course
advisers and the like. Purchase of equipment and other ergonomic aids will also involve
varying levels of contact by the fundseeking organizations with the relevant suppliers.

Rehabilitation Procedures: Guidelines for Insurers and Rehabilitation
Providers

1992

These Guidelines were developed by a working party representing those at w h o m
they were directed: insurers and rehabilitation providers. In turn, they were endorsed and
published by the WorkCover Authority. They are not prescribed by any specific legal
provisions. They are, therefore, a form of agreed voluntary interorganizational contract

(Hall et al, 1977) between providers and insurers designed to overcome unnecessary and
dysfunctional administrative delays that were often characterised in earlier years by mistrust
and suspicion a m o n g the parties. They are intended to clarify procedures for the
administration of workers' compensation claims involving occupational rehabilitation
services. In acknowledging that referral to rehabilitation m a y be m a d e by any party, these
Guidelines stipulate that only employers and more particularly insurers m a y authorise in
writing expenditure on rehabilitation plans and programs. In essence, paid involvement and
approval of plans proposed by rehabilitation providers (mandated) is controlled by insurers
(nonmandated). A s the Guidelines state:
"These [provider reporting] procedures are intended to
• control what services m a y be billed for [....]
• control what costs are to be included in fees for services rather than charged as
separate items [....]
• separate occupational rehabilitation service costs from other costs [....]
• encourage accountability, since services invoiced can be checked against
rehabilitation plan." (Rehabilitation Procedures etc. 1992:6.)
O f all the guidelines relating to occupational rehabilitation, these are the most detailed
and specific. Proformas for rehabilitation plans and progress reports are provided, invoice
details and service codes as well as their definition are set out. It is interesting and somewhat
ironic that the most precise and detailed interorganizational arrangements that pertain at the
policy (state) level involve a party not explicitly mandated to be involved in occupational
rehabilitation: insurers. Through their form, these Guidelines appear to reflect an
intersection of voluntaristic aims of providers and insurers for more efficient and stable
rehabilitation administration with providers mandated requirements embodied in the 1988
Regulations and 1988 Interim Standards referred to above.

5.5 Handbooks
There are three W o r k C o v e r handbooks that relate directly to occupational
rehabilitation. These are:

Handbook for Rehabilitation Coordinators 1990
Vocational Retraining Handbook 1991
WorkCover Medical Practitioner's Handbook 1991
All of these handbooks are intended to be informative and practical in their advice.
Consequently, there is no requirement nor mechanism for ensuring compliance. The first
two of the above relate respectively to the 1987 Guidelines for Workplace-based
Occupational Rehabilitation Programs and Section 153 of the Workers Compensation Act
1987. They appear to unpack further the intentions contained of the provisions for mandated
organizations contained in the 1987 Guidelines and the 1987 Act. The rehabilitation
components of the WorkCover Medical Practitioner's Handbook do not have such direct
legal underpinnings so far as doctors are concerned. Each of these handbooks is analysed in
more detail below.

Handbook for Rehabilitation Coordinators 1990
Designed to assist employer organizations' rehabilitation coordinators to understand
their role in the development and maintenance of rehabilitation programs, this handbook
focuses predominantly on establishing "networks" both inside and outside the workplace,
and on workers' compensation claims and rehabilitation information processing . Internal
networks are considered to comprise management in general, section managers, supervisors,
personnel staff, workers, their representatives and others "who have a particular interest in
the welfare of workers". (Handbook for Rehabilitation Coordinators, 1990:10). The main
external parties identified are rehabilitation providers, doctors and insurers (also referred to
as fund managers). It is also recognised that unions and other health care professionals m a y
be involved. While the need to maintain contact with the above parties is encouraged, it is
not clear h o w this should be coordinated. Coordination is characterised as involving liaison
with numerous others. "Liaison" is a term that remains undefined and unexplained. Thus
the five step process guide suggested for the provision of treatment and rehabilitation of the

injured employee is somewhat uninformative so far as external, interorganizational dynamics
are concerned.

Vocational Retraining Handbook 1991
This handbook complements the three Section 153 guidelines discussed in the
previous section, since it also relates to Section 153 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987.
It differs from the guidelines in that it explains the conditions under which vocational
retraining should be considered, the main sources of assistance, the benefits and retraining
options available O n the other hand, in a similar vein to the guidelines, the handbook
identifies numerous other organizations with which the vocational retraining sponsor
(usually the employer or rehabilitation provider) m a y need to come in contact. Over and
above the previously mentioned private and public education institutions (especially the
Department of Technical and Further Education), attention is drawn to the services available
from other State and Federal Agencies such as the N e w South Wales Migrant Employment
and Qualifications Board and the Commonwealth Department of Employment, Education and
Training.

WorkCover Medical Practitioner's Handbook 1991
The last of the handbooks to be examined and be published within the study time
frame, the WorkCover Medical Practitioner's Handbook is the only WorkCover document,
legislative, regulatory or guiding in nature whose primary target is a party that is not
mandated to be involved in occupational rehabilitation. A WorkCover sponsored
consultancy project conducted in the late 1980s found, among other things, that doctors were
unclear as to their role in workers' compensation and even more so in occupational
rehabilitation under the then relatively new Workers Compensation Act 1987. In response
the WorkCover Authority clearly considered it warranted a handbook. Topics covered
include the role of the medical practitioner, referral to other professionals, the WorkCover

Medical Certificate, occupational rehabilitation, payment of bills, medical panels and dispute
resolution.
The format and tenor of this handbook raises more issues than answers. A s a
document it is badly written: it is not logically ordered, nor is it clear what the book's aims
are nor h o w a doctor should refer to it. For example, the handbook appears to give most
prominence to occupational rehabilitation and yet discussion is inexplicably broken between
its aims and principal features by several pages about medical reporting, referrals and
certification. There is an apologetic tone in a number of points highlighted by WorkCover so
far as doctors are concerned. This is captured in the introduction to the handbook, where
"....the treating doctor remains the key person in workers compensation ...." ".... a strong
point that is tempered by the more equivocal ..." ".... medical practitioners m a y help
patients to return to work, by actively assisting in their rehabilitation program." (WorkCover
Medical Practitioner's Handbook, 1991:1.)
The attested centrality of the doctor in one WorkCover system domain, workers'
compensation, is traded off for only a potential involvement in another, rehabilitation.
However, even this potential involvement is bolstered in a number of ways. Rehabilitation
to meaningful employment is to be considered "as soon as medical judgement deems safely
possible" (WorkCover Medical Practitioner's Handbook, 1991:2). This qualification seems
to preserve medical hegemony in a w a y not stated in any other WorkCover rehabilitation
document. Doctors are also repeatedly reassured that".... in only 5 % to 1 5 % of workplace
injures will the treating doctor and the rehabilitation coordinator need to call on other
assistance ...." (p. 3) and that ".... effective, professional diagnosis and treatment are
essential to any rehabilitation program and this is the domain of the doctor". (WorkCover
Medical Practitioner's Handbook, 1991:2). The overall theme seems to be one of placation
by WorkCover Authority.
The WorkCover Medical Certificate is an object of some confusion. Intended as a
formal means of gaining a doctor's appropriate recommendation for a worker to be placed on
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suitable duties, in addition to traditional diagnosis, the W o r k C o v e r Medical Certificate is
viewed by W o r k C o v e r Authority as the connection by which the doctor becomes involved in
a worker's rehabilitation plan. In one section, the reader is advised that a W o r k C o v e r
Medical Certificate must be supplied to the employer, patient and insurer, and yet in two
other sections it is clearly indicated that this certificate is not essential, albeit strongly
recommended. If the WorkCover Authority is unclear about the linkage between the medical
practitioner and workplace rehabilitation, it is hardly surprising if doctors and other
interested parties continue to be so.
T h e above notwithstanding, medical practitioners have a major and powerful role in
the control of occupational rehabilitation confirmed and in part conferred by the WorkCover
Authority, although not through the rehabilitation legislation or regulations. Furthermore,
consistent with previous documents and statutory instruments discussed in this chapter, this
handbook tacitly acknowledges the interorganizational nature of the rehabilitation problem.
This is quite clearly established by noting the scope for referral to other medical specialists
and allied health professions such as dentists, physiotherapists, chiropractors, osteopaths,
masseurs, medical gymnasts, speech therapists and, of course, accredited rehabilitation
providers.

5.7 Implications for Interorganizational Relations
A number of implications for interorganizational relations arise out of the preceding
analysis of mandated occupational rehabilitation form. These are discussed with respect to
the interactions between the WorkCover Authority and the explicitly mandated organizations,
and secondly, in relation to the interactions that take place between explicitly and implicitly
mandated organizations likely to be involved in occupational rehabilitation.
T h e legislation and regulations relating to occupational rehabilitation explicitly
mandate the involvement of the following organizations:
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• employer
•

union

•

rehabilitation provider

•

WorkCover Authority.

The mandate varies in terms of the strength of compliance requirements for these target
organizations. The accreditation and certification procedures and standards for rehabilitation
providers are more precise and demanding than the regulatory impost on employers and
unions. This form of licensing suggests that WorkCover Authority - provider enforcement
relations will be closer and probably more tightly controlled than those that arise out of the
loosely framed conditions for employer organizations and unions. Indeed, analysis of the
mandate shows a form that cedes a high degree of scope and discretion to the regulatory
agency in its implementation and enforcement of occupational rehabilitation, subject to
engendering and encouraging consultative and cooperative relations between the parties
involved. This latter condition can be viewed as an approach that seeks to avoid traditional
punitive enforcement measures. Even where there are fines available for offences, their
maxima are set at low and barely threatening levels - a m a x i m u m of $2,000 imposable.
With the exception of the provisions relating to providers, the mandate is relatively
vague and loose in its prescriptions. Even with guidelines and handouts to unpack the
legislation and regulations, m u c h remains unclear and unexplained. Lack of clarity and
uncertainty in operational definition borne out of complexity m e a n that not only the
WorkCover Authority but also the target organizations have significant choice and flexibility
in h o w they develop their programs. A corollary of such choice is that it m a y find
expression in organizational inaction as well as action. This further reinforces the
inappropriateness and futility of traditional, punitive rule book enforcement. The mandate
provides for the regulatory agency and target organizations (employers and unions) to devise
their rehabilitation plans in a loosely coupled, semi autonomous manner: WorkCover sets

broad parameters within which target organizations m a k e their o w n arrangements a m o n g
themselves and with others. This points to the likelihood of an enforcement strategy adapted
by WorkCover Authority that is an extension of Braithwaite, Walker and Grabosky's (1987)
concept of unenforced self-regulation. The form of the mandate implies that it will be, in
large part, unenforced mutual regulation. It is likely to be unenforced, if not unenforceable,
due to the wide scope for interpretation of the mandate. It is mutual regulation, in that it
involves more than one organization often from more than one sector. Under these
circumstances use of "self" connotes with the individual organization or industry which is
often not the situation that pertains in occupational rehabilitation. A failure or disinclination
by aregulatoryagency to enforce its mandate does not mean that that agency will not become
involved in its implementation. Other strategies available to it might include education,
training, convening meetings and seminars and other awareness increasing techniques.
The open ended partial character of the mandate means that the notion of unintentional
legal loopholes is of little analytic value; the "holes" are intended and form part of the
mandate design. This open-endedness and partiality are continually acknowledged through
the statutory instruments, guidelines, handbooks and even in the legal charter of the
WorkCover Authority itself. O n e of the most prominent indicators is frequent reference
made to the need for "liaison", making contact and cooperation with organizations other than
those explicitly mandated. These implicitly mandated organizations include:
• medical practitioners
• insurers (aka fund managers)
•

physiotherapists

•

chiropractors

•

osteopaths

•

masseurs

• dentists
•

dental prothetists

• interpreters
• tertiary education institutions
• equipment suppliers
• other state and federal government agencies.
The potential interorganizational network heterogeneity implied by involvement of even some
of the above organizations in a rehabilitation case goes some w a y to explaining w h y the
occupational rehabilitation mandate is so open-ended. It would be impossible to regulate
effectively all of the possible permutations and combinations of network size and elements
that embrace the full range of occupational injury and illness that warrant rehabilitation.
In analysing mandate form, it became evident that not all of the above non-mandated
organizations are considered equal by the WorkCover Authority in terms of their role and
importance in occupational rehabilitation. Treating medical practitioners and insurers are
recognised as having nonmandated control over target organizations in a number of respects.
Treating doctors' prior approval is considered necessary for advancing rehabilitation cases
to, say, a staged return to work. Insurers' prior authorization is required for paid
involvement by rehabilitation providers. Thus treating doctors and insurers, by w a y of their
involvement in workers' compensation appear to be implicitly the most prominent mandated
organizations.
The implications of rehabilitation mandate form for interorganizational relations
among the target organizations and the nonmandated organizations concern network
complexity and the interaction voluntary choice of action. T h e potential complexity of
relations arising out of the heterogeneity of the constituent organizations in rehabilitation
networks m a y stimulate creative, flexible solutions to difficult cases through access to
different perspectives and ideas from a range of professionals and practitioners. Conversely
it m a y lead to communication difficulties among organizations through unfamiliar technical
language and problems of making contact in addition to conflicts of opinion about what is
possible.

The fact that overall the rehabilitation mandate is open-ended and partial in nature
means that target organizations are in a position to exercise choice to varying degrees about
h o w they construct their programs and plans. Rehabilitation providers seem to have the least
choice available in that their reporting structures and paid involvement are quite clearly
delineated in the mandate. Even key aspects of their relations with the nonmandated insurers
have been formalised into a handbook of rehabilitation procedures. T h e widest choice
available to target organizations rests with employers and unions. They need to seek
incentives beyond legal necessity in order to rehabilitate the injured worker and so become
involved with other parties. T o this end efficiency incentives from an employer and worker
(union) perspective, it was argued, were found to exist in the workers' compensation
payment provisions for partially incapacitated employees. However, these incentives are
more relevant to the implementation of rehabilitation programs than their development.
Nowhere in the mandate or in the associated WorkCover handbooks is there a requirement
for employers and unions to implement rehabilitation programs.

5.7 Summary
Through a detailed analysis of the form of the relevant extant legislation and
associated regulatory instruments, this chapter fulfilled its two aims. A picture emerges of
an interorganizational mandate that is generally vague, open-ended and partial in nature; one
which relies on the nonmandated authority of insurers and treating doctors. For all the
regulations, guidelines and handbooks, regulatory agency and target organization discretion
remain very broad, underlining the potential difficulty, if not undesirability, legally to control
relational matters between organizations.

Chapter 6
Implementation of the Occupational Rehabilitation M a n d a t e

"The Government recognises that to be successful,
every rehabilitation programme will require active cooperation and participation between employers, their
organizations, workers, trade unions, medical
practitioners and rehabilitation providers, as well as
Government agencies and insurers" (Guidelines for
workplace-based

occupational

rehabilitation

programmes, 1987 : Foreword).

6.1 Introduction
The above quote clearly establishes the implementation of occupational rehabilitation
as an interorganizational activity necessitating cooperation between mandated (employers,
unions, providers and government) as well as non-mandated organizations (medical
practitioners, insurers). This chapter focuses on the implementation of the rehabilitation
mandate; it comprises the main part of the empirical study. In addition to examining mandate
implementation issues at the State policy level as with mandate emergence and form, actual
interorganizational rehabilitation network relations are assessed.
A s discussed earlier (Chapters 2 and 3), mandate implementation is m a d e up of two
major intersecting and interrelated categories: enforcement and compliance. With regard to
mandate enforcement the primary aims of the empirical analysis are:
(i)

to establish and assess the following factors that are considered to influence the
efficacy of agency (WorkCover) enforcement:
•

enforcement strategy and design;

•

nature of the agency; and

•

enforcement context.

(ii)

to examine and compare the interorganizational relations between the regulatory
agency (WorkCover Authority) and the target elements (explicitly and implicitly
mandated organizations) in each case study that have developed over the five years
ending 10 June, 1992.

Withrespectto mandate compliance, the main aims are:
(i)

to establish, assess and compare the occupational rehabilitation network relations
between the target elements (explicitly and implicitly mandated organizations) in and
between the case studies that have developed in the five years ending 30 June, 1992.

(ii)

to determine if there are significant differences between explicitly and implicitly
mandated organizations in and between the case studies. T o assess, in particular, if
there are significant differences between the explicitly and implicitly mandated
organizations in terms of the following theoretical variables:
•

network definition;

•

perceptions of mandate form;

•

importance of mandated activity;

•

readiness and capability;

and the following dimensions contained in the theoretical propositions:
•

formalization;

•

network density;

•

intensity;

•

threat to autonomy;

•

stability; and

•

concern for outcomes.

With the above aims in mind, this chapter is organised into four main sections. The
first sets out the main characteristics of the two network case studies as well as their contexts.
The second section analyses rehabilitation mandate enforcement at both central (Sydney, head
office) and local (Illawarra, network) levels in terms of the above stated aims. T h e third

section assesses the empirical evidence on mandate compliance according to the theoretical
variables listed in the above aims. Finally, the overall theoretical implications of the above
analyses are discussed.

6.2 Characteristics and Contexts of the Case Studies
In this section the two network case studies developed for the analysis of mandate
implementation are described. They are examined in terms of a number of organizational and
network level characteristics including boundary definition, size and technology. Their
geographic and sectorial contexts are also discussed. T h e rationale for this descriptive
analysis is to set the scene clearly for the subsequent assessment of the case data according to
the theoretical concepts and so assist the reader to keep in touch with the empirical origins.
Finally, non responses by organizations in the case studies are explained and their potential
implications for the overall study are examined.

Case Studies' Characteristics
Rehabilitation Cases
T h e general composition of the two case studies w a s discussed earlier in the
methodology chapter. T o recap, key features include:
Case 1:

private sector domain, heavy manufacturing industry, relatively hazardous
work environment and self-insured workers' compensation.

Case 2:

public sector domain, tertiary education industry, relatively safe work
environment and externally insured workers' compensation.

It is n o w appropriate to look at the case composition in greater detail. Each case is
comprised of three rehabilitation cases that were considered representative of those involving
arehabilitationprovider, in that they included:

•

a simple, straightforward case,

•

a difficult, yet successful case,

•

a difficult and contested (not necessarily litigated case).

Appendix 13 sets out basic, a n o n y m o u s case details and identifies all the
organizations by type and all key persons by position involved in each rehabilitation case in
each case study. Apart from a number of organizational and network level issues that will be
examined presently, the case information reinforces the point that the two major case studies
are based on actual rehabilitation cases that had taken place without any involvement or
interference by the researcher. In addition, it serves as a reminder that, as analysis moves to
higher levels, there are injured individuals w h o directly and/or indirectly are recipients of the
actions, interactions and deliberations of these organizations at these levels.
All of the injuries in both cases are predominantly musculoskeletal in nature, although
the circumstances of their occurrence were different in each instance. In 1991/92
musculoskeletal injuries in the form of fractures, dislocations, sprains and strains were the
most c o m m o n workplace injuries in N e w South Wales and, more specifically, in the Country
South Region of the State of which the Illawarra is the major industrial sector (WorkCover
Authority, 1993 (a), 1993 (b)). They were also by far the most costly injuries and incurred
the greatest number of permanent disabilities and time lost for those temporarily disabled
(refer to table 6.1).

Total N e w South Wales
No. of
% Permanent % Temporary %
Cases Total Disabihty Total Disabihty Total
Time Lost
(Persons)
(Persons)
(weeks)

Gross
%
Incurred Total
Cost
($000)

Fractures and
5184 13.6

525

17.6

42740 17.7

69135

22.8

20574 53.9

1328

44.4

144714 59.8

159714

52.6

Other

12405 32.5

1136

38.0

54650 22.5

74805

24.6

Total

381633 100.0

2989 100.0

242104 100.0

dislocations
Sprains and
strains

303654 100.0

Country South Region
Gross
%
No. of
% Permanent % Temporary %
Disabihty
Total
Incurred
Total
Disabihty
Total
Cases Total
Time Lost
Cost
(Persons)
(Persons)
(weeks)
($000)
Fractures and
955

13.7

78

16.6

8180 19.0

9194

17.1

3692

52.9

208

44.1

25032 58.1

29113

54.3

Other

2328

33.4

185

39.3

9890 22.9

15337

28.6

Total

6975

100.0

471

100.0

43102 100.0

dislocations
Sprains and
strains

Table 6.1

53644 100.0

Musculoskeletal* Workplace Injuries in N e w South Wales and
Country South Region (incorporating the Illawarra), 1991-1992.

(Adapted from WorkCover Authority 1993 (a) and 1993 (b)).
*musculoskeletal injuries include fractures, dislocations, sprains and strains.
Given the prevalence of musculoskeletal injuries, it is not surprising that they were
the types independently selected as representative by key informants in each of the major case
studies. A corollary is that through the absence of other injury and disease types, for
example burns, contusions and crushings, industrial deafness and infections, a number of
medical and allied health professions such as dermatologists and plastic surgeons, have not

been included in this study. However, this is offset by the study's focus on the dominant
occupational injury type experienced in the wider community.

In examining further the injuries that comprise case studies 1 and 2, it is interesting to
note that similar types are to be found in work environments that are quite different in terms
of their relative safety. For example, in 1991/92 the number of employment injuries per
1,000 workers in N e w South Wales for the relevant industries in which case study 1 and 2
are situated were 55 and 7 respectively, a difference of almost 8 0 0 % (WorkCover Authority,
1993 (a)). Clearly, therefore, safety is not evenly spread even within the comparatively less
hazardous tertiary education sector. There are individuals and occupations that are at higher
risk of injury and these are represented in case study 2 by the physically demanding
labouring and cleaning jobs. Nevertheless, the potential for injury is m u c h greater in heavy
manufacturing (case 1) which, as might be expected, attracts more internal (employer)
financial and staffing resources as means for securing its control, an issue that is examined
more fully in the section dealing with mandate compliance.

Network Size
The number of organizations and persons directly involved in each rehabilitation case
in both case studies is shown in Table 6.2 below. A number of observations can be made.

Total No. of
Organizations

No. of
Organizations
Based in
Illawarra

% Total
Based in
Illawarra

Total
No. of
Persons
(Minimum)

Case Study 1 (Heavy
Manufacturing Sector)
Rehabilitation Case A

13

12

92

25

Rehabilitation Case B

30

Rehabilitation Case C

16

17
15

57
94

43
22

Sub Total

52

44

75

90

Rehabilitation Case X

12

92

17

Rehabilitation Case Y

23

11
14

61

32

Rehabilitation Case Z

17

12

71

26

Sub Total

52

37

71

75

111

81

73

165

Case Study 2 (Tertiary
Education Sector)

Grand Total
Note:

Cases A, X = simple and straightforward
Cases B, Y

= difficult and yet successful

Cases C, Z = difficult and contested
Table 6.2

Number of Organizations and Persons Directly Involved in Each
Rehabilitation Case (Excluding Injured Worker)

This table clearly confirms that occupational rehabilitation is an interorganizational
issue with the potential to involve significant numbers of parties. The simple and
straightforward rehabilitation cases (A and X ) in both case study 1 and case study 2 involve
the least number of organizations and are almost completely contained within the Illawarra

Region: This is provisional support for claims that early reporting of injuries and early
intervention through treatment and rehabilitation will lead to more successful and speedy
outcomes ( A C O M / A C R M , 1987; Ganora and Wright, 1987) and presumably reduce the size
and complexity of interorganizational networks that might mitigate against these.
The difficult yet successful rehabilitation cases (B, Y ) both involve the largest number
of organizations and draw more upon organizations from outside of the Illawarra Region (i.e.
Sydney, the State Capital) than any of the others studied: 4 3 % and 3 9 % respectively. In the
main, these Sydney-based organizations were specialist medico-legal assessors, specialist
diagnosticians and workers' compensation lawyers whose involvement in occupational
rehabilitation is probably more limited than those organizations contained within this study.
Nevertheless, future studies of this nature should consider the role that these parties play in
network aspects of rehabilitation. However, whether the difficulty of cases B and Y led to
the growth of the number of organizations involved and their attendant activity or vice versa
is not clear.
The difficult and contested rehabilitation cases (C and Z ) lie between the other two
types in terms of the number of organizations involved.

However, case Z has a

pronouncedly higher proportion of organizations involved that are external to the Illawarra:
2 9 % compared with 6 % in case C. There is no obvious explanation for this difference.
Overall, w h e n comparing the number of organizations involved between the two case
studies the patterns by rehabilitation case are similar. T h e m u c h larger proportion of
organizations are based in the Illawarra which means that this study has the scope to tap
almost 7 5 % of all the organizations involved: 7 5 % in case 1 , 7 1 % in case 2.

Mandated and Nonmandated Organizations
Since this thesis is concerned with legally mandated interorganizational relations and
seeks to test a number of related propositions by comparing the actions and perceptions of
mandated with nonmandated organizations in the field of occupational rehabilitation, it is

necessary to recast the above rehabilitation case data to elicit how many organizations there
are in each category. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 do this respectively for all organizations directly
involved and then only those based in the Illawarra Region. Some interesting findings
emerge from this breakdown.

All Organizations
Case Study 1
(Heavy Manufacturing
Sector)
Mandated
Organizations
Rehabilitation Case A
3

Nonmandated
Organizations
10

Total No.
Organizations
13

% Total
Mandated
23

Rehabilitation Case B

2

28

30

7

Rehabilitation Case C

4

12

16

25

Sub Total

9

50

59

15

Case Study 2
(Tertiary Education
Sector)
Mandated
Organizations
Rehabilitation Case X
2

Nonmandated
Total No.
Organizations Organizations
10
12

% Total
Mandated
17

Rehabilitation Case Y

4

19

23

17

Rehabilitation Case Z

3

14

11

18

Sub Total

9

43

52

17

18

93

111

16

Grand Total
Table 6.3

N u m b e r of Mandated and Nonmandated Organizations Directly
Involved in Each Rehabilitation Case - All Organizations

Illawarra Region Only
Case Study 1
(Heavy Manufacturing
Sector)
Mandated
Nonmandated
Total No.
Organizations Organizations Organizations
Rehabilitation Case A 3 9 12 25

% Total
Mandated

Rehabilitation Case B 2 15 17 12
Rehabilitation Case C 4 11 15 27.
SubTotal 9 35 44 20

Case Study 2
(Tertiary Education
Sector)
Mandated
Organizations
Rehabilitation Case X 2 9 11 18

Rehabilitation Case Y
Rehabilitation Case Z

4

Sub Total
Grand Total
Table 6.4

Nonmandated
Total No.
Organizations Organizations

% Total
Mandated

3

10
_9

12

9

28

37

29
25
24

18

63

81

22

14

N u m b e r of Mandated and Nonmandated Organizations Directly

Involved in Each Rehabilitation Case - Illawarra Region Only

The most striking observation is that in all the rehabilitation cases in both case

studies, the number and proportion of nonmandated organizations far exceeds those that

mandated. In case study 1 nonmandated organizations comprise 85% (80% in the Illawarra
of the total Case 2 corresponds closely with case 1 in terms of the nonmandated

configuration: respectively 83% and 76% of the total. As the focus shifts to the Illawa

region only, so the number of nonmandated organizations decreases quite dramatically f

total of 50 to 35 in case 1 (a drop of 30%) and from 43 to 28 in case 2 (a fall of 35%)

this study, all of the organizations outside of the Illawarra region were nonmandated,

the exception of the central offices of the W o r k C o v e r Authority and even these were not
identified as actively and directly involved in any of the six rehabilitation cases.
The above finding suggests that overall there is a significant voluntary commitment to
rehabilitation by organizations with no direct legal incentive to become involved. Alternative
incentives will need to exist for these organizations to interact with one another in pursuit of
successful rehabilitation. A s will be shown later in the section on compliance, s o m e of the
more prominent of these are variously economic, professional and interpersonal in nature.
The high presence of nonmandated organizations also suggests that the types of rehabilitation
cases under study not only have but necessitate their involvement. Put another way,
mandated organizations are to s o m e extent dependent on the nonmandated in fulfilment of
their legal obligations and must therefore appeal to their participation through appropriate
voluntary incentives. Put yet another way, mandate implementation relies on tacit compliance
by nonmandated organizations through voluntary ties: the law is not an island to itself. T h e
legal environment operates within a wider interorganizational environment. W h e n the
number and proportion of nonmandated organizations is apparently so great by comparison
with to the mandated, agency enforcement feasibility comes under question.
Table 6.5 identifies by case study the mandated and nonmandated organization types
directly involved in the two sets of rehabilitation cases. T h e distinction between mandated
and nonmandated is based on interpretation of the mandate form analysed in Chapter 5.

Case 1
(Heavy Manufacturing Sector)
Organization T y p e

Case 2
(Tertiary Education Sector)
Organization T y p e

Respondents

Mandated
Employer/Insurer

Employer

Trade union

Trade union

WorkCover Authority

WorkCover Authority

Rehabilitation provider

Rehabilitation provider

General medical practice

General medical practice

Orthopaedic surgery

Orthopaedic surgery

Vascular surgery

Rheumatology

Physician

Chronic pain specialist

Pathology practice

Radiology

Radiology practice

Private hospital

Public hospital

Clinical psychology practice

Private hospital

Physiotherapy clinic

Clinical psychology practice

Insurer, fund manager

Physiotherapy clinic

State agency

Ambulance services

Vocational assessment

Safety equipment supplier

Carrentalfirm

Pharmacist

Driving school

State agency

State agency

Nonmandated

Federal Agency
Nil Response
Nonmandated
General medical practice

General medical practice

Orthopaedic surgery

Clinical psychology

Physician

Physiotherapy

Ophthalmic Surgery

Acupuncturist

Anaesthetics

Massage therapy

Table 6.5 Mandated and Nonmandated Organizations: Types Directly
Involved in the Case Studies (Illawarra Only)

They are broadly similar across the two case studies with respect to the mandated
category and the nonmandated medical and allied health professions. Given that the workers
beingrehabilitatedwere carrying predominantly musculoskeletal injuries, it is to be expected
that there would be s o m e correspondence in the medical and allied health professions
involved. The organization types that differ most pronouncedly are nonmandated and neither
medical nor health based. This is largely due to the particular demands of a rehabilitation
case. For example, actions in case Y in the tertiary education sector led to the usage of a
driving school and the rental of a passenger van to assist in retraining the injured employee
for a set of duties quite different from those she performed as a labourer. However, under a
finer grained analysis quite pronounced differences begin to emerge between the mandated
organizations within and between the two domains, for example in terms of size and
technology. These are examined later in this section.

Boundary Definition
Table 6.5 corroborates W o r k C o v e r Authority's frequent mention of the need for
contact and cooperation with other organizations in its statutory instruments, guidelines and
handbooks (refer to Chapter 5).

Yet, w h e n the n u m b e r and types of nonmandated

organizations that appear to be involved are taken into account, an important question that
arises is: are all of these organizations actually involved in occupational rehabilitation? This
question seeks to test, if not establish, the boundaries of occupational rehabilitation and its
associated domain networks. T h e simple answer is that not all of these organizations claim to
be involved in occupational rehabilitation. T h e analytic convenience of assuming that the
rehabilitation network is either those organizations mandated by law (a policyrisk)or all of
those involved in every aspect of a workers' compensation claim (a policy nightmare) belies
the fact that a number of organizations subscribe to neither. Network boundaries in the real
world are defined by the actors. This issue of network definition is taken up and analysed in
greater detail in the section on mandate compliance.

Organizational Size
Organizational size, measured by the number of employees (including proprietors) in
the Illawarra varies markedly within each case study. In case 1 the range is from well in
excess of 7,000 employees (the employer organization) to a sole proprietor physiotherapy
practice. In the main, most organizations had less than 10 employees. T h e treating medical
practices (general practitioners, orthopaedic surgeons, physicians), the allied health
professions (physiotherapy, clinical psychology) and the rehabilitation providers were
generally the smallest, typically comprising the health practitioner(s) plus s o m e clerical
support. Organizations providing diagnostic services, hospitals and state and federal
government departments (other than W o r k C o v e r ) tended to fall in the range of 50-1,000
employees. The organizational size of those making up case 2 is a similar pattern to those of
case 1, with the exception of the employer organization which has a staff complement of just
over 1,000.
A s Scott (1992:259) noted, the advantage of using employees as an indicator of
organizational size is that it "tends to reflect both the capacity of the organization for
performing work as well as the current scale of actual performance". A caveat needs to be
applied in interorganizational mandate analysis by relating that size to the particular set of
activities under study, in this instance the implementation of occupational rehabilitation. The
reason for this is that size and general organizational activity m a y not necessarily predict
capacity to engage meaningfully in occupational rehabilitation networks. For example, the
two pathology organizations in case 1 (both nonmandated) have 60 and 150 employees
respectively but they claim that their activities and involvement in the rehabilitation of
workers to be minimal.
A feature of organizational size in this study is its positive association with structural
differentiation, although the extent to which functional specialization leads to more expert or
focused involvement in occupational rehabilitation depends on the organization's perceived

vested interest, an issue taken up later in this chapter. Therefore, in interorganizational
network analysis, organizational size needs to be treated cautiously as a predictor of potential
commitment or involvement to any particular network activity.

Technology
Using Daft's (1989) typology, organizational level technologies are either
manufacturing or service in orientation. In case 1, the employer organization's dominant
technology is large batch manufacturing that employs highly capital intensive equipment,
tools and processes in its production of goods for customers. This stands in contrast to the
remainder of the organizations in case 1, both mandated and nonmandated, which are
predominantly service providers. The medical practitioners, other primary health providers,
the enforcement agency, interpreter services and so on are concerned with providing clients
with intangible services that are simultaneously produced and consumed. O n closer
examination, the service firms differ significantly in terms of the tools, techniques and
actions they use. The craft union offering members industrial relations advice and advocacy
through its fulltime officials is quite different to the orthopaedic surgery that provides
patients, w h o m a y well be the same union members, with treatment, opinions and referrals
based on m a n y years of highly specialised and advanced training using dedicated and
complex techniques, instruments and facilities.
M a n y of the service organizations in case 1 are m a d e up primarily of professionals,
whose technologies also vary. So, the radiology practice with traditional x-ray and
specialised imaging equipment run by highly qualified radiologists (with the help of
radiographers and administrative staff) is quite different technologically from the general
medical practice comprising the also highly but slightly less qualified general practitioner w h o
uses basic medical equipment such as the stethoscope and the prescription pad.
With the exception of the employer organization, the organization level technological
profiles and differences of the organizations in case 2 are similar to those of case 1. That is,

they are service organizations dominated primarily by the health professions, professions that
in turn vary significantly. T h e employer organization, a tertiary education institution, uses a
service technology to a high degree through the interactions between lecturers and students
and among researchers and their clients/sponsors.
Given the above, at an interorganizational domain level, occupational rehabilitation
appears technologically to be primarily a professional service network characterised by
significant technological variation between the professional as well as the non-professional
organizations. A corollary of technological variation is the variation in the jargon and
language employed. In the interorganizational network, such differences have the potential to
spawn difficulty in effective communication through lack of understanding, misinterpretation
or even areluctanceto interact. Thus technological and size heterogeneity can be seen to be
the precursor of network complexity.

Case Studies' Contexts
The Illawarra Region
With the exception of the central offices of the W o r k C o v e r Authority, all
organizations in the two case studies are located in the Illawarra Region, although a number
of these are divisions or branches of parent organizations/agencies headquartered elsewhere:
12 organizations in case 1 and 8 in case 2. The Illawarra region is situated 45 k m s south of
Sydney and covers 8,485 sq k m s with a multicultural population in 1991 of more than
337,000 people (IRIS: 1993). T h e majority of these people reside in the Wollongong local
government area, also the region's main industrial centre. T h e 1993 statistical Guide to the
Illawarra region published by the Illawarra Regional Information Service observes: "the
sectors of manufacturing, wholesale and retail, community services and finance dominate the
region's industry structure and employ over 6 4 % of the region's labour force of over
132,000 people".

The employer organization in each of the case studies, the heavy manufacturing and
tertiary education sectors, is a m o n g the largest in the region in terms of employment and
income generation. Because of the regional economy's heavy reliance on traditional coal
mining and iron and steelworking, the region's employment was adversely affected during
the 1980s as major employers were faced with strong international competition, reduced
demand for production and relatively high unit labour costs. Closures, enterprise
restructuring and recapitalisation led to significant reduction in employment which continued
into the 1990s; for example, unemployment in the region increased from 7.1% in 1981 to
13.7% in 1991. It is within these difficult general economic and social circumstances that the
two sets of rehabilitation cases and their attendant I O R took place.

77te Sectorial Contexts
The two case studies are situated in the heavy manufacturing and tertiary education
sectors respectively. While the regional economy was undergoing problems in the five year
period to end July 1992, the picture was rather different in the two sectors. Even though
employment numbers were drastically reduced in heavy manufacturing through the 1980s
and into the 1990s, productivity in terms of output per worker and unit cost of output
improved greatly, in part as a consequence of massive capital investment and significant
internal organizational restructuring of jobs, processes and relationships. These major
changes, which are continuing to this day, were introduced with the (interorganizational)
cooperation and agreement between the traditionally adversarial unions and sector employers.
The tertiary education sector has also been characterised by significant change in the
five year period under study. In response to additional Federal Government funding to create
a "clever" country by attracting more students and with a tight employment market making
tertiary education a m o r e appealing proposition to school-leavers, this sector grew
significantly to meet this demand. Another source of sector growth w a s the lucrative
recruitment of a large number of full fee paying international students. In contrast to the

above sector, one of the most prominent manifestations of this growth w a s an increase in
personnel employed. Thus this sector differed quite pronouncedly with the recessionary state
of affairs in therestof the regional economy.

Nil

Responses
The final part of this section discusses the nil responses in the two case studies.
Out of a possible total of 68 organizations, 12 (17.6%) were non-responses (refer to

Appendix 8). The 7 non-responses in case 1 represent 17.5% of its total and the 5 in case 2
represent 17.9%. A s Table 6.5 shows all nil responses were nonmandated organizations.
The reasons for non-responses in case lwere:
general medical practice 1

a locum doctor w h o m it was not possible to track down.

general medical practice 2

moving location, too busy to talk.

general medical practice 3

does not participate in research.

orthopaedic surgery:

relocating practice outside the region, unable to contact.

physician:

via secretary considers no role played in rehabilitation.
N o need to talk.

ophthalmic surgery:

no response to contact efforts.

anaesthetics:

no response to contact made.

The reasons for non-responses in case 2 were:
general medical practice:

doctor died prior to contact.

clinical psychology:

unable to contact.

physiotherapy:

too busy to talk.

acupuncturist:

out of business.

massage therapy:

out of business.

The proportion of nil responses is very similar between the two cases and is not
particularly large. Therefore, the integrity of the case studies remains intact. However,
when organizations' responses are missing from interorganizational network analysis, gaps

or holes m a y appear where contact, dealings, I O R of particular frequency and intensities
existed. Thus it is feasible to conceive that certain structural ties might not be as strongly
represented had all organizations participated in the study. O n the other hand, in terms of type
only two organizations are not represented in each case, in case 1 - ophthalmic surgery and
anaesthetics and in case 2, acupuncturist and massage therapy. According to an organization
type criterion, therefore, the cases remain highly representative.

6.3 Mandate Enforcement
In Chapter 4 analysis of the rehabilitation mandate's emergence naturally touched on
its implementation. The progressive introduction of legislative amendments, regulations and
guidelines over the five year period under study, as well as structural and operational changes
in rehabilitation administration were examined. It is not intended to go over these issues in
detail here again, although it is acknowledged that they were important aspects of
implementation. B y taking these factors largely as given, the focus in this section will be on
State and local (that is, Illawarra region) level mandate implementation by WorkCover
officers charged with this responsibility.

Enforcement Strategy and Design
Strategy
" W e implement, w e don't enforce. W e have never had to enforce it [occupational
rehabilitation]

"; "

w e are loathe to enforce"; "It w a s never the policy that

enforcement is the thrust." These comments by three WorkCover officers about enforcement
strategy are representative of their colleagues' views. All eight informants were separately
strident on this matter: the mandate w a s implemented. Enforcement w a s considered to
connote with coercion, c o m m a n d and control, pressuring target groups to do things they
might not want to do and a threat to the cooperative relations that WorkCover claimed to have
with its target "client" groups on rehabilitation. Traditional authoritarian enforcement

operations such as inspections, investigations with a view to prosecution of noncompliers
and imposition of available penalties were absent in occupational rehabilitation.
The implementation strategy employed by WorkCover for therehabilitationmandate
can be described as generally consultative, cooperative unenforced self-regulation. The
overall tenor of this strategy remained remarkably constant over the five years, irrespective of
structural changes and shifts in resource availability. T h e distinguishing characteristics of
what numerous officers referred to as a "softly softly" strategy are to be found in the main
interorganizational activities of WorkCover in relation to the target groups:
•

advice by phone and in face-to-face dealings with representatives in individual
organizations and their constituent groups on matters relating to the law,
regulations, guidelines, rehabilitation program structure and implementation and
their potential benefits for the parties involved;

•

training, education and information dissemination on legal and practical aspects
of the mandate;

•

mediation in disputed rehabilitation matters primarily between employers and
employees, the latter often represented by their union;

•

formation of self-helping interest groups for employers' rehabilitation
coordinators;

•

funding to employers and workers via provider submissions to assist with more
difficult cases that m a y necessitate vocational retraining or n e w equipment;

•

in the early years of the mandate, funding trade unions and employer groups to
assist in awareness creation through dissemination of information about the
rehabilitation mandate;

•

leaving target groups free to get on with fulfilling their obligations generally
without unsolicited interference.

These nonpunitive, helping actions do not sit comfortably with power dependent, parentchild like control strategies that characterise the relations between the regulator and the

regulated in taxation, for example. Motivated involvement and cooperative commitment by
employers, in particular, were considered by W o r k C o v e r to be essential to successful
rehabilitation outcomes; enforcement was considered at least a compromise and more a
serious threat to such cooperation and motivation:
"I'm a great believer that cooperation is better than coercion or force and if w e fine
them (employers) they m a y well be very reluctant in the future to cooperate in the
rehabilitation program."
While the general thrust of the implementation strategy was consultative, cooperative,
nonpunitive and self-regulatory, a closer examination shows differences in WorkCover
approaches between the two of the primary target groups: employers and rehabilitation
providers. WorkCover officers as well as organizations in the case studies indicated that
WorkCover's rehabilitation strategy for employers w a s exactly in line with the above
discussion. A s might be expected, the resultant I O R between WorkCover and employers
were loosely coupled (slightly less so following the creation of regional offices) and marked
by low hierarchical differentiation (Aldrich and Whetten 1981). They were loosely coupled
to the extent that WorkCover was making itself available to employers as an aid in mandate
compliance, through advice, training and so forth. However, employers were not required to
use these services in setting up and running their o w n rehabilitation programs; it was a
matter of choice rather than compulsion. There was low hierarchical differentiation between
employers and WorkCover since the latter's strategy was not about exertion of authority but
more of team playing, and often only w h e n invited.
WorkCover's implementation strategy for rehabilitation providers is broadly in line
with the general thrust discussed earlier. However, it differs from that directed at employers
by virtue of the accreditation process administered and controlled by WorkCover. Essentially
a form of licensing, providers in N e w South Wales are required to satisfy accreditation
criteria annually which, following a detailed initial application, are based on provider
supplied performance data collated and analysed by the accreditation section at the Sydney
head offices. This conferral of official status means that rehabilitation providers are more

closely tied to and more hierarchically differentiated from WorkCover than are employers.
As will be shown in more detail later, the closertiesbetween WorkCover and providers arise
primarily out of the written exchange of regular, monthly provider returns and monthly
WorkCover reports that focus on identified performance indicators. The more pronounced
hierarchical differentiation is based on rehabilitation provider dependency on WorkCover
permission to offer rehabilitation services payable under the WorkCover system. In effect,
the WorkCover Authority was responsible for the creation and supervision of the statewide
rehabilitation provider infrastructure through the accreditation process. A n infrastructure that
handles approximately 7,000rehabilitationcases annually (see Chapter 7 for more detail on
provider performance). This provider reliance creates the hierarchy and explains w h y
rehabilitation providers and insurance companies, (another group licensed by WorkCover
only for workers' compensation purposes), are active lobbyists at the policy level. B y
influencing and even participating in the development and implementation of WorkCover
policy that takes their interests into account, providers seek to ensure that strategy
implementation is not operationally compromising. For all the control potential that resides in
the WorkCover-provider relation, it is not exercised on a day-to-day basis. Providers are
generally left to get on with their business with the threat of punitive action emerging very
infrequently, according to h o w well they are considered to be performing.

Design - Form
Originally, the enforcement design form for the rehabilitation mandate was through
two departments of the State Government:

the Department of Industrial Relations and

Employment and the State Compensation Board. Then, through the establishment of the
WorkCover Authority in 1989, rehabilitation was brought under a single statutory authority.
Implementation w a s coordinated and run from central offices based in Sydney.
Subsequently, following the corporatisation of W o r k C o v e r there w a s significant
restructuring which in 1991 led to the establishment of one stop-shop regional offices. They

are one-stop in the sense that the three WorkCover platforms, occupational health and safety,
workers' compensation and occupational rehabilitation are m a d e available to the public
through the safety inspectorate and R E C O M advisory officers based in these locations.
These arrangements effectively limited the central rehabilitation focus to the accreditation of
rehabilitation providers and vocational retraining, an activity predominantly coordinated
through the aforementioned providers. Thus, implementation design form led to structural
arrangements segregating rehabilitation activities according to target group: providers at the
centre, employers (and their injured workers) in the regions. In the period under study, it
seems that internal coordination between the provider and employer arms of rehabilitation
was virtually non-existent. Each independently got on with its o w n work.
The decentralisation of the employer (and employee) focused R E C O M advisory
served the implementation strategy better than the former centralist arrangements. B y
creating closer contact, more frequent involvement and stronger interpersonal ties with their
target groups, especially employers, this part of W o r k C o v e r w a s considered by employers
and unions (as representatives of injured workers) in both case studies to be more helpful,
accessible and available than previously.

Design - Discretion
Views on the amount of discretion available to W o r k C o v e r in rehabilitation
implementation vary quite pronouncedly. At one extreme, the situation is seen by one officer
as "open slather", more subtly explained by another as a high degree of internal autonomy
bounded by the broad confines of WorkCover's overall corporate plan. At the other extreme,
there are those in W o r k C o v e r w h o regard the procedures and rules borne out of extensive
consultation with "key players" as tightly circumscribing the discretion available in
rehabilitation implementation. T h e above two positions are not necessarily in conflict w h e n it
is understood that each independently applies to a separate target group: thus they are able to
co-exist. However, a corollary of open-ended discretion in mandate implementation is open-

ended discretion in mandate compliance by target organizations, in this instance employers.
Such freedom is welcomed by some targets as unconstrained choice of rehabilitation actions;
others see it as vague, uncertain and ambiguous - they are not sure of what to do. This latter
view goes some w a y to explaining w h y workplace rehabilitation coordinators formed an
association in the Illawarra independently in 1988. It has met bimonthly in order to make
sense of what is expected of such coordinators given the absence of a clear mandate and
regulatory agency direction. The converse is also pertinent. Target organizations m a y also
seetightrules and procedures as a brake on preferred actions; others see them as providing
clarity and certain guidance on to what to do in, for example, gaining approval for the
purchase of special equipment.

Design - Sanctions
The sanctions available to a regulatory agency and h o w they are applied are often a
central consideration in mandate enforcement/implementation. The power to punish or
reward, or their respective threat or opportunity, provide some insight into h o w compliance
is secured from target organizations. The monetary penalties available to WorkCover for
non-compliance had not been used once in the five years studied A s one officer put it "....
it's (occupational rehabilitation) not the kind of thing you can force someone to do, because
you need your heart in it to do it properly anyway". The sanctions applied to employers
(latterly at a local level) are not to be found in the mandate; rather they are the potential
benefits associated with reduced workers' compensation premiums and other operating costs
achievable by curtailing injured employees' time off work through rehabilitation. In this
sense, they are not really sanctions:
"The one incentive, or the one selling point that w e have for rehabilitation, I mean
remembering that employers only have to have programs, they don't have to use
them, one of the things that w e have been very strong on from the day I joined [....]
has been premium impact. That is our one selling point, our major selling point for
employers. Y o u can argue the fact that the community would be a nice place to live

in if that employer provides suitable duties for Joe Bloggs. But that's not going to
be an argument that is going to get them to provide suitable duties. W h a t you have
to do is explain to them what is going to happen to their premium if they don't, and
to do that you need to understand (Sections) 38 and 40 as well as the tariff structure,
the premium formula etc. That's our only argument apart from the moral. [....]
The moral questions work sometimes but certainly not as often as the economic ones
.... [....] Our view is that the punishment is the premium impact and all of the
other generalised ones, loss of productivity, etc."
In this way it is seen that WorkCover appeals to the value of voluntary, economic rather than
compulsory legal (dis)incentives as the means for encouraging employer compliance.
With regard to rehabilitation providers, WorkCover was able to invoke m u c h stronger
mandate sanctions: the potential threat of non-renewal of accreditation. Without accreditation
by WorkCover, providers would not be able to operate and be paid under N S W workers'
compensation. For those providers whose main or sole business was in this field, the
perceived cost of non-renewal would be extremely high: this was the case for two providers,
one in each of the two case studies. Their rehabilitation work and income was critical to their
survival. Consequently, not only were they concerned to perform (comply) well and be seen
to do so by WorkCover, their clients and other organizations with w h o m they had dealings,
they also m a d e efforts to maintain some degree of interpersonal contact with WorkCover
officers, both at the local as well as the central levels. O n e of these provider organizations
was represented at the policy and board level of WorkCover through co-stewardship of the
Association of Rehabilitation Providers in the Private Sector, an organization with a specific
object to lobby its interests with WorkCover.
The converse applies to those providers whose main business lay elsewhere. T h e
remaining two provider organizations in case study 1 had primary business respectively as a
public and private hospital with nonwork-related patients. They were far less concerned
about their accreditation, to the extent that one of them had received "counselling" from
WorkCover about its below average performance in terms of case load. In fact this provider

was unconcernedly on the point of getting out of the provider business due to a lack of staff
resources.
The above discussion has centred on the perceived cost of non renewal of provider
accreditation. However, the extent which accreditation was not renewed and the manner of
non renewal warrant some attention since they concern the actualriskof the perceived cost
being realised. Not one provider had been denied a renewal of accreditation by WorkCover.
Where performance w a s considered below average, most commonly case load, then as one
officer put it "we counsel them out rather than kick them out", and very infrequently. In
other words, non renewal of accreditation does not arise.
The inference to be drawn from the above discussion is that the more potent a
sanction (positive or negative) is to the target organization, be it real or imagined, the more
likely the target organization is to commit resources to the forging of closer and multiplex ties
with the regulatory agency. In doing so, the target organization will seek to manage the risk
of the sanction (increase or reduction according to its nature) being applied by, for example,
influencing agency policy governing its application as well as the implementation proclivity
of the officer responsible.

Nature of the Agency
In addition to enforcement strategy and design, it was postulated that rehabilitation
mandate implementation would be a function of the nature of the regulatory agency,
WorkCover. This is examined below in terms of surveillance undertaken, resources
available and the background of the staff responsible for implementation.

Surveillance
Surveillance, in the sense it is used here is taken to mean h o w WorkCover obtained
its work. In the first two years or so following the introduction of the 1987 Act, WorkCover
was proactive in mandate implementation. The fact is that n e w legislation, regulations and

guidelines promoting self-regulation required awareness creating educational and training
initiatives. Subsequently, WorkCover's rehabilitation surveillance has been predominantly
reactive, with slight qualification.
Typically employers (and employees) would make queries or complaints, usually by
telephone, to which W o r k C o v e r would respond.

Following the regionalization of

WorkCover and the creation of R E C O M Advisory, it was found that the majority of these
calls concerned workers' compensation. However, rehabilitation queries, although smaller
in number, took m u c h more time and were considered by WorkCover m u c h more complex to
handle. The Wollongong R E C O M office received in excess of 300 calls per month to be
handled by two advisory officers with clerical support. In order of frequency they were from
employees and employers by far, and then rehabilitation providers and trade unions.
Statistics would be kept by the R E C O M office on the nature of the call according to which of
13 categories they fell under; for example, claims procedures, weekly pay, nonpay benefits,
noncompliance, rehabilitation lump sum benefits, disputes. In addition to passing these
statistical frequency reports to head office in Sydney for self justification, they were used by
the Illawarra R E C O M officers to identify more general problem areas and trends. The
officers would then proactively seek to discuss and explain these to employers w h e n in the
field through one-on-one meetings, group training sessions and "rehabilitation coordinator
networks" which they had initiated around their region (except for Wollongong).Essentially
self-help groups, these rehabilitation coordinator networks are an interesting form of
interorganizational outreach (modelled on a voluntarily formed coordinators' association)
used by WorkCover with a primary target group:
"Well, it's one very good w a y of getting information out and assisting people to do
the (rehabilitation) process properly. Probably because our brief in areas such as this
is to m a k e sure w e are accessible to employers and the public. So w e can't just sit in
our Wollongong office and expect to deliver services on a centralised basis. So w e
have a clear function of getting out in the field and doing field work. So I guess it's
probably one of the easiest ways, I guess, of approaching it because there is

supposed to be a rehabilitation coordinator in the workplace, so they are easily
identified."
Towards the end of the study timeframe, the Southern Region's R E C O M office was
piloting a computerised database on which were recorded details as to whether or not
employers possessed a rehabilitation program. T h e raw data were gathered by the Safety
Inspectorate (not the rehabilitation officers) in the regional offices through a Notice to
Employers system, whose primary intention was to ensure that employers were covered by
workers' compensation insurance. A s one officer explained: "we have at the m o m e n t not
quite 1,000 employers on our database and from that w e can see very easily which ones have
rehabilitation, which ones haven't and what w e are going to be then doing is developing
strategies to target those". M o r e active monitoring appeared to be on the way, although there
was some scepticism about this in Sydney.
Surveillance of rehabilitation providers by the accreditation section was m u c h more
formalised than for employers. From late 1989, data on providers and their performance was
kept on A.R.P.R.S. (Accredited Rehabilitation Provider Reporting System). Providers
submitted monthly details on their case load. Using these, the accreditation staff produced
summarised reports for providers' information and self regulation. These were reports on
WorkCover derived key performance indicators for providers:
output

- number of rehabilitation case closures

effectiveness - achieved return to work rate
efficiency

- average delay, injury to rehabilitation referral
- average cost of a rehabilitation case
- average duration of a rehabilitation case.

These data also were used annually for provider accreditation proposals and, as mentioned
earlier, were reactively employed in a few cases in counselling below par performers.
B y responding to provider-initiated applications for retraining or equipment funds,
the Vocational Services branch would monitor progress of such support through information

given by providers from time to time. These data had not been collated nor used for any
specified purpose during the study timeframe.

Resources
It is axiomatic that, in the eyes of operational staff, more resources will lead to more
effective, if not more efficient, organisational operations. With the exception of the
vocational services grouping, all other parts of WorkCover's rehabilitation implementation
effort were considered to be constrained primarily by a shortage of staff. This was
exemplified by various claims that staff were being "pinned to the telephones" unable to get
out into the field; that there w a s a reduction in staff numbers and the creation of too m a n y
managers in the regionalization process; that unqualified staff were offering advice to the
public; that following up on employers' rehabilitation programs is m u c h more intensive than
finding out if they have insurance cover. It is difficult to substantiate the extent to which
these claims, if true, affected implementation. W h a t is clear, and on this there was a high
level of convergence, the Division then Branch of Rehabilitation Services was denuded of
staff during the study timeframe. The numbers in accreditation fell from a m a x i m u m of 6
fulltime officers to 1; the advisory staff were hived off to region-based R E C O M ; the policy
and data unit collapsed: "the Division of Rehabilitation Services gradually disintegrated". In
effect, apart from the relatively prosperous Vocational Services Branch (which was never
part of the Division of Rehabilitation Services), WorkCover's central head office commitment
to occupational rehabilitation, by the end of the study period, as measured by staff numbers,
was negligible, if not neglectful. F r o m an interorganizational perspective, this was
weakening the centre's ties with its target population compensated in part by closer I O R
between the local, regional offices the employer/employee target groups.

Staff Background
The staff background aspect of the W o r k C o v e r Authority and its influence on
mandate implementation confirms that the danger of capture by the regulated was not an
issue. N o one interviewed within WorkCover nor in either of the two network case studies
even hinted at this. Rehabilitation was not a strategic issue for most network organizations.
The background of the staff charged with mandate implementation differed according
to target group. Those engaged in vocational retraining services and in the accreditation unit,
that is rehabilitation provider focused, were health professionals: psychologists,
rehabilitation counsellors, occupational therapists. The backgrounds of those staff involved
in advisory functions (now R E C O M ) servicing primarily employers and employees were
more eclectic: career public servants, workers' compensation insurance officers, trade union
officers, public relations and a few health professionals with rehabilitation qualifications.
For one head office informant, the lack of formal health professional qualifications was of
concern in that those seeking advice from such R E C O M staff might doubt the validity of the
advice or information being given. This disposition implies that rehabilitation is primarily a
health professional concern subordinating others' inputs. It focuses on a number of
professional/nonprofessional power dependency issues that arise in rehabilitation networks.
These are discussed in the section on compliance, theoretical proposition 5.

Enforcement Context
The final factor to be examined in WorkCover's mandate implementation is the
context within which it operates. This includes the extent to which target organizations,
beneficiaries as well as other forces such as political and economic pressures in that context
have played a part. From the outset of the 1987 Act, it m a y be said that the courts and
judicial process have had no obvious effect on WorkCover's rehabilitation activity, since
there were no cases prosecuted under the relevant mandate in the study timeframe.

B y looking at the policy and operational levels a number of environmental influences
can be discerned. Taking the policy level, first, WorkCover's consultative proclivity
demonstrated a sensitivity to stakeholders' interests. Thus, as noted in the discussion on
mandate emergence (see Chapter 4), system reviews involved multiparty committees
comprising not only representatives of mandated rehabilitation target groups but also
significant nonmandated players, namely, insurers and the medical professions. These latter
groups in showing an unfounded concern about rehabilitation providers' potential to
overservice, managed to secure a legal $1,200 provider preview point for all rehabilitation
cases. Indeed, throughout the five years the general view was that the insurers and more
latterly the rehabilitation providers were the most active lobbyists within WorkCover, to a
point where WorkCover set up an insurer-provider committee to work on formalizing
reporting arrangements among themselves. Insurer involvement in rehabilitation mandate
policy led one officer to remark "insurance companies are usually in on everything even
when it doesn't really concern them. They just get in on everything. Depending on the
issues other groups, but the insurers tend to be the c o m m o n forces".
While fairly active in policy reform processes in the early days of the WorkCover
system, employer groups and even more so trade unions in recent times, played a m u c h
diminished day-to-day role on policy matters. There are two main reasons. First, following
its establishment, the rehabilitation mandate was progressively embedded into society without
undue controversy, disruption or dislocation to employers, employees (in general) and their
unions. There was little need to intervene at the policy level, unlike prior to 1987. Second,
from 1989 onwards a deep economic recession befell the country and as might be expected
consumed a significant proportion of employers' and unions' attention. The former
embarked upon labour-shedding and restructuring programs, and in response the latter were
concerned to defend their threatened members' interests and deal with the damage of
shrinking membership.

In turn, the economic recession led W o r k C o v e r to direct some of its plentiful
resources to fund rehabilitation through vocational retraining for workers unable to return to
their former work due to injury restrictions or recession - induced job loss. This injection of
funds to assist with increasingly prominent long term rehabilitation cases suggests political
astuteness (or compliance) by WorkCover in playing a more visible and socially responsible
role. Unemployment was the State's key social concern of the day.
At the operational level within WorkCover there was some degree of equivocation
about contextual influence. The provider focused sections based at head office felt that there
was no real influence exerted by those w h o m they sought to regulate. O n e officer
commented "I stick very m u c h to the rules." Given the relatively loose ties between
WorkCover and providers in a predominantly self-regulatory strategy, it is quite consistent
for WorkCover to feel relatively free of operational provider influence. Furthermore, the
accreditation system placed most of whatever operational influence there was in the hands of
WorkCover. Interestingly, there w a s a suggestion by one officer that the medical
professions, a nonmandated group w h o m W o r k C o v e r does not seek to regulate,
deleteriously affected operations in the provider area because they allegedly understood little
about occupational rehabilitation.
The self-regulation strategy for employers and unions w a s even looser than for
providers: there was no potential reward or threat from accreditation controls. A partial
offset was to regionalise and so become more accessible and knowledgeable about local
conditions. For some target organizations in the case studies this led to strengthened
information exchange and cooperative rehabilitation problem solving with WorkCover. This
was supported by one officer's view that "probably the most influence is once again that
networking factor [....]. It's the fact that w e are all aware of what the other people are doing
[....] and that means that they are m u c h more liable to call on us as local operatives rather
than just leave things in a void or refer it on to litigation ...."

The injured employee was claimed by R E C O M to be the most influential in terms of
shaping their mandate implementation work. This was because "it's the injured worker that
actually creates the problem for the other players". In a sense, the worker was seen as a
pivot around which the rehabilitation network formed and operated. Consequently, through
the employee, the employer and rehabilitation provider were considered by WorkCover to be
the most influential. R E C O M also confirmed the difficulties brought about by the economic
recession in the Illawarra in terms of employer downsizing and restructuring. Rehabilitation
scope was reduced.

The foregoing analysis of mandate enforcement is striking in a number of ways. The
absence of coercive isomorphism conveys an image of WorkCover as a regulator reluctant to
interfere with target organizations' choices about rehabilitation. The overriding emphasis on
self-regulation, on consultation and cooperation with target organizations is considered by
WorkCover to mitigate against control actions. Perhaps, this is tacit recognition that most
organizations are good corporate citizens a n y w a y (Zald, 1978).

Instruments of

encouragement and informed persuasion are seen as the most appropriate regulation devices.
For the most part, these emphasise voluntaristic economic not legal benefits. Thus the
impression emerges of a broadly mapped out regulatory field with a few anodyne rules that
are rarely refereed.

6.4 Compliance
Compliance refers to the behaviour of explicitly and implicitly targeted organizations
in meeting the aims of the mandate. This section focuses on interorganizational network
aspects of this compliance primarily through empirical assessment of the six theoretical
propositions outlined in Chapter 2. Preparatory to this, it is necessary to ascertain the nature
of the following explanatory variables that will be employed in the above assessment:

network definition, perceptions of mandate form, importance of mandated activity and
organizational readiness and capability.

Network Definition
The relevance of network definition is found in gaining an understanding of what
organizations consider to be the problem domain and their role in it. If the mandate were to
be used as the defining criterion, then the vast majority of those apparently involved would
be excluded and the resultant analysis grossly incomplete. Conversely, by taking as given,
therehabilitationinvolvement of all of those organizations listed in Table 6.5 and Appendix
13, would overextend the study's credibility. Thus to gain a more accurate definition of the
network and its boundaries, it is necessary to elicit this from the organizations themselves.
The first step taken in defining the interorganizational networks in the case studies
was to establish the presence or otherwise of an interorganizationalrelationship.Tables 6.6
and 6.7 graphically set out the presence of reported direct interorganizational dealings
concerning injured workers in each of the case studies. T h e matrix format permits
comparative analysis within and between the cases at three levels: the network, subnetwork
(that is, mandated or nonmandated) and the organization. Each table indicates there are some
hundreds of interorganizational connections a m o n g the identified parties. This lays to rest
the WorkCover principle of occupational rehabilitation as a workplace based phenomenon. It
is probably more appropriate to argue that it is network-based with a workplace focus, that
is, if it is accepted that the high level of interorganizational connectedness claimed by the
employer organizations ( 1 0 0 % in Case 1, 9 2 . 6 % in Case 2) confers on them some measure
of network centrality. This leads to another point: a visual inspection of Tables 6.6 and 6.7
clearly indicates that some organizations have dealings with significantly more organizations
than do others, and some have barely any interorganizational dealings. These differences
concern network density (connectedness) and are also analysed later in this section as one of
the six theoretical propositions.
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Interorganizational Dealings C o n c e r n i n g Injured W o r k e r s
C a s e S t u d y 2, Tertiary E d u c a t i o n Sector

The presence of interorganizational dealings in the cases does not necessarily m e a n
that all directly concern occupational rehabilitation. T o ascertain this, and as a consequence a
clearer picture of what constitutes a rehabilitation network, requires an understanding of the
role that organizations consider themselves to play as well as the primary types of
interorganizational activities into which they enter. These are discussed below.
According to the Workers Compensation Act 1987, confirmed by referring to Tables
6.6 and 6.7, only 7 out of a possible 40 organizations in case 1 and 5 out of 29 in case 2 are
legally mandated to be a part of occupational rehabilitation. General practitioners,
orthopaedic surgeons, in fact all of the medical professions as well as the identified allied
health professions (physiotherapists, clinical psychologists) are not. They are considered to
provide treatment and are required to bill the relevant insurer as such. However, w h e n
informants were asked about h o w they perceived their prior involvement in rehabilitation, the
responses were m u c h broader than that found in the legislation.
The pattern of responses w a s broadly similar across the two cases, although there
were some differences between the mandated and nonmandated subnetworks. With regard to
the mandated, both employers saw their involvement in terms of setting up and running
rehabilitation programs. However, the employer organization in case 1, in its additional role
as a self-insurer in workers' compensation did not see a part for itself in rehabilitation; it
tried not to get involved with other staff specialists' rehabilitation "area". This reluctance is
consistent with the nonmandated external insurer in case 2 which professed to little actual
involvement in rehabilitation beyond having to review files "more than w e would like to" for
payment authorisation purposes.
T w o of the three unions (one in each of the cases) were the least clear and unsure of
the mandated organizations about their rehabilitation involvement, with a tendency to see it as
a rights protection exercise of "placing people onto our solicitors" and thus abdicating any
direct responsibility. O n the other hand, union 2 (case 1) had a firm grasp on its legal and

actual involvement. A s discussed in the previous section on mandate enforcement, the
WorkCover Authority at the regional level had a clear view about its rehabilitation
involvement.
The accredited rehabilitation providers all viewed their role in rehabilitation largely as
one of coordinating the injured employee's return to work process. Providers 2 and 3 in case
1, and the provider in case 2 claimed that other than for workers' compensation billing
purposes, rehabilitation and treatment were essentially the same. These providers m a d e this
assertion from a treatment perspective: in addition to their accredited rehabilitation provider
status, they offered a wide range of nonmandated medical and primary health treatment
services. T w o were hospitals, one private, one public and the third an industrial health centre
covering prevention, treatment as well as rehabilitation.
The attested rehabilitation involvement of nonmandated organizations is more varied
than the mandated. For the larger part, the merging or blurring of actual rehabilitation with
treatment (as distinct from legal rehabilitation and treatment) discussed above w a s confirmed
by the medical and allied health treatment organizations. These include: general medical
practitioners, orthopaedic surgeons, rheumatologists, pain specialist, physiotherapists and
the hospitals. Typical comments were:
"... minor injures, I handle the rehabilitation myself...."
"... major injuries ... w e are working in conjunction with occupational therapists ...
with the rehabilitation specialists."
(general practitioners)
"... rehabilitation in orthopaedics is part of the whole thing."
(orthopaedic surgeon)
"... in chronic pain, if y o u are treating you are rehabilitating ... you can't
distinguish."
(rheumatologist)
"Rehabilitation are lines of treatment that I vary."
(pain specialist)
"The relationship is blurred between physiotherapy and treatment."
(physiotherapist)

"It's grey isn't it"
(medical specialist, hospital 1)
There were very few exceptions to the above theme with distinctions between
rehabilitation and treatment being drawn along the lines of patient activity and the amount of
time involved.
Those organizations offering diagnostic services (radiology and pathology)
unanimously saw no rehabilitation role for themselves in an interorganizational sense. O f the
remaining organizations in both cases, the majority felt their role in rehabilitation as
peripheral, in terms of the occasional delivery of services such as vocational retraining
(government agencies 1 and 3, vocational assessor, case 2) and interpretation (government
agency, case 1). A few, the car hire firm, driving school, the pharmacy and equipment
supplier claimed no involvement.
In interorganizational network analysis, it is not sufficient simply to adopt a focal
organization's perspective about its involvement in a particular field activity; in this case,
occupational rehabilitation. It is also necessary to take account of the perspectives of those
organizations with which the focal organization enters into dealings. This is because the w a y
in which and the organizations with which a focal organization claims to interact m a y not be
quite h o w the alleged interacting organizations view and interrelate with it. For example, the
care hire firm in case 2 did not see itself as playing any part in occupational rehabilitation of
any employer organization. However, the employer organization in this case, by arranging
to hire a vehicle to assist in training an injured worker for alternative work viewed that car
hire firm as a useful resource toward the fulfilment of its rehabilitation plans. Similarly,
provider 1 (case 1), in seeking and receiving advice about an injured worker's physical
limitation from orthopaedic surgeon 1, viewed that as part of the rehabilitation process. The
surgeon, on the other hand, stridently claimed no involvement in rehabilitation. O f course,
the juxtaposition of a focal organization's professed involvement with claims by the involved
not only points to potentially significant differences but also serves independently to

corroborate and thereby validate the general content and thrust of their interorganizational
dealings.
A useful means of tapping into these interacting organizations' perspectives is by
looking at their primary dealings with the focal organization. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 set out the
primary types of reported interorganizational dealings in case 1 and case 2 respectively.
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show the primary direction of the above dealings in case 1 and case 2
respectively; that is, they identify the initiation point for those particular dealings. For
example, in case 1 general practice 3 reported that, in its relationship with provider 2, it
primarily referred there for assessment (and possibly rehabilitation or treatment) of the
injured patient. Provider 2 independently confirmed this to be so. It is important to bear in
mind that while the initial direction of dealings is shown in the majority of instances to be
uni-directional often the first approach would lead to an exchange. So, in the above example,
general practice 3 would receive written as well as verbal feedback following the referral.
The I O R among the mandated organizations in both case studies were corroborated as
similar in content and direction. T h e dealings are characterised by reciprocally initiated,
multiple purpose exchanges between the employer and rehabilitation providers, by
WorkCover Authority (local office) as the recipient of general and case specific requests for
information and advice about employee rehabilitation and workers' compensation matters
from all parties, and by the unions involved in information exchange and negotiations
primarily with employers. A n example of multiple purposes are the injury prevention
consultancy, medical treatment, occupational rehabilitation, and physiotherapy services found
in the I O R between the employer and provider in case 2.
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Table 6.9

n = negotiation
r = rehabilitation
s = proprietary services
t = treatment
y = assessment (and possibly rehabilitation or treatment)
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> = primarily refer to for
eg.> d (see Table 6.9) means row organization primarily refers to the column
organization for diagnostic services
< = primarily referral from for
eg. < i means row organization primarily received referral from the column
organization for information
< > = two-way referral
eg. o means row and column organizations primarily refer to each other
for rehabilitation purposes

Table 6.11 Primary Direction(s) of Interorganizational Dealings in
Case 2, Tertiary Education Sector

The I O R content and direction between the mandated and nonmandated organizations
are much more varied. The unions in both cases are involved in barely any dealings beyond
contacting the occasional doctor and visiting hospitals to find out h o w their injured members
are faring, and chasing an insurer (case 2) about matters such as benefits payment. In its
nonmandated role as a self-insurer in workers' compensation, the employer's (case 1) claims
as a recipient of bills for services rendered and reports from the nonmandated are confirmed.
For its mandated part as an employer, it also seeks and receives information from treating
doctors and physiotherapist, for which there is only partial confirmation. While in case 1 the
mandated employer-nonmandated insurer relationship is an intraorganizational matter, in case
2 it is interorganizational in nature. The employer has a close multiple purpose, reciprocally
initiating relationship with its insurer. Yet, interestingly it seeks to mimic the self-insurer's
role of "keeping an eye on the costs" by asserting its receipt of bills and reports from the
nonmandated sector, claims which are not confirmed by the field. Instead the nonmandated
saw the employer in case 2 as an employee referring source for assessment, treatment and
rehabilitation. Another difference between the two employers in relation to the nonmandated
was that the case 1 employer reported dealings with treating health professions in search of
information and advice for rehabilitation purposes, dealings that were not reported by the
case 2 employer.
Except for provider 1 (case 1) all other provider-nonmandated I O R are complicated
because, in addition to their rehabilitation function, these providers operate as medical and
other primary health care treatment facilities. Thus while provider 1 is confirmed essentially
as an initiating information and advice seeker, the other providers, particularly 2 and 3 in case
1 (which are hospitals), are viewed by the same treating organizations as both a rehabilitation
and treatment source. Further, provider 2 (case 1) and the provider in case 2 see their
involvement with medical treating and diagnostic organizations in both treatment and
rehabilitation terms. Therefore, through this claimed synergistic combination of treatment

and rehabilitation they report greater outreach into the nonmandated network than providers 1
and 3 (case 1). For provider 1 (case 1) and the provider in case 2 occupational rehabilitation
is a key business activity which perhaps explains w h y they tend to initiate I O R more than the
other providers, whose hospital roles predominate.
Providers and insurers also tend to maintain multiple purpose I O R ;

prior

authorization by the insurer w a s required by providers to b e c o m e involved in paid
rehabilitation work, and insurers would often refer to providers for assessment in workers'
compensations claims management. These are not so evident in case 1 where, as mentioned
earlier, the employer is the insurer.

Mandated organizations' relations with other

nonmandated organizations such as government agencies, care hire and pharmacy were
corroborated as primarily the provision of proprietary services to the employer, usually the
purported request of a provider. Finally, WorkCover continued to be a source of information
and advice to a small portion of the nonmandated populations in both cases.
The I O R content and direction a m o n g the nonmandated were broadly corroborated as
similar across both cases, with the main exception being that bills and reports in case 2 would
be directed to the insurer, and to the employer in case 1. Overall, general practitioners would
refer to medical specialists for assessment and possibly treatment. They would refer to
physiotherapy clinics and the clinical psychology practice for treatment services. All medical
treatment organizations and to a lesser extent the physiotherapists were confirmed as referring
to the radiology and pathology organizations for diagnostic services. These diagnostic
organizations' relations were referrals from the abovementioned treatment practices
(including hospitals and those providers offering medical services) and with the bill-paying
insurer in case 2 and employer in case 1. Thus, it was established that they were at the end
of the medical referral network and in the same w a y as m a n y of the remaining nonmandated
organizations (government agencies, vocational assessor, car hire firm, driving school,
ambulance services, pharmacy equipment supplier) they represented the boundaries of the
occupational rehabilitation network. O n e of the challenges in an interorganizational study of

this nature w a s securing the participation of these organizations residing at the network's
periphery. Not surprisingly, their reticence arose out of a failure to recognise the study's
relevance to their practice or business. While not key players, they were at times considered
by others as resources necessary for the successful progression of the network's activities.
Based on the above discussion, an image emerges of a rehabilitation domain only
partially embraced by the legal mandate, a domain which involves, merges and overlaps with
voluntaristic and complementary fields such as medical treatment and workers' compensation
claims management. In this complex interorganizational field which one medical specialist
referred to as "a bit like a ring-road around London", there seems to be a reasonably high
degree of correspondence a m o n g organizations as to the content and general direction of their
dealings. Figure 6.1 sets out a simplified summary of the major directional flows of primary
dealings between organizations in case 1 and case 2. A c o m m o n feature is the general
consistency of shape and direction in both industry sectors. T h e main qualification to this
observation is that the self-insured employer in case 1 is connected by m o r e
interorganizational flows than the externally insured case 2 employer. This hints at the
greater centrality of the case 1 employer in the rehabilitation network, a point discussed in the
network density proposition. However, it is the rehabilitation providers, particularly those
also offering treatment services (providers 2 and 3, case 1 and the provider in case 2) that
appear to reside at the main confluence of the mandated and nonmandated interorganizational
dealings. In addition, greater network complexity is seen to characterise case 2, as a
consequence of more ties occurring with the external insurer (whose role is subsumed by the
employer in case 1). The above suggests that the more an organization internalizes or already
possesses operational parts of an interorganizational network the greater its potential
accessibility to the network. In summary, then, occupational rehabilitation is confirmed as a
partially mandated interorganizational process similar in basic content and direction
irrespective of industry sector.
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Perceptions of Mandate

Form

In the theory chapter it was argued that the ways in which mandate form is perceived
will influence implementation efforts by target organizations, including their IOR. The extent
to which this is so is discussed in terms of the focal organization's perceptions of its
mandated role as well as the roles of the other organizations in the network. This latter aspect
is relevant given the rehabilitation mandate creates I O R not just between the regulator and the
regulated, but also among the regulated and the nonregulated.
Contrary to expectations, the mandated organizations displayed quite a wide range of
perceptions about their role in relation to the mandate. The employers in both cases were
reasonably clear about their role, although the self-insured section of employer 1, case 1, was
rather uncertain, primarily because, it was claimed, there was no real role under law beyond
ensuring that workers' compensation payment provisions for rehabilitation services and time
off were followed. Only one of the three unions that responded fully k n e w its legal role
(union 2, case 1). This knowledge w a s based on direct and active involvement in
rehabilitation, not evident in the reports by the other two.
Of all the mandated organizations, apart from WorkCover, providers 1 and 2, case 1
and the case 2 provider were the most clear and knowledgeable about their legal role.
Provider 3, case 1 was quite unsure about its legal role and responsibilities in relation to the
accreditation section of WorkCover head office and other organizations such as employers,
unions,-medical practices and so on.
With the exception of union 2 case 1, all mandated organizations found the law to be
relatively clear and not particularly complex; as one provider put it "the law's straight
forward but the [rehabilitation] process can be very complex". All of the mandated felt there
was a goodly measure of legal discretion apart from reporting requirements placed upon
providers for WorkCover and insurance companies. While a number remarked upon positive
aspects of the flexibility and broad choice of action embodied within a major part of the

mandate's discretion, there were also some cautionary comments about apathy, avoidance
and uncertainty. For example:

"1 suppose there is a fair bit of choice. I mean, you could be passive as opposed to
being active like w e are ... yes, you can be passive and some providers are ..."
(provider, case 1)

"It (discretion) can be a good thing in some cases but if it can be used to avoid
responsibility as it is sometimes used, I don't k n o w h o w good a thing that is."
(employer, case 2)

"Yes, I think actually having quite clear guidelines is much better than having it open
because it really does help and structure yourself in what you need to do."
(provider, case 1)
The mandated organizations in both cases did not identify any major nor frequent
changes to the mandate, although where changes had been brought in there was some
criticism by providers levelled at their poor dissemination. Thus, perceived absence of legal
uncertainty through low rates of change m a y be compromised by ineffectual enforcement
behaviour when a change comes through.
W h e n it comes to the mandated organizations' perceptions of other organizations'
(including the nonmandated) roles under the law, the overall picture is mixed. While the
mandated have a reasonable idea of what is expected from the mandated (except for the
unions), there is uncertainty about the role of the nonmandated, treating medical practitioners.
Both employers and three of the four providers erroneously believed doctors had an explicit
role under the mandate ranging from the need to follow well-defined (but not identified)
procedures through to completing WorkCover medical certificates.
The perceptions of mandate form by the nonmandated are characterised by an
expected lack of awareness by most organizations for themselves and others in both cases.
There were few exceptions. The insurer in case 2 was familiar with its legal role and those of
others. One physiotherapy and two medical treatment practices wrongly believed they had a

specific role under the mandate although these views were found to be based on their
respective professional codes.
If, as suggested by W o r k C o v e r (see quote at the beginning of this chapter),
successful rehabilitation outcomes are dependent upon effective interorganizational
cooperation and coordination a m o n g mandated and nonmandated actors, then the lack of
awareness about each other's legal roles is problematic. It can lead to erroneous role
assumptions which precede inappropriate compliance behaviours. A counterpoint to this
view is that if a mandate is sufficiently open-ended such that it provides for almost unlimited
(and unenforced) discretion, then the need for organizations to k n o w each other's mandated
roles or otherwise is neither here nor there.

Importance of Mandated Activity
There were varying types and degrees of importance attributed to the mandated
occupational rehabilitation activity by organizations, although there was no clear distinction
between the two cases. T h e types of importance referred to were mainly organizational,
professional or moral in orientation; no one claimed it was important because of the law.
Overall, albeit somewhat unevenly, the mandated organizations considered occupational
rehabilitation as organizationally the most important in strategic and operational terms.
Provider 1, case 1 and the provider in case 2 (the two which claimed significant outreach in
their interorganizational dealings and were a m o n g the most knowledgeable about the
mandate) held it to be a core part of their businesses, formalized into computerised, quality
assured operating procedures and capped by its enshrinement in their corporate objectives.
The remaining two providers emphasised the professional importance of rehabilitation to
them at the expense of the organizational since the latter had fallen off almost completely in
recent times due to resource constraints (provider 2 - public hospital) and redirection
following takeover (provider 3 - private hospital).

While neither employer claimed rehabilitation to be strategically significant, they did
assure its importance in their respective h u m a n resource management activities, although one
which maintained a fairly low profile compared with other functions. T h e unions espoused
its importance in their portfolios of local m e m b e r representation matters, but it w a s not
conferred a central role.
From the ranks of the nonmandated, the external insurer, a general medical practice,
the chronic pain clinic and all of the physiotherapy practices held rehabilitation to be
organizationally as well as professionally important. For one physiotherapy clinic it w a s
their "bread and butter", for another it represented a strategic direction it intended to pursue
through application for accreditation by WorkCover. It was important organizationally in that
it formed a significant part of their caseload and, therefore, income. Other treating doctors
acknowledged the professional significance of rehabilitation, although there w a s a note of
indifference, if not resentment, a m o n g the orthopaedic surgeons. This is probably due to
their perception that rehabilitation providers were a recent interference and encroachment on
their traditional doctor-patient relationship. This issue is addressed in the later analysis of the
threat to autonomy proposition.
Even those nonmandated organizations at the periphery of the network, the medical
diagnostics practices and the "others" such as the driving school and the government agencies
expressed the moral importance of helping the injured. T o summarise, an emotive issue such
as the significance of dealing with the injured worker/union member/patient/client/customer is
almost guaranteed to be endorsed as important. H o w e v e r , the extent to which that
importance stimulates interorganizational action is m o r e likely to occur if it is organizational
in nature. This is manifest in part by the willingness and ability of organizations to commit
their resources to occupational rehabilitation. This is discussed below.

Organizational Readiness

and Capability

In this subsection organizational readiness and capability are assessed, firstly, in
terms of the organizations' disposition and ability to commit their resources to occupational
rehabilitation, and therefore interorganizational relations, and secondly, with regard to the
part they considered the WorkCover Authority to play in bringing about this commitment. In
much the same w a y as most organizations attributed s o m e level of importance to
rehabilitation, so they also confirmed a commitment to helping the injured workers.
Moreover, this commitment also differed in terms of type and degree. The two main types of
commitment identified were organizational and professional, where the latter m a y exist at the
individual or group level without any significant impact on organizational commitment, as
will be demonstrated below.
In line with the discussion on mandate importance, organizational commitment was
more prevalent in the mandated subnetworks than the nonmandated. However, this
commitment was not even within or between the mandated. The case 1 employer situated in
a comparatively hazardous industry, had a large amount of resources deployed in
occupational health and safety, of which rehabilitation (and workers compensation) was a
part. Well in excess of 60 specialist staff were dedicated to this effort including, occupational
physicians, rehabilitation counsellors, occupational health workers, psychologists,
occupational hygienists, safety engineering and ambulance officers. Approximately 1 0 % of
the staff complement were allocated specifically to occupational rehabilitation. Written
policies and procedures, inhouse booklets for employees in multiple languages targeting the
multicultural workforce of more than 7,500 employees, a relatively recently computerised
rehabilitation information system, funds for training staff, budgets for dealing with disputed
cases all signified a sizeable resource commitment by this round-the-clock large batch
technology organization. However, even this level of commitment was questioned in relation
to rehabilitation difficulties encountered as a consequence of internal restructuring and

multiskilling. In contrast, the relatively safer tertiary education based case 2 employer, had
one fulltime officer and intermittent casual clerical support allocated to deal with the gamut of
health, safety, rehabilitation and workers' compensation claims management. Even with
documented policies and procedures for well over 1,000 employees, although no systematic
information system for rehabilitation, the resource commitment w a s considered somewhat
thin. However, this w a s partially offset by an apparently greater relative proclivity by the
organization to accommodate its injured workers in alternative, modified or completely n e w
work. Thus, while the higher the level of safety risk associated with industry and
technology, the more likely those organizations will invest inriskreduction capability, the
same cannot necessarily be said for the strength of their motivation, or willingness to deploy
that capability.
Notwithstanding the above, both employers actually went well beyond the mandate's
requirement to establish a rehabilitation program: they implemented it. The rationale for
voluntary implementation involving significant I O R activity was based on the perceived
opportunity to reduce workers' compensation costs and insurance premia (economic), to
maintain or enhance industrial relations with unions (stability), to be seen by employees as a
fair and responsible employer (legitimacy) and to secure employee commitment to the
organization through organizational c o m m i t m e n t to the employee in such matters
(reciprocity).
The unions also differed in their commitment to rehabilitation. While all claimed a
willingness to help their members, only union 2, case 1 committed an official on a quasiformal basis to deal with rehabilitation matters on a regular footing. This is due to its
members being the largest employee group at the employer organization working in the most
hazardous jobs and consequently presenting the largest number of rehabilitation candidates.
The rehabilitation providers' commitment to rehabilitation w a s also variable.
Consistent with earlier analysis, provider 1, case 1 and the provider in case 2 were by far the
most organizationally committed: rehabilitation w a s central to their survival. Staff,

procedures and motivation reflected this. T h e remaining two providers indicated a personal,
professional commitment to rehabilitation that w a s not reflected by the organization. A s
mentioned earlier, one w a s on the point of not renewing its accreditation and the other was in
an organization that w a s reorienting its strategy away from a workplace rehabilitation market.
WorkCover commitment was discussed in the previous section.
In the main, nonmandated organizations' in both cases consistently reported a
professional commitment to rehabilitation with the peripheral diagnosticians and others
declaring little or no organizational commitment, and the insurer claiming a moderate level of
commitment.

Professional c o m m i t m e n t w a s not necessarily a lesser entity than

organizational. M a n y organizations in the nonmandated subnetworks were small, often
reliant upon the professional capabilities of one individual. Given these circumstances, the
main organizational commitment such organizations can m a k e are defined in terms of their
professional services. T h e extent to which their professional commitment assumed
organizational significance w a s primarily as a function of caseload.

Thus, those

nonmandated w h o attested to the importance of rehabilitation in an organizational sense also
were the most resource committed, indicated by activities such as attention to referrals and
involvement in case conferences by one specialist, time spent with the injured workers and
interacting with other organizations on return to work possibilities by a number of
physiotherapists and the clinical psychologist, and time spent by the insurer promoting the
cost advantages of active rehabilitation programs to their clients.
W h a t influence did the mandated and nonmandated consider WorkCover to exert on
their rehabilitation readiness and capability? B y and large, they felt that WorkCover's
influence was minimal. The mandated confirmed WorkCover's aim to being an informative,
advisory rehabilitation service, rather than a regulatory agency entering into stereotypical
assymetrical relations with its target elements. O n e union officer bemoaned this absence of
WorkCover enforcement power describing the situation as "boxing with both hands behind
your back". The providers implied that WorkCover possessed unrealised potential so far as

their accreditation was concerned through calling for regular reports and reviewing their
status each year. However, as things stood they were not a threat; for provider 1, case 1 and
the case 2 provider they felt secure since their performance was well ahead of the industry
standard. In other words, they were already willing and able to get involved in rehabilitation.
For most nonmandated organizations in the study, there had never been any contact
with WorkCover, let alone any influence on them.

S o m e treating doctors talked

disparagingly about completing WorkCover medical certificates as well as receiving booklets
and other literature. Beyond this there was little else, although one surgeon felt that
WorkCover had s o m e influence on the rehabilitation system in the early years, but was
unable to explian clearly what he meant.

Theoretical Propositions
In Chapter 2, six theoretical were developed and presented for testing the theoretical
differences between explicit (mandated) and implicit (nonmandated) components of partial
mandates. The empirical findings are discussed below.

Formalization
Proposition 1: The formalization of relations in partially mandated legal-political networks
will be more highly developed for those members who are explicitly identified.
Findings from the field research strongly support this proposition. Tables 6.12 and
6.13 identify the formalized I O R in case studies 1 and 2 respectively. They are more
prevalent among the mandated than elsewhere in the networks and find expression in a
number of different ways. In line with the mandate, the employer organizations and the
unions were signatories to jointly developed rehabilitation policies and programs; in effect,
extending the scope of their longstanding and otherwise highly formalized industrial relations
found in local enterprise and industry-based agreements. Certain rehabilitation providers
were explicitly identified and nominated by the employer and unions within this
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Table 6.12 Formalized Interorganizational Relations,
Case Study 1, Heavy Manufacturing Sector
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Table 6.13 Formalized Interorganizational Relations,
Case Study 2, Tertiary Education Sector

documentation as their provider(s) of choice (although an injured worker retains the final
right of decision as to which provider(s) he attends). Thus it is noted that providers 2 and 3
in case 1 were not employer/union nominated. While nomination w a s the extent of
formalized I O R between employer and the provider in case 2, additional formal arrangements
existed between provider 1 and employer in case 1: there was a jointly negotiated service
supply agreement as well as formal payment authorisation procedures with the self-insurance
section which are examined in the analysis of formalized I O R between mandated and
nonmandated organizations.
Interestingly, none of the unions considered they were party to a formal relationship
with the providers through the policy and programs agreed with the employer; nor for that
matter did the providers with respect to the unions. The situation was one where the policy
and programs were seen to create malleable expectations between employer as the focal
organization and the parties rather than stringently binding contractual terms among them all.
The I O R between the providers and WorkCover were more formalized than the above
policies and programs through clearly defined (re-)accreditation procedures and frequent,
regularised reporting protocols. Moreover, without WorkCover's formal accreditation,
aspiring rehabilitation providers were legally precluded from payment for rehabilitation
services; in effect, they were excluded from the occupational rehabilitation domain.
WorkCover's formal I O R with the employer in case 1 specifically concerns its
licensing of that employer to be a self-insurer in workers' compensation, an even more
tightly prescribed operational (and financial) set of arrangements than that with providers. It
is an internal organizational equivalent to the formal mandated-nonmandated I O R that
characterise the WorkCover-insurer relation in case 2. Although the insurer and self-insurer
part of the employer professed little involvement in rehabilitation, the payment authority
vested in them through the licensing arrangement conferred a significant degree of power not
only on activities in the mandated but also in the nonmandated subnetworks: treatment and

rehabilitation are limited by funding. This capacity of the nonmandated party (the insurer)
was particularly pronounced in the I O R with the mandated providers, for m a n y of w h o m
rehabilitation w a s a primary source of income. Earlier differences encountered on the criteria
for authorising paid provider involvement led to the implementation of WorkCover endorsed
(and published) insurer-provider developed authorisation guidelines. These were considered
a great success by the relevant parties in the case studies in terms of clarifying aspects of
interorganizational communication: referral/approval and reporting procedures.
Aside from the provider-insurer and employer-insurer IOR, the only other formalized
mandated-nonmandated relations reported were between providers 2 and 3, case 1 and
various medical practices. These two providers in their additional and nonmandated capacity
as treating hospitals, engaged certain orthopaedic surgeons, the pain specialist and so on as
visiting medical officers. In a sense, therefore, these I O R could also be construed as
involving non-mandated organizations only, as confirmed by similar arrangements with the
hospitals in cases 1 and 2. The extent to which their treatment and operations concern
occupational rehabilitation is a function of the participating organizations' perceptions which
were discussed earlier in this section.
While formalization characterises the I O R a m o n g the mandated, a glance back at
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 confirms that a significant amount of overall network activity between the
mandated and nonmandated and a m o n g the nonmandated alone was conducted outside of
formalized arrangements. These I O R relied on the voluntary cooperation of participating
organizations. The injured employee was widely reported as the primary contingency for
initiating this cooperation as distinct from the largely case-independent nature of the
formalized IOR. Thus, if the worker presented with significant musculoskeletal problems
(the dominant medical problems in this study), there is a strong likelihood of referral by
general medical practitioners to and subsequent voluntary participation (assuming payment)
by available orthopaedic surgeons, radiologists and physiotherapy clinics.

Their

technologies (skills, equipment, work organization) would be most suited to deal with the

particular medical demands. In a similar way, different organizations with their particular
perspectives, products and services become involved to deal with other injured employee
needs such as counselling, job redesign and retraining, that would involve a rehabilitation
provider, the employer and trade union.
In addition to the peculiarities of the presenting injury problem and its technological
demands, there were a number of qualifications as to choice of organizations with which to
cooperate. These included perceptions of the other organization's performance, geographical
proximity and interpersonal friendship. Perceptions of other organizations' performance
were derived from direct interaction as well as vicariously through the eyes and "word of
mouth" experiences of third parties, such as the injured worker and other organizations in the
network. Naturally, a reputation for high quality performance featured prominently as an
interorganizational selection criterion, by signifying a basic trust in the other party and
validating the focal organization's judgement. Geographical convenience for the injured
worker was also frequently cited as a factor for choosing which physiotherapy clinic,
radiology or pathology practice to deal with. For one doctor this was justified as "supporting
the local radiologist". This touches upon notions of community which, inter alia, are often
spatially defined. Finally, the existence of personal ties between representatives of different
organizations was considered by some to be an influential cooperation choice, based on the
premise that it is easier to deal with someone you k n o w and with w h o m you have personal
contact At the same time, this was assiduously denied by a number of medical practitioners
and the diagnosticians.
In summary, formalization is more prevalent and highly developed a m o n g the
explicitly mandated organizations. However, m u c h of network life concerning the
rehabilitation of injured workers involves voluntary cooperation, an issue which is examined
further in the analysis of the threat to autonomy proposition.

Network Density
Proposition 2: The interdependence created between the explicitly identified members
supports the view that network density (connectedness) will be higher for them than for those
implicitly identified.
Network density is concerned with the number of connections that exist or have
existed between the participating organizations; it is an aggregation of their dyadic linkages.
Tables 6.14 and 6.15, derived from Tables 6.6 and 6.7, respectively show the number and
percentage of dealings in both case studies reported by the focal organization and by the
interacting organizations. The range of connectedness within the network is broad, with the
employer in case 1 showing contact with all (100%) organizations through to the equipment
supplier claiming dealings with only 1 (2.6%) other organization.
So far as the proposition is concerned, there is only partial confirmation that network
density is higher for the mandated. Table 6.16 clearly shows the mandated employers and
rehabilitation providers to be consistently among the most highly connected. However, they
are accompanied by the nonmandated orthopaedic surgeons, and the insurer

Case Study 1
Heavy Manufacturing Sector
Focal
Reported Dealings
Organization
with Others
% Total*
No.
mandated
employer
39
100.0
union 1
15.4
6
union 2
9
23.1
provider 1
21
53.8
provider 2
66.7
26
provider 3
28.2
11
WorkCover
43.6
17

Case Study 2
Tertiary Education Sector
Focal
Reported Dealings
Organization
with Others
No.
% Total**
mandated
employer
25
92.6
union 1
6
22.2
i***
union 2
3.7
provider
22
81.4
WorkCover
12
44.4

nonmandated
general practice 1
general practice 2
general practice 3
orthopaedic surgery 1
orthopaedic surgery 2
orthopaedic surgery 3
physician 1
vascular surgery
radiology 1
radiology 2
radiology 3
radiology 4
pathology 1
pathology 2
physiotherapy 1
physiotherapy 2
physiotherapy 3
physiotherapy 4
physiotherapy 5
psychology practice
ambulance services
hospital 1
hospital 2
government agency
pharmacy
equipment supplier

nonmandated
insurer
general practice 1
general practice 2
orthopaedic surgery
rheumatology 1
rheumatology 2
chronic pain clinic
radiology 1
radiology 2
radiology 3
physiotherapy 1
psychology practice 1
vocational assessor
hospital
government agency 1
government agency 2
government agency 3
car hire
driving school

20
14
21
24
16
n/a
14
n/a
19
10
11
12
13
21
16
8
6
10
8
12
9
26
16
2
7
1

51.3
35.9
53.8
61.5
41.0

n/a
35.9

n/a
48.7
25.6
28.2
30.8
33.3
53.8
41.0
20.5
15.4
25.6
20.5
30.8
23.1
66.7
41.0

4
13
17
16
11
16
8
7
8
10
11
3
7
4
3
8
2
2

95.7
14.8
48.1
62.3
59.3
40.7
59.3
29.6
25.9
29.6
37.0
40.7
11.1
25.9
14.8
11.1
29.6
7.4
7.4

5.1
17.9

2.6

* n= (N -1) = 39
**n=(N- 2) = 27
*** = data incomplete
**** n= (N -1) = 28

Table 6.14

Dealings Reported by Focal Organization with Other Organizations in

Each Case Study Network

Case Study 1
Heavy Manufacturing Sector
Dealings Reported
Focal
Organization
by Others
No.
% Total*
mandated
100.0
employer
30
10.0
union 1
3
16.7
union 2
5
50.0
provider 1
15
60.0
provider 2
18
70.0
provider 3
21
53.3
WorkCover
16

Case Study 2
Tertiary Education Sector
Focal
Dealings Reported
Organization
by Others
No,
% Total**
mandated
employer
15
652***
union 1
13.6
3
union 2
17.4
4
provider
63.6
14
WorkCover
27.3

nonmandated
general practice 1
12
general practice 2
12
general practice 3
16
orthopaedic surgery 1 20
orthopaedic surgery 2 20
orthopaedic surgery 3 17
physician 1
11
vascular surgery
13
radiology 1
11
radiology 2
8
radiology 3
11
radiology 4
12
pathology 1
9
pathology 2
8
physiotherapy 1
7
physiotherapy 2
8
physiotherapy 3
11
physiotherapy 4
6
physiotherapy 5
6
psychology practice
9
ambulance services
7
hospital 1
18
hospital 2
14
government agency
7
pharmacy
4
equipment supplier
2

mandated
insurer
general practice 1
general practice 2
orthopaedic surgery
rheumatology 1
rheumatology 2
chronic pain clinic
radiology 1
radiology 2
radiology 3
physiotherapy 1
psychology practice 1
vocational assessor
hospital
government agency 1
government agency 2
government agency 3
car hire
driving school

no reply
general practice 4
general practice 5
general practice 6
orthopaedic surgery 4
physician 2
ophthalmic surgery
anaesthetist

8
8
5
17
9
6
6

40.0
40.0
53.3
66.7
66.7
56.7
36.7
43.3
36.7
26.7
36.7
40.0
30.0
26.7
23.3
26.7
36.7
20.0
20.0
30.0
23.3
60.0
46.7
23.3
13.3
6.6

26.7
26.7
16.7
56.7
30.0
20.0
20.0

6

no reply
general practice 3
physiotherapy 2
psychology practice 2
acupuncturist
massage

18
11
11
14
12
12
14
11
11
8
10
10
4
9
8
9
8
2
1

j****

9
2
3
2

81.8
50.0
50.0
63.6
54.5
54.5
63.6
50.0
50.0
36.4
45.4
45.4
18.2
40.9
36.4
40.9
36.4
9.1
4.5

4.5
40.9

9.1
13.6

9.1

*n = (N -10) = 30
**n = (N - 7) = 32
***n = .(N-6) = 23
**** = data incomplete
Table 6.15

Dealings with Focal Organizations Reported by Other Organizations in
Each Case Study Network

and chronic pain clinic in case study 2. C o m b i n i n g this with absence of the unions and
WorkCover Authority from this more highly connected group, puts to rest the inference that
network density is necessarily positively associated with mandated rehabilitation
involvement. In the case of the mandated unions, Table 6.16 shows them uniformly to be
located among the most sparsely connected organizations.
Taken at the level of the subnetwork, there is support for the proposition. Density
among the mandated organizations is significantly higher than elsewhere in each case study
network: 85.7% and 87.5% for the mandated and 35% and 37.4% elsewhere in the case 1
and case 2 networks respectively. However, since occupational rehabilitation is a network
activity widely transcending the mandate, it is appropriate to maintain the focus on density at
the level of the total network.
Appreciation of network density is acquired through a closer analysis of the nature of
the dealings that transpire through the interorganizational connections and their meaning for
rehabilitation. The major reason for the high connectedness of the insurer in case 2 and one
of the major reasons for the self-insured employer in case lis because they paid the

Case 2

Case 1
Rank self
Order
report
Top 5
1
2
3
4
5

others'
report

employer
employer
provider 2
provider 3
hospital 1
orthopaedic surgeon 1
orthopaedic surgeon 1 orthopaedic surgeon 2
provider 2
provider 1

Bottom 5
equipment supplier
1
equipment supplier
2
government agency
union 1
3
union 1
pharmacy
4
physiotherapy clinic 3 union 2
5
pharmacy
physiotherapy practices

4&5
Table 6.16

self
report

others'
report

msurer
employer
provider
orthopaedic surgeon
chronic pain specialist

insurer
employer
provider
orthopaedic surgeon
chronic pain specialist

driving school
car hire
government agency 2
vocational assessor
government agency 1/
general practice 1

driving school
car hire
union 1
union 2
vocational assessor

R a n k Order of the T o p and Bottom Five Organizations According to the

Proportion of Available Interorganizational Dealings (excluding the No
Replies)

bills for most of the organizations in both case studies, whose involvement was secured on
the basis of an expected and generally realised fee for service (major exceptions are employer
in case 2, W o r k C o v e r and the unions). The resultant connectedness, whilst necessary, was
considered by neither insurer nor self-insurer as an indication of their o w n rehabilitation
involvement (apart from specified expenditure authorisation for rehabilitation providers). In
a similar vein, the reported high connectedness of providers 2 and 3 in case 1 is not so m u c h
a function of their involvement in occupational rehabilitation as their additional role as treating
hospitals offering a wider range of primary health care services. This explains w h y other
organizations report I O R with provider 3 at a level m u c h higher than provider 3 itself, which
claims relatively low network connectedness.
Of the "top five" in both cases, the mandated employers, provider 1, case 1 and
provider, case 2 were the most highly connected directly with regard to occupational
rehabilitation. Overall they were the most knowledgeable and committed in terms of financial
and human resources and, of course, central to the rehabilitation mandate. Their activities
were primarily directed at achieving an effective return to work or retraining the employee for
viable alternative work.
The strong presence of orthopaedic surgeons is explained not so m u c h in terms of
their o w n commitment to involvement in rehabilitation to which, for their part, they displayed
a fair measure of ambivalence. Rather, their connectedness is due partly to the workers'
predominantly musculoskeletal injuries, their area of speciality, and partly due to medical
specialists and surgeons in particular, being a comparatively scarce network resource with
w h o m the far more numerous general medical practices and physiotherapists relate. This
relative centrality in medical treatment led to tensions w h e n the surgeons' equivocation about
their role in rehabilitation w a s contrasted with others' reliance on their participation in
network activities. These tensions, mainly with rehabilitation providers, are examined in the
discussion of threat to autonomy proposition.

At the opposite extreme to the highly connected, and contrary to the proposition, the
mandated unions are found to be a m o n g the sparsely connected, nonmandated organizations
confirmed as peripheral to rehabilitation networks. However, neither the unions nor the
employer organizations, with w h o m they had the most frequent and intense involvement,
considered their rehabilitation role as peripheral. Finding another driving school or car hire
firm was not problematic. Such redundancy did not apply to the unions. There were
historically longterm protagonists in the industrial relations with the employers. In addition
to legitimising employer rehabilitation policy and programs, the unions were considered
important and necessary contributors to the m o r e difficult, rather than day-to-day,
rehabilitation problems. O n e employer admitted to having sought union involvement in
certain rehabilitation cases to secure internal leverage over reluctant line managers and staff.
The above arrangements also suited the unions whose limited resources and other priorities
prevented any greater commitment.
In summary, since the rehabilitation mandate is not particularly predictive of network
density, it is necessary to find explanation through factors such as the importance of and
commitment to rehabilitation expressed through organizational and interorganizational
activity.

Intensity
Proposition 3: The resources (informational and financial) committed by the explicitly
mandated members to their network relationships will also be greater than by those implicitly
identified.
Intensity of I O R are examined in terms of the amount of resource exchange and the

•J
frequency of those exchanges. Taking financial resources first, the evidence for the above
proposition is mixed. Explicit financial exchanges in both cases were limited almost
exclusively to accounts submitted to and paid for by the self-insured employer in case 1 and
the insurer in case 2. This goes s o m e w a y to explaining the insurers' high connectedness

with the network. Apart from the unions and the local office of WorkCover, all other
organizations were active on a fee for service basis. O f all the explicitlyfinancialexchanges,
the most intensive according quantum was between the mandated employer and nonmandated
insurer in case 2. The insurer's payment of bills for rehabilitation-related network activities
were funded by the employer's workers' compensation insurance premium, not a particularly
well recognised fact in the network. This also sheds light on the case 2 employer's desire
and uncorroborated claims to be more in control of these costs than the external insurers. In
case 1 this financially intense employer-insurer relation w a s absorbed internally through
WorkCover approved self-insurance.
B y gauging the intensity of financial exchange in rehabilitation as a function of its
strategic or operational contribution to the focal organization, itself determined by workload,
then provider 1, case 1 and the provider in case 2 stand out as being probably the most
financially committed. While the rehabilitation mandate created a market niche for these
linking-pin organizations, the intensity directed toward fulfilment of their objectives was
largely a matter for their self-determination. Consequently, providers 2 and 3, case 1
displayed relatively low levels of financial intensity in occupational rehabilitation as they
focused on different priorities. In contrast, and as discussed in the subsection on the
importance of mandate activity, various nonmandated organizations (eg chronic pain clinic,
physiotherapists) testified to its workload, and therefore, financial significance.
W o r k or case load extends the notion of financial exchange beyond explicit monetary
dealing to acknowledge that interorganizational exchanges of implied financial value imbue
network activities in both case studies. Referral by one organization to another for services is
typically based on the understanding that financial recompense will result through a third
party (in this instance, the insurer). It is for this reason that health professionals, and medical
specialists in particular, hold m u c h store by their referral networks. It also explains w h y one
of the medical specialists, in setting up practice in the Illawarra, personally visited more than
100 general practitioners as well as giving numerous public talks and seminars. The picture

that emerges from this analysis is not so m u c h one of proposed heightened financial intensity
according to explicit mandate prescriptions as one where such intensity is more dependent on
the relative importance of rehabilitation to the participating organizations, calculated using
voluntary precepts.
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 set out the general frequency and primary means of
communication within the networks in each case study. The means of communication are
used as indicators of informational intensity; they include financial transactions but only
from an information perspective. With regard to the frequency of interorganizational
communication among the mandated, the evidence shows that some, not all of the mandated
organizations in each case have the most frequent contact with other organizations. These
were between the employer and provider 1 in the heavy manufacturing sector, and between
the employer and provider in the tertiary education sector. The more frequent daily contact in
the former case study is mainly due to the greater number of rehabilitation cases in the more
hazardous and m u c h larger employer organization. Providers 2 and 3 in case 1 had far less
frequent exchanges with the employer, mainly because they were not formally nominated as
preferred by the employer (and unions) in its rehabilitation policy and procedures, nor did
they have an established supply agreement, primarily due to experience-based views about
their performance. For their part, these providers were becoming increasingly less involved
in occupational rehabilitation. The unions in both cases were involved with other mandated
organizations, chiefly employers, on a weekly or monthly basis usually in response to a
particular problem rather than as a matter of routine. Apart from regular formal monthly
accreditation reporting requirements placed on rehabilitation providers, W o r k C o v e r
Authority's contact w a s generally restricted to sporadic contact with other mandated
organizations.
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d = daily contact
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y = contact from less than monthly to at least once per year
s = less than once per year, seldom
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General Frequency and Primary M e a n s of Communication in
Interorganizational Relationships, Case 1, Heavy Manufacturing Sector
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d = daily contact
w = contact at least once per week
m = contact at least once per month
y = contact from less than monthly to at
least once per year
s = less than once per year, seldom
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Table 6.18 General Frequency and Primary Means of Communication
in Interorganizational Relationships, Case 2, Tertiary
Education Sector

With respect to mandated-nonmandated IOR, there were some instances where
frequency of contact outstripped by far m u c h of that within the mandated subnetworks.
Three prominent examples are: employer-insurer (case 2), employer-nonmandated (case 1)
and provider-nonmandated (case 2). This lends support to the partial mandate notion of the
interdependence not only among mandated and voluntary I O R contingencies but also among
mandated and nonmandated (voluntarily participating, implicitly mandated) organizations.
The provider, in coordinating a rehabilitation effort goes in search of more accurate up-todate information about a worker's injury and consent from treating doctors and other health
professionals on its rehabilitation intentions. The employer reaches out into the network to
reassure organizations of its commitment to helping its injured workers return to their original
job wherever possible.
A m o n g nonmandated organizations, there is evidence of high frequency contact
particularly between treating doctors and radiologists, with daily referrals reported by some
orthopaedic surgeons. However, the extent to which these frequent interactions directly
concern rehabilitation is small, as confirmed by radiologists' and pathologists' assertions of
no direct involvement (refer to the subsection network definition).
Unlike the mixed results concerning the intensity proposition in terms of financial
exchange and general communication frequency, there is stronger support for the proposition
by way of the primary means of communication. The findings in both case studies indicate
that the mandated organizations are more likely to conduct I O R using either oral, or a mixture
of oral and written communication than the nonmandated. Oral communication among the
mandated took place via the telephone and, among a number of the mandated, in face-to-face
dealings. Interorganizational meetings were especially c o m m o n among representatives of
both employers, the unions (more so union 2, case 1 and union 1, case 2 whose members
were at highest risk of injury), and the rehabilitation providers (particularly provider 1, case 1
and the.provider in case 2). Such interpersonal contact would be characterised by periodic
bursts of activity surrounding a particular case where the parties, on occasions, would meet

and discuss matters for s o m e hours, physically inspect workstations' suitability, and then
follow up with confirmatory correspondence and proposed or agreed reports on actions to be
taken. T h e intensity of such varied communication, underpinned by the representatives'
personal commitment to negotiated solutions stands in contrast to the predominantly arms
length and interpersonally less demanding written referrals and exchanges of written reports
found among the nonmandated organizations.
Overall, evidence in support of the intensity proposition holds most strongly in all
three intensity facets (financial and informational exchange, and frequency) for employers
and provider 1, case 1 and provider, case 2. These providers were formally nominated by
the employers through written polices and procedures; they are also the most strategically
committed to rehabilitation of those providers studied. However, such exchange intensity
was not uniquely the purview of the mandated as indicated earlier by the likes of
physiotherapy practices and the chronic pain clinic.

Stability
Proposition 4: Explicitly mandated members are more likely to seek greater stability in their
IOR than are implicitly mandated network members.
Tables 6.19 and 6.20 present a summary of organizations' reported experiences of
change in relations with other organizations in each of the case study networks. T h e overall
pattern is similar across both cases. It is characterised by predominantly stable relations
throughout the network. There were few instances of reported weakening relations. T h e
most striking is provider 3, case 1 which confirms earlier discussions on this hospital's
repositioning in the marketplace a w a y from occupational rehabilitation. There w a s a
reasonably significant amount of unpredictability in I O R reported by a number of health
professionals, in particular by rheumatologist 2, chronic pain clinic and vocational assessor
(case 2), orthopaedic surgeons, hospital 1 (case 1) and the clinical psychology practice and
radiologists in both cases. Sources of referrals and decisions as to w h o m to refer appeared to
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Legend:
s = stable relationship
d = weakening relationship
i = strengthening relationship
o = absent or insufficient information
Table 6.19 Interorganizational Stability, Case Study 1,
Heavy Manufacturing Sector
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Legend:
s = stable relationship
d = weakening relationship
i = strengthening relationship
o = absent or insufficient information
Table 6.20

Interorganizational Stability, Case Study 2,

Tertiary Education Sector

o o

fluctuate, "to ebb and flow" as some put it, without a clear or established pattern. W h y some
health professionals reported flux in their I O R and others did not w a s unclear. O n e possible
explanation is assiduity exercised by some of these interacting organizations to avoid even the
remotest hint of noncase specific working relations symbolised by stability that might lead to
professionally (and strategically) damaging allegations of financially-driven patronage and
overservicing.
In general, the proposition is confirmed. In the context of overall network stability
the mandated were more likely than the nonmandated to seek greater stability in their IOR,
not only among themselves but also with the nonmandated. From difficult times experiences
in adapting to the n e w legislation and in dealings with others in the late 1980s, union 1 case 2
considered its I O R on rehabilitation matters to be improving: for example, the provider was
"starting to accept w e have a role". WorkCover, a relatively late arrival in the Illawarra on a
fulltime and permanent footing, was found to be making solid progress in strengthening ties
with its target groups. Others, such as union 2, case 1 and the employer in case 1 felt their
relations with other mandated organizations to be solid and well-established, only after a
period of working through some "rough patches" such as the design of rehabilitation policies
and procedures, and the development of a mutual understanding of each others' aims and
intentions for the injured worker. A s union 2, case 1 put it: ".... I think I have to keep them
(the rehabilitation providers) on their toes sometimes, and I have to let them k n o w w h o they
are working for, w h o is their client. Not all the time, but from time to time."
Further support for the stability proposition is found by examining the multiplicity of
interpersonal ties between organizations. Tables 6.21 and 6.22 show the number of
specified interpersonal ties in each of the case studies. They consistently indicate the
mandated to have established multiple, k n o w n interpersonal ties among themselves and from
the perspective of numerous other nonmandated organizations. They contrast markedly with
the nonmandated organizations (excluding the insurer), with w h o m multiple ties for m a n y

mandated

no reply

lllftll ! = 2£-S3"J" o^S °lis sefi
2*« 5\q 111

m
a employer
n union 1
d union 2
a provider 1
t provider 2
e provider 3
d WorkCover
gen prac 1
gen prac 2
gen prac 3
orth surg 1
orth surg 2
orth surg 3
physician 1
n vase surg
o radiol 1
n radiol 2
m radiol3
a radiol4
n pathol 1
d pathol 2
a physio 1
t physio 2
e physio 3
d physio 4
physio 5
psycho
ambulance
hospital 1
hospital 2
govt ag
pharm
equip
n gen prac 4
o gen prac 5
r gen prac 6
e orth surg 4
p physician 2
1 oph surg
y anaesth

1 3
4 X 1
7 1 X
4
M
6
1
1
M 2 2
N
N
1
N
N
0 o o
N
o 0 o
N
N
N
N
1
N
N
3
N
1
1
2
4
N
2
N
N
1
o o 0
0 0 o
o o 0
0 o o
0 o o
o o o
o o o
X

ooooooo o o
3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
N
2 N N 2
X 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 X 1 2 1
1
N 1 X N
N N N
3 1N X
1 1
N 1M N X
1
X
N N N N
N 1N N
X 1 1 1
N M M
1 1 1 X 1
X
N M N
1 1 1
0 0 o o o 0 o o o X
1
1
N N
o
o
0
o
0
o o o 0 o
N
1 1 1 1 1 1
N N 1
N N
1 1
N
1 1 1
1 1
1 1
N 1 1 1
1 1
N
N
1 1 1
1 1
2 2 1
1 1
1
N
1 1
N N N N
1
1 1
1
2 1
1 1
1 1
2 2 M|N
1 1
1
1
N N
N N N
1 1
1 1
1
1
N
1
M
h

J^

7]

gen prac 4
gen prac 5
gen prac 6
orth surg 4
physician 2
oph surg
anaesth

employer
union 1
union 2
provider 1
provider 2
provider 3
WorkCover

nonmandated

o .2.2.2.2 £ £ !!!!'»-8 £ -a/a *. f &
c* > £ £ £ £ a i a D i f t f t f t f t f t i S x i j oo a, o
1N N N N N N N N N 1 1N 1N N N 1N 1
N N N
N N N
1
2 N 1 1 2
N N N
1 N N N N N N N 1N N
1N N N N
1 2 1
1
N
1N N N 1
1N N N N
N
N
1N
N N 1
N N N N N
N N
1
N
1 1N
2 N 1 1 1 N
1N
N 1 N N N
1 1 M N N N
N N N N N N N N N 1 1
o 0 o 0 o o o o 0 o o o 0 o o o 0 o o 0
N N N N N N
X
N
o X 0 o o o o o o 0 0 o o 0 0 o o 0 o o
1 1 X
N N
X
N N
1 1
X
N
1 1
X
1
1 1
X
N N
N X
N
1 1
2 1
N
X 2 3
X
1
1
X
N
N
X
N
X
1
X
N N
X N N
1 1 1N N N N N
X N
1
1
X
1N N N N N N 2

MJ

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1
1
1
N

N
1

1
1 1
1 1 1
o o 0 o
1 1
0 0 o 0
1 1 1 1
1

1 1

o o o
o 0
1 1 1
1

0

1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1

X

N

1 1

X
X

o o o
o o o 0
o 0 o o
o o o 0
o 0 o o
0 o 0 o
o o o 0
0

0 0 0 0 0

o
0 o
0 o
0 o
o 0
o o
0

0

o
o
0

o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

0

o
o
o
0

o

o o
0 o
o 0
o o
o 0
o o
o o

0 0 0

o o
0 o
o o
o o
o 0
o o

0

o
o
o
0
0

o o
0 o
o 0
o o
o 0
o o
o 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

o o o o 0
o 0 o o 0 o
o o o o 0 o
o 0 0 0 0 0
o 0 o o o o
0 o o o 0 o
0

o o o o o 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 o
o o o o o o o
o o o o o 0 o
o o o o o 0 o
o o o o o o o
0 o o o o o 0

0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0

o
o
o
o
o
o

0 X 0 0

o o X o
o o o X
o 0 0 0
0 0 o 0
o o o o

o 0 0
o o 0
o 0 0
X o 0
o X 0
o o X

Legend:
1,2 etc = number of specified persons k n o w n to focal organization w h o have been involved in the interorganiza
relationships
= multiple interpersonal ties
M
N
= interorganizational relationship involving no particular individual
o
= absent or insufficient information

Table 6.21 Number of Specified Interpersonal Ties in Interorganizational
Relationships, Case 1, Heavy Manufacturing Sector
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Legend:
1,2 etc = number of specified persons k n o w ntofocal organization w h o have been involved in the
interorganizational relationships
M
= multiple interpersonal ties
N
= interorganizational relationship involving no particular individual
o
= absent or insufficient information
Table 6.22 Number of Specified Interpersonal Ties in
Interorganizational Relationships, Case 2,
Tertiary Education Sector

interacting organizations were impracticable. This was because m a n y of them were sole
operator health professionals, usually supported by a small number of clerical administrative
staff. For these organizations the proprietor's time is at a premium, and offers some
explanation as to w h y a large part of their I O R in rehabilitation were conducted by
correspondence and written reports. Moreover, a significant number of I O R involving
nonmandated organizations took place on an impersonal basis; no particular individual was
required. Such personally anonymous dealings imply a saving of the time and effort required
to establish and maintain interpersonal relationships, connoting with the idea of an
interorganizational bureaucracy. The absence of interpersonal commitment also corresponds
with reduced informational intensity.
Conversely, the mandated organizations tended to forge closer, more stable ties
through personal, face-to-face dealings with each other's staff. Multiple ties provided
multiple opportunities for contact as well as discretionary time to develop relations, since the
interacting organizations were variously less reliant on single individuals for key aspects of
organizational affairs. In this way, increasing I O R stability is seen to be positively associated
with informational intensity and formalization that characterises the mandated IOR. The
emerging evidence on mandate compliance thus far, is that the rehabilitation m a y have
precipitated earlier activities such as the formalization of relations between employers, unions
and providers through policies and procedures but ongoing and day-to-day involvement is
driven by voluntary contingencies.

Threat to Autonomy
Proposition 5: Explicitly mandated network members will tend to perceive a greater threat to
their autonomy

through subordination of certain organizational operations/goals to

superordinate goals embodied in the interorganizational components of the mandate.
This proposition is analysed from two perspectives; one direct, the other indirect.
The first approach sought responses to a direct question concerning organizations' views of
their autonomy in relation to others. T h e second tapped power and resource dependency
issues through examination of the influence focal organizations considered that others exerted
on them. Each perspective served as a check on the other in that organizational
acknowledgment of power or resource dependency can be interpreted as some measure of
autonomy concession. These perspectives are each discussed in turn.
Tables 6.23 and 6.24 summarise organizations' perceptions of the interorganizational
threat to autonomy. There is little support for the proposition that the explicitly mandated
perceive a greater threat to their autonomy in either case. Rather, they tended to see their
interactions with others (even w h e n conflictual) as autonomy enhancing. The reasons are
discussed following a more general network analysis. In both cases the overall pattern of
responses to the issue of threat to autonomy through I O R was dominated by reports of
neutral or nil effect and secondarily by claims that I O R enhance focal organization activities
rather than limited them. These were very few instances of acknowledged constraint or
limitation.
The presence of nil/neutral effects of I O R on autonomy was most prominent among
the nonmandated and, in particular, those organizations considered to be peripheral to
occupational rehabilitation; for example, the diagnostics practices, pharmacy, equipment
supplier, care hire firm etc. Given their professed absence of interest in rehabilitation in an
organizational sense and its concomitant low level of importance, it was most unlikely they
would feel threatened in their I O R with organizations involved in such matters. In other
words, their loose coupling in the rehabilitation network, further characterised by

249
mandated

nonmandated

gen prac 4
gen prac 5
gen prac 6
orth surg 4
physician 2
oph surg
anaesth

employer
union 1
union 2
provider 1
provider 2
provider 3
WorkCover

no reply

a, a, a * a « .g „ .g o o ^ g o -s •- -s •- - ^ 3 •-•« „ g .g,
aooosoo 0 0 a, > u 2 2 S OnOnn < D J D J a l a,n < c3jaja M B , 0

m
a employer X E E E L L E E E
L
NX E
n union 1
E EX BBB E
d union 2
E
a provider 1 E B X E E E
E X E E Ej
t provider 2 E
EEEX N
e provider 3 B
d WorkCover E E E E E E X
NN ELX
gen prac 1 L
EEEN X
gen prac 2 N
NNNN
gen prac 3 E
LLL NN
orth surg 1 L
LLL
orth surg 2 E
orth surg 3 o 0 o o o 0 o 0 0
NN
physician 1 N
n vase surg o o o o o o o 0 0
NN
N
N
o radiol 1
NNN
N
n radiol 2
N NN
N
m radiol3
N
N
a radiol4
N
N
N
N
n pathol 1
N N NN
N
d pathol 2
N
NNN
a physio-1
N
N
t physio 2 N
e physio 3 N
NNNN
d physio 4
NN
N
N
physio 5
N
N
psycho
NNNNNN
N
ambulance N
NN
hospital 1 N
NNNNN
hospital 2 N
N
govt ag
N
N
pharm
N N
N
equip
N
n gen prac 4 0 o o o o o 0 0 0
o gen prac 5 o o 0 o o o o 0 0
r gen prac 6 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0
e orth surg 4 0 0 o 0 o o 0 0 0
p physician 2 0 o o o o o o 0 0
1 ophsurg
oo0 oo0 o0 0
2 anaesth
o0 o0 o0 0 0 0

EEEENNNNNNNN EEEEEB EE E
NNN
NN
EEEEE
EEEEE
EE EEE EEEEEEEEEE EEEE
B
EEE
E
E
EE
E
EEEE
EEEE E E
E E
N
EENN
E
EEEEE
E
EE
E
X E E E E E E
EEEE E E
NN NN NNN
NX E
NN N
EEEENN EEEEE
X
N

EEEEEEENNN
E
EEE
E
E

E
E

E
L
EEE

NN

NN

N

0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

N

N

X

NNNNNN

N

NN

0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NNN
N
NNN
NNN
NN
NNN
NN L
NNN

NNNX
N
NNN
NNN
NN
NNNN
L
N N

NN
NN

X

N

X

N

X

N

X
X

N NN
N
NN
NNNNNNN
N
L
N

NN
N
NN

X

N

NNNNNNN
NN

NN
X

N

X

NNNN
N
N
NNNN
NNN
NN
NN
NNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNN
N

N

X

N
N
N
NNNNNNN
NN

X

N

X

NN
X N
N NX
X

N

X

N

NN

N

X
X

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X

Legend:
E = Interorganizational relations generally enhance focal organizations activities
L = Interorganizational relations generally limit focal organization activities
B = Interorganizational relations variously enhance or limit focal organization activities
N = Neutral or nil effect
Table 6.23

E
E
B

Interorganizational Threat to Autonomy, Case Study 1,
Heavy Manufacturing Sector

non mandated

no reply

employer
union 1
union 2
provider
WorkCover
insurer
gen prac 1
gen prac 2
orth surg
rheumat 1
rheumat 2
pain spec
radiol 1
radiol 2
radiol 3
physio 1
psycho 1
voc ass
hospital
govt ag 1
govt ag 2
govt ag 3
car hire
drivsch
gen prac 3
physio 2
psycho 2
acupunc
massage

mandated

m
a employer
n union 1

E N E E B E N L E E N N N N N E N N N
L N L
E
E X

d union 2
a provider

o o X o o o o 0 o o 0 o o o o 0 o 0 o o o 0 o o 0 o o o o

t

N N

X

0
0

X B E B B B B B B N N N E E N N N
E
N
E E
E
E E E E
WorkCovei E E E E X E

0

N N N N
E
E

N

0

e
d^
insurer

N N N E N

gen prac 1

N
E
n rheumat 1 N
0 rheumat 2 N
gen prac 2
orthsurg

n pain spec
m radiol 1
a radiol 2
n radiol 3
d physio 1
a psycho 1
t vocass
e hospital
d govtagl

N
N
N
N
N

govtag 2
govtag 3
car hire

X

N
L
E
E
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N N N
E N
N
N N
N
E E

L L L L L
X
E
X N N N
E E X E E
N N X
X
N N
N N E E E
N N N N N
N
N N N
N N N N N
N N
N
N N N N

L N N
N
N N N
E E E
E E E
N N N
X N N
N X
N
X
N
N N N
N

N N E N N N
E
N
N
E E E
E
E E E
N N
N N
N E E N N

o

N N
E E
N N

N
o E
0 E
0 N
o E
0

N

0

N

X
X

N

N

X

N N N N

0
0

N

o
o

X
X

0

N

X

N

N

E E E E E
N

0
0

X

E
N

N

drivsch

L N N N N

0

N
N

N N

0

X

0

X

N

X

0

n

0 gen prac 3 o o 0 o o 0 o 0 0
r physio 2
0 o o o o o 0 o o
e psycho 2
o o 0 o o 0 o 0 o
o o 0 o o 0 o 0 o
P acupunc
1 massage
o o 0 o o 0 o 0 o

o o 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 o o 0 X 0 o 0 o
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o X o o o
0

o 0 o o 0 o o 0 o o 0 o 0 0 0 X 0 0
0 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 o 0 X 0
0 o o 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 o o o o 0 o o 0 X
0

0

L
Legend:
E = Interorganizational relations generally enhance focal organizations activities
L = Interorganizational relations generally limit focal organization activities
B = Interorganizational relations variously enhance or limit focal organization activities
N = Neutral or nil effect

Table 6.24

Interorganizational Threat to Autonomy, Case Study 2,
Tertiary Education Sector

infrequent and indirect involvement, low organizational commitment placed them at virtually
no risk of challenge to their autonomy.
A number of treating health professionals, including those with attested high
involvement and organizational commitment to rehabilitation (most notably the physiotherapy
practices, general medical practice 2 (case 2), the chronic pain clinic), also reported little or
no threat to their autonomy. O n e physiotherapist asserted "I can do whatever I like". The
clinical psychology practice claimed "I don't think anyone attempts to influence anyone else.
Most people are very independent minded and want to stay that way". O n e possible
explanation is that professionals seek to emphasise their independence and retain their
integrity, being answerable only to their respective associations. Such professional and
organizational egocentrism mitigated against recognition of critical interdependencies with
those w h o refer work and those to w h o m work is referred. In this instance, they did see
themselves as participants in an interorganizational network problem whose resolution
required their contribution, even w h e n such participation was apparent to others (eg.
rehabilitation providers and employers). Failure, even a reluctance, by these professionals to
make such an appreciation would be a constraint on generating network level responses to
occupational rehabilitation.
In contrast to the above, mandated organizations generally perceived their I O R not so
much a threat as autonomy enhancing. Reasons given for such a view include:

"They (the unions) give me more control, which gives me a better picture to make a
decision ...."
".... because it fills in an extra piece of the jigsaw. Even if it's a bad result it still
helps m e m a k e a decision on an outcome and I believe I have control over that...."
(employer, case 1)
"See, the reason for contacting all the doctors is to get more information. So, really
once we've got the contact they enhance the process ...."
".... it might not be a pleasant exchange (with the doctors), but you usually c o m e out
with what you want...."

".... they generally give us the word to do whatever w e want...."
(provider 1, case 1)
"First w a y is that union organizers have good grass roots knowledge of the work
areas and they can provide an alternative to supervisors. Secondly, if I'm going in to
bat with a particular supervisor in support of a rehabilitation, then it is useful to have
the union as an ally. Thirdly, they are useful an alternative w a y of communicating
with employees sometimes."
"They (other organizations) give m e more control..."
".... They give m e the advice and the information to be able to control the claim and
help get the outcome that we're after."
(employer, case 2)
"I think they (the employer) have been very, very cooperative and very positive."
(provider, case 2)
"I think it's an enhancement for all of us. The value I think of making regular contact
is that it extends your limitations a bit more than just focussing in. So if you have a
chance to sit d o w n and talk with somebody about something you can extend your
opportunities."
(WorkCover Authority)
The picture that emerges from the above and other informants' explanations is that the
mandated were more likely to view their I O R as a positive contribution to the construction of
meaningful and timely rehabilitation programs. Their individual organizational limitations are
overcome or reduced through access to the more resource rich network. M o r e options, more
choices were seen to ensue. In effect, there was little threat to autonomy for the mandated
because the legislative form and enforcement provided them with almost unbounded freedom
on the design and implementation of their programs.
There were few examples cited of I O R limiting focal organizational activities with
regard to rehabilitation. Providers 2 and 3 (case 1) were respectively considered too
medically oriented and lacking in experienced staff by the employer. Union 2 (case 1) was
uncertain about rehabilitation providers' intentions, feeling the need to pull them into line on
occasions w h e n they were considered to be underemphasizing the injured workers' needs.
Union 2 and the external insurer in case 2 appeared to view each other as a hindrance,

although the union w a s rather more explicit: "They are not forthcoming in giving
information". T h e case 2 employer found the insurer capable of enhancing as well as hrniting
its rehabilitation effort, primarily because it controlled "the purse strings", in insurance terms.
Ironically, it was the employer that filled this purse with its insurance premium.
The most striking example of threat to their autonomy w a s that voiced by some
orthopaedic surgeons in their relations with rehabilitation providers. O n e surgeon felt they
(the providers) went "on and on and on", they tended to line up patients for the longterm,
representing a bureaucratic growth industry in the workers' compensation field over which
there seemed to be no control. Another considered providers' letters, requests for reports
and telephone calls to be a nuisance in that they wasted his time. H e asked "why not reduce
the number of providers around?" .... "there are too m a n y networks." From a provider's
side, surgeons and other doctors ".... can have an effect, if they refuse to communicate with
us, because they m a k e our job very difficult to be able to asses what the person's capable of
doing ..." ".... and also, if they rubbish rehab to the client...." ".... the client tells us ...."
"... it can m a k e the progression of the case very difficult...." "... because obviously to the
client the doctor is very important and what he/she says often dictates the w a y the client
goes". Without explicitly acknowledging the point, orthopaedic surgeons were responding
defensively to one of the rehabilitation mandate's major structural innovations: the accredited
rehabilitation provider system. Their concerns, echoed more mildly by a number of other
doctors, were that their traditional authority over the patient w a s being challenged not
according to medical criteria but network criteria such as those found in occupational therapy
and the flexible work situation. Thus, it seems that there existed underlying tensions among
a number of parties, tensions which rarely broke out into overt conflict but often found
expression in being difficult with one's protagonist.
While tensions and differences among organizations and personalities are endemic to
network life, they were not the dominant feature of the networks in this study. The above
analysis, in addition to disconfirming the initial proposition, also exposed the significant

amount of goodwill a m o n g organizations. Organizations were more likely to think well of
other.organizations through their I O R than not. This good faith and trust underpinned what
was largely loosely bound, conflict-(not tension) free network cooperation. Evidence of this
cooperation in the Illawarra was found not only in terms of dealings in relation to a specific
case but also through predominantly informal groups meeting on a regular basis to share
ideas and concerns about rehabilitation and treatment issues, so as to m a k e sense of the more
complex problems preparatory to devising solutions. Local examples include:

• Rehabilitation Coordinators' Association of the South Coast and Tablelands,
bimonthly meeting of employer appointed rehabilitation coordinators;
• Chronic pain group, monthly meeting of pain specialist, clinical psychologist,
rheumatologist and physiotherapist;
• A "bones" group, meeting monthly and comprising mainly orthopaedic
surgeons, radiologists, rheumatologists and pathologists;
• Local occupational therapists' group drawn from public and private sectors,
meeting monthly.
Interestingly, no single group was formed that embraced a representative spectrum of
the different interests involved in rehabilitation. In fact, in its early stages the above
Rehabilitation Coordinators' Association went so far as to limit membership to coordinators,
rejecting the idea of joint association with, for example, rehabilitation providers on the
grounds that such association might bias coordinators' views. Instead, the Association chose
the safer strategy of inviting occasional expert speakers representing, for example, a
rehabilitation provider, clinical psychology, rehabilitation counselling, various offices of the
WorkCover Authority, a trade union, a workers' compensation insurer and an occupational
physician.
Analysis of the proposition from the second, indirect perspective of
interorganizational influence yields similar corroborative results to the direct approach.

Influence, where it w a s experienced, did not generally create a greater threat to or loss of
autonomy for the mandated. Tables 6.25 and 6.26 set out the level or interorganizational
influence reported in case studies 1 and 2 respectively. They show there was negligible
interorganizational influence experienced by a large part of the nonmandated subnetworks in
each case. Organizations deeming themselves impervious to external threat or opportunity
were equally likely to deny any external influence. Major exceptions to the above pattern
among the nonmandated were explained in terms of strong customer focus embodied in total
quality management practices (pathology practice 2, case 1; radiology practice 1, both
cases), a personal preference for dealing with the identified organizations (orthopaedic
surgery, case 2), a key source of referred case load and suppliers of vital diagnostic services
(orthopaedic surgeon 1, hospital 2, case 1), and the traditional authority of treating doctors
vested in medical certification (insurer, case 2).
Taken as a whole, mandated organizations responses indicated they were more
widely subject to higher levels of interorganizational influence than the nonmandated, or at
least, were more aware of and willing to acknowledge the influence of others on their
activities. O f these, provider 1, case 1 and the provider in case 2 (organizationally the most
committed to rehabilitation in the overall study), were the most sensitised to the influence of
other organizations. Often acting as an intermediary, as an interorganizational organization,
between the employer and insurer (in case 2) on one side and primary health care
practitioners on the other, managing interdependence and associated patterns of influence was
the above provider's business. T o this end, they considered themselves the coordinators of
the treating service. Together with the employers, w h o held access to the occupational part
of rehabilitation, they were considered the most influential among the mandated. Yet, among
the nonmandated their influence was generally considered negligible.
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Legend:
v = very significant influence
1 = large influence
m = moderate influence

Table 6.26

s = small influence
n = negligible influence
o = absent or insufficient information

Interorganizational Influence: Focal Organization Reports

of Influence Exerted by Others, Case Study 2,
Tertiary Education Sector

In addition to assessing the theoretical proposition and the available empirical
evidence, an important issue to emerge from this analysis was the locus of control in the
rehabilitation network. Examination of Tables 6.25 and 6.26 points to a view held by a
number of the mandated that treating doctors, particularly the specialists, have a large to very
significant influence on their rehabilitation activities. For example:
".... there is a general acknowledgment that the treating doctor has by virtue of his
position a fair amount of influence in terms of the medical determination of the injured
employee, his or her ability to return back to work and by inference the
commencement of the rehabilitation process."
(employer, case 1)
"The treating team has the major influence .... They basically control the outcome....
O h yes. Y o u have to wrest control from them to be able to get a result that is running
off the rails. Not wrest control, but they need to be educated. S o m e of them don't
want to be educated."
(provider, case 2)
The insurer (case 2) concurred:
"They (the medical practitioners) are initially who we look to first. If we have a
problem with the medical certificate w e will write to the medical practitioner. We'll
ask them some questions, you know. Are they considered a good candidate, is
rehabilitation an option here, what's the expected prognosis etc. etc. So the part they
play initially is a big one. If you get a doctor switched on, you know, you can have
that person back quickly."
However, a tendency solely to attribute control of the occupational rehabilitation
process to the socially powerful medical professions is erroneous. Further analysis indicated
a diversity of views on rehabilitation network control. O n e union in each of the cases
acknowledged employer control of the process (in line with the thrust of the mandate). O n
the other hand, one provider claimed that it w a s the insurer w h o defined what could and
could not be done since they determined payment. Still further, one general practitioner (and

one specialist) considered himself to be the most appropriate person to m a n a g e the
rehabilitation in conjunction with others, as necessary.
W h a t emerges from the above and, only three organizations acknowledged this, is
that in a complex network problem with its various organizational inputs, there m a y be
simultaneously more than one locus of control over rehabilitation. For example, treating
doctors might control medical aspects of the employee restoration process, employers the
workplace aspects, rehabilitation providers the vocational factors, and so on. Secondly, the
potency of such controls, and associated dependencies are likely to shift over time. Thus, in
the acute stages of the injury rehabilitation process, the treating doctor's control is more
potent than the employer's, whose network power in turn is likely to grow once the scope for
the employee's return to work is agreed. In more difficult cases, this agreement is often
brokered through the intercession of the rehabilitation provider with primary health care
givers, and then usually only following an insurer's approval of the planned expenditure.
Based on the above, one of the challenges in interorganizational network development is to
identify and agree on the organizations with salient power and then to create an awareness
and ability among these to cope with shifting, often overlapping network control.
T o summarize the findings, proposition 5 is largely disconfirmed: the mandated as a
whole did not see a greater threat to their autonomy arising from goal displacement. Instead,
an image appears of generally benign, mutually adjusting complexes faced with an unclear
vision on h o w the rehabilitation process is controlled.

Concern for Outcomes
Proposition 6: Explicitly mandated network members will demonstrate a higher concern for
outcomes associated with mandate compliance.
There is partial support for the proposition in both case studies. Concern for
outcomes expressed by organizations was not a function of the hypothesised fear of penalties
for failure to comply - this did not arise for organizations. Nor w a s there heightened concern

among the mandated due to a sense of lost autonomy - m a n y felt their I O R were autonomy
enhancing. T h e principal reasons for the partial support for this proposition are found in the
close correspondence with organizations' perceptions of (mandated) rehabilitation importance
and their ability and willingness to act accordingly. The more organizationally important
rehabilitation was considered to be, the greater the expressed concern for outcomes, towards
which resources had been committed.
The above does not m e a n that such concerns were directed invariably at the injured
employee's return to work. A distinction emerged between the concern for end outcomes
and process outcomes. End outcomes were viewed as the successful return to work by the
injured employee or placement into meaningful retraining for an alternative occupation.
Process outcomes were identifiable stages in the overall rehabilitation process which, on
effective completion, led to successive stages and finally the end outcome. Examples typical
of process outcomes included: early first intervention (usually by employer), initial
assessment and treatment by general medical practitioner followed by referral to an
orthopaedic surgeon for further assessment and treatment protocols, supported by diagnostic
reports from a radiology clinic, and subsequent patient referral to a physiotherapy centre.
The concern for end outcomes w a s primarily the domain of the mandated
organizations in both cases and the external insurer (case 2). Concern for process and end
outcomes was limited to provider 1 - case 1, provider - case 2, and both employers, the
organizations that had demonstrated the strongest willingness and ability to act. For provider
1, case 1, employee return to work was a key performance objective, and used as a measure
of its service effectiveness to the employer. For provider, case 2: "it's critical, the outcome
is critical. Also getting the desired result or achieving the goals that you have set in your
(rehabilitation) plan in pleasing both the patient and employer.... If w e didn't get results w e
wouldn't survive." However, as mentioned earlier, employer - case 1 w a s experiencing a
reducing but nevertheless strong propensity to rehabilitation due to award restructuring and

the additional work expectations placed on employees through multiskilling. This sparked
union concern; as one official put it:

"Well, a worker is able to perform more varied tasks at any time, breaking down
demarcation barriers. Unfortunately, that is then being established as the norm.
Then, if you don't fit into that norm, then you don't fit in. A n d there needs to be a
place in industry for people w h o are less fortunate than others. Because we'll finish
up with a nation of two classes of workers that are fit, able-bodied and highly
intellectual, and those w h o have a physical impairment and those w h o have an
intellectual impairment as another class."
However, the above union concern did not translate into mitigation strategies. A s discussed
earlier, the unions were priority and resource constrained. Similar constraints affected
providers 2 and 3 in case 1 and their subsequent concern.
The nonmandated organizations' concerns varied by degree, from nil at the periphery
of the network to a high degree for physiotherapy practices (eg " it's part of our aims"), the
chronic pain clinic (injured workers a major part of the practice) and insurer (cost minimizing
workers' compensation claims management). For the larger part, the nonmandated were
more concerned about process than end outcomes. Their interest in the injured worker was
generally limited to the extent of their o w n involvement with referral to others (apart from
diagnosticians) often signifying a referral of responsibility and involvement unless re-referral
took place. B y comparison, the above mandated employers and providers, in showing a
concern for process and end outcomes, were more likely to become and remain involved with
network activities over the life of the rehabilitation case.

6.5 Theoretical Implications
Through the above analysis, the concept of partially mandated I O R is confirmed and
its external validity strengthened by the replication of results in the two industry sector case
studies. The major support is found both in enforcement and compliance through the
emphasis on voluntarily derived incentives and the reliance on nonmandated organizations'

cooperative interaction to achieve mandated goals. While there is strong support for partial
mandates in this study, the extent to which mandate implementation depends on voluntary
incentives and voluntary interorganizational resources is likely to vary according to the type
of public regulation employed. In this study the occupational rehabilitation mandate was
implemented in a manner largely consistent with its emergent form: open-ended and selfregulatory; enforcement was linked primarily to education and advice. Under these
circumstances, once the mandate has stimulated initial compliance seeking behaviour,
voluntary contingencies are seen to be prominent factors since self-regulation implicates the
need for target organizations to search for compliance incentives from within rather than
some external hierarchically differentiated control agency. "Within" in this type of complex
social problem embraces the network that emerges to deal with it, in addition to internal focal
organization search.
The robustness and responsiveness of the concept of partially mandated I O R would
benefit from analysis under different regulatory structures and strategies. B y using the
empirically-based enforcement taxonomy of regulatory strategies developed by Braithwaite et
al. (1987), partially mandated I O R might be systematically examined across a wide range of
legislative forms. For example, it is likely that the performance curve (Zald, 1978) of I O R
among the regulated as well as between the regulator and the regulated arising out of benign
big gun enforcement strategies, where enforcement "agencies .... walk softly while carrying
a big stick" (Braithwaite et al, 1978:336) would be significantly different from those
examined in this study". The enormous powers vested in agencies such as the Reserve Bank
and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal are likely to be characterised by pronouncedly more
vertically differentiated I O R with target organizations. Furthermore, mandatory compliance
incentives are likely to be m u c h more potent than those found in this study.
With the exception of proposition 5 (threat to autonomy) there was at least partial
support for all theoretical propositions. Taken at the subnetwork level, theorised aspects of
the mandated I O R were different from those of the nonmandated. In other words, mandated

interorganizational coordination was found to be different from voluntary interorganizational
cooperation. However, the exceptions that arose at the organizational level weakened these
findings: trade unions (both cases) and providers 2 and 3, case 2. In the absence of active
enforcement by the regulatory agency, other than predominantly through education and
advice, organizational capacity and willingness to comply with a mandated activity preceded
by perceptions of the organizational importance of the mandated activity became all the more
significant in predicting compliance behaviour. This supports Zald's (1978) mini theory
concerning compliance readiness and capacity as a pre-requisite for industry performance
according to social control prescriptions. Furthermore, in the context of complex social
problems such as occupational rehabilitation, mandated interorganizational coordination is
likely to be dependent on the voluntary interorganizational cooperation of the nonmandated.
Overall, the distinction between interorganizational coordination and cooperation was
not a strong one. In a sense, coordination a m o n g the mandated in this study emerged as a
formalized interorganizational cooperation characterised by more active involvement with
others in pursuit of mandated outcomes. This is broadly in line with Alter's (1990) assertion
that coordination is a form of cooperative activity. O n e possible explanation is that the
coordination strategy embodied in the mandate and subsequently implemented was relatively
weak and as such closely aligned with mutual adjustment, according to Mulford and Rogers
(1982) the weakest of three managed coordination strategies. Mutual adjustment, similar to
Warren's (1967) social choice form of interorganization decision-making context,
corresponds with interorganizational cooperation in terms of relatively few formal roles and a
focus on focal organizational goals.
Finally, the absence of empirical support for the threat to autonomy proposition
warrants further discussion. In a recent network analysis of organizational autonomy in
IOR, Oliver (1991) challenged the widely held assumption that organizational concern for the
integrity of independence as a consequence of relationship formation would have an impact
on the likelihood that the relationship will form. Likewise, this study calls such an

assumption into question. In addition to Oliver's focus on organization-set explanations for
the above finding (reciprocity, strategic alternatives for autonomy, enhancing stability,
enhancing legitimacy), this study suggests that the nature of the problem/opportunity
bringing organizations into interaction with each other is also a key determinant.
Interorganizational problems requiring interorganizational solutions m a y lead to the view of
the resultant I O R as autonomy enhancing if organizations are brought in touch with a richer,
more varied array of resources and options than would be otherwise directly available.
Moreover, if the problem is seen to be less than strategically important, then it is less likely to
be considered autonomy threatening.

6.6 Summary
Following a descriptive analysis of the occupational rehabilitation cases comprising
the two industry network case studies, mandate implementation was examined in terms of
enforcement and compliance. They both confirmed the processual nature of legislative
efficacy and the concept of partially mandated interorganizational relations. Enforcement at
the State (policy) and regional (operational) levels was marked by its absence in a traditional
authoritarian sense. Agency-target organization I O R tended to be consultative and in
response to form, were based on broadly unbridled target organization discretion.
Compliance behaviour by the mandated was seen to depend on voluntary incentives and on
the voluntary cooperation of the nonmandated, rather than through agency enforcement
power. Qualified empirical support w a s found for the proposed theoretical differences
between the explicitly mandated and implicitly mandated (the nonmandated) organizations.
Finally, the theoretical implications of the empirical analysis were discussed.

Chapter 7
Impact of the Occupational Rehabilitation M a n d a t e

"Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can
do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get
somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as
that!"
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking
Glass (1872)

7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, mandate impact, the fourth and final stage of the process model of
legislative efficacy is the focus of empirical attention. Specifically, the aims are to determine
how well the mandate has performed in relation to its intent in the five years ending 30th June
1992:
• at a policy (state) level
• at the operational (network) case study levels.
Analysis at each of the above levels forms the next two sections of this chapter. They
are followed by an examination of the implications of the impact of the rehabilitation mandate
for interorganizational relations.
This assessment of the impact of the occupational rehabilitation mandate, at both
policy and operational (network) levels, is based on available objective performance
measures and informants' organizational perceptions and experiences of rehabilitation
outcomes. This approach is consistent with Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978:73) prescription
that "the prediction and explanation of organizational behaviour will be enhanced if the
attentional process, as well as the objective setting, is included in the framework". More
pragmatically, it is underpinned by the dearth of objective rehabilitation outcome measures, a
point examined presently.

7.2

Policy (State) Level Impact
Earlier in Chapter 4, WorkCover system performance was considered in the analysis

of mandate emergence. Three key indicators used by the Authority to assess system
performance included workers' compensation costs and premia, the number of workers'
compensation claims, and return to work rates achieved by rehabilitation providers (see
Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7). The trend with the first two show an overall improvement in
WorkCover performance over five years since its inception in 1987, although the
contribution m a d e by occupational rehabilitation is not discernible. Yet, workers'
compensation cost reduction w a s cited some WorkCover officers as evidence of the
successful impact of the rehabilitation mandate. The third indicator, return to work rates,
contrasts with the first two in showing a general downward trend in accredited provider
performance. However, the reasons are not apparent, and cannot necessarily be attributed to
a deterioration in rehabilitation outcomes, as will be discussed presently.
With reference to the occupational rehabilitation mandate in particular, objective
measures of impact are conspicuous by their absence. Granted, measures such as the above
return to work rates give some evidence of impact, as do other key indicators of accredited
rehabilitation provider performance compiled by WorkCover: number of rehabilitation case
closures, average delay of injury to rehabilitation referral, average duration of a rehabilitation
case. Table 7.1 below shows these for the period September 1989 (data collection began)
through M a y 1992.
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Number of case
closures

Achieved

Time between
injury and
rehabihtation
referral

Number

Percent

All Closures

19,852

100%

68%

$ 943

26%

89%

1-2 months

4,986
2,774

76%

2-3 months

1,992

69%

$1,028

3-6 months
6-12 months

3,643

72%

$1,118

56%

$1,141

over 12 months

3,453

14%
10%
18%
15%
17%

$ 626
$ 951

46%

$1,030

less than 1 month

Table 7.1

3,004

Relationship B e t w e e n

return to
work rate

Average
cost of a
rehabihtation
case

Delay in Rehabilitation Referral a n d

Rehabilitation O u t c o m e s a n d Costs
(Based on Data Covering the Period September 1989 through M a y 1992) 16 July 1992
Note:

There were 248 case closures which were not included in the study due to
classification difficulties. Also, in calculating the achieved return to work rate cases
where the provider was instructed to cease services by either the employer or insurer

and those cases where a plan was not developed were excluded.
Source: Provider Press, July 1992.
These data confirm that in terms of WorkCover's main provider effectiveness
indicator, achieved return to work rate, the longer the delay in referral to rehabilitation the
lower the rate. However, they do not permit comparison between different time periods and
so ascertain any trends in improvement or deterioration. T o glean these, it is necessary to
access the more restrictively circulated routine provider performance reports prepared and
sent out monthly by the then Data and Policy Unit of the Division of Rehabilitation Services
to accredited providers for self monitoring, regulation and assessment. Table 7.2
summarises comparative key provider performance indicators.
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Average
Delay
Between
Injury and
Rehabilitation
(months)

Period

2nd qtr 1992
1st qtr 1992
4th qtr 1991
3rd qtr 1991
2nd qtr 1991
1st qtr 1991
4th qtr 1990
3rd qtr 1990
2nd qtr 1990
1st qtr 1990
4th qtr 1989
3rd qtr 1989*

8.1
8.3
7.3
8.2
7.6
6.9
5.8
5.8
5.3
5.3
4.9
5.1

Return
to
W o r k Rate
%

Average
Cost of
Rehabilitation
($)

68
63
62
63
63
66
73
72
74
70
77
77

1,215
1,270
1,185
1,159
1,094

899
815
836
867
845
767
792

Average
Number
Duration
of
of a
RehabiliRehabili- tation Case
tation
Closures
Case
(months)

5.0
5.3
5.0
5.2
4.9
4.9
4.0
4.1
4.1
4.1
3.6
3.5

1,723
1,581
1,720
1,820
2,025
2,046
1,851
1,848
1,903

i

1,866
1,648

635

*part quarter
only

Table 7.2

K e y Performance Indicators for Rehabilitation Providers

Source:

Accredited Rehabilitation Provider Reporting System Mini Study-WorkCover
Rehabilitation Provider Performance by Provider Type (1993).

All of these suggest a deteriorating rehabilitation provider performance and they contrast
starkly with the overall improvement in WorkCover as a whole (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6).
This presents a somewhat equivocal picture of the impact of the rehabihtation mandate unless
it is inferred that worsening provider performance is not significant to overall WorkCover
system performance. However, this m a y be a rather simplistic connection. In an earlier
analysis of the downward trend in provider performance indicators, explanations external to
actual provider operations were postulated:

"• T h e availability of fewer jobs for workers, in general, and injured workers in
particular, given the downturn in the labour market.
"• A s employers' workplace-based rehabilitation programs become fully functional
employers are likely to refer only the more difficult cases to rehabilitation
providers. Rehabilitation of these more difficult cases would be expected to take
longer and cost more.
"• Part of the increase in cost is related to inflation.
"• A recent policy change relating to rehabihtation case management has contributed
to the increase in case duration." (Provider Press, No. 19, December 1991:5).
Thus, even the key provider performance indicators are qualified by limited direct
control.
While they focus on provider performance, the above data are silent on employer and
union contributions to mandate impact as well as those of key nonmandated organizations
such as insurers and doctors. Apart from the provider statistics, other formal evidence of
mandate impact at the policy level is to be found in anecdotal success stories published in the
WorkCover News, a bi-monthly organ internally produced for public circulation. Traditional
measures of legislative impact such as the number of cases successfully prosecuted and
quantum offinesimposed are irrelevant in that none have been m a d e in the 5 year period
under study. This confirms Cranston's (1987:172) assertion that the view of law as litigation
is belied by modern legal practice where legislation is "a source of law in its o w nright".It
also demonstrates that mutually regulatory rehabilitation mandate impact is to be found
elsewhere.
A n important question arises from the above discussion: w h y is the espoused
centrality of occupational rehabihtation in the WorkCover system not properly supported and
substantiated by a systematic performance measurement system? Almost five years after the
1987 Act was promulgated, it was belatedly reported that "....research into the effectiveness
of the WorkCover legislation in returning workers to durable employment" (Provider Press,
May 1992:3) was commissioned to be completed during 1992. B y mid 1993, this research
had not.even commenced, with no reasons forthcoming.

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:75) argue that".... available information provides cues to
what is considered organizationally important and provides the information which will tend to
be used by decision-makers". The absence of policy data on rehabilitation impact leads to the
inference that it was not considered important enough by policy-makers to warrant attention.
Words backed by little action also support the earlier argument in the analysis of mandate
emergence (Chapter 4), that rehabilitation might be viewed a symbolic bargaining chip
legitimating changes to workers' compensation benefits and so pacifying the powerful N e w
South Wales union movement. Further evidence endorsing this view is found by the
relegation of the Division of Rehabilitation Services to a branch of WorkCover in 1991.
The above analysis draws attention to the interactive relationship between
rehabilitation mandate impact and emergence, a line that also applies to mandate form and
implementation. Thus, vague, open-ended, mutually regulatory rehabilitation mandate form
was seen to lead to loosely structured, conciliatory enforcement by the WorkCover
Authority, and a wide range of compliance behaviours by target organizations drawn into
multiple dealings with m a n y nonmandated parties. These indeterminate rehabilitation
characteristics are likely to beset formal attempts at assessing mandate impact when they are
made. If, as Cranston (1987) suggests, it is highly problematic to establish legislative
impact, it will be particularly pronounced for self or mutually regulatory mandates which
invoke a number of voluntaristic social controls, such as those discussed in the preceding
chapter.
Given all of the threats to the validity of assessing mandate impact, and given the
attested centrality of occupational rehabilitation in the WorkCover system, it would be highly
appropriate to assess its impact using detailed and systematic processual analysis of both
successes and failures as well as broader, more extensive survey techniques. In this way,
opportunities for mandate improvement might be more readily identified.
The above discussion on formal assessment notwithstanding, policy level impact also
finds expression through the views of W o r k C o v e r officers directly concerned with

implementation (enforcement) of occupational rehabilitation. These views serve both as a
basis for and a reflection of their enacted strategies (Weick, 1979). Taken as a whole,
WorkCover informants' comments about rehabilitation outcomes since the introduction of the
1987 legislation are mildly positive, although tinged with uncertainty and in some cases,
equivocation. Observations on improvements as a sign of positive mandate impact were
explained in terms of the falling cost of workers' compensation premia (a point made earlier),
greater awareness and understanding by employers of what to do, anecdotal success stories,
explicit rehabilitation procedures and good service provision. O n e officer's explanation for
the improvement was justified in terms of external legitimation "in that, as you realise,
Victoria is n o w adopting our system more or less word for word and so that is a very good
indication that on the whole our system is working very well indeed....". N o one was able
to substantiate h o w rehabilitation outcomes had contributed to W o r k C o v e r system
performance. This inability led to uncertainty about mandate impact so that some officers
would claim significant and dramatic improvement while others would refer to marginal,
incremental progress.
In some instances, officers claimed they did not k n o w whether rehabilitation
outcomes had improved, deteriorated or remained the same. They did not k n o w "what the
data is". O n e officer opined "....WorkCover unfortunately is burdened with a quite
outrageously inefficient and ineffective computer system which has not been set up to draw
out this sort of information. There is not a lot of information about rehabilitation, no
statistics on the ground stuff, it's very sparse on the ground ...."

Not knowing and

uncertainty gave w a y to equivocation about the nature of mandate impact. Pointing to
WorkCover system-wide measures as grounds for claiming improvement in rehabilitation
outcomes, a few officers also alluded contradictorily to deteriorating performance in terms of
rehabihtation provider indicators. This latter point was explained by one officer as being a
consequence of the recessionary economic situation since the late 1980s and the availability
of fewer jobs, and "with a lot of technological changes that are occurring, m a n y of the

(injured) workers are semi-skilled or unskilled and the limitations of getting them back into
some kind of suitable duties are certainly a bit more prevalent".
The above uncertainty and equivocation surrounding fundamentally positive views
about mandate impact at the policy level are barely surprising given the absence of systematic
and meaningful information (feedback) on rehabilitation outcomes.

7.3 Operational (Network) Level Impact
In a manner similar to the policy level, the organizational basis for judging
rehabilitation outcomes and mandate impact at the operational case study level was
predominantly informants' experiences and perceptions of what had taken place in the five
year period under study. Objective data at this level were also marked by their absence.
O n the whole, and once again in line with the policy level, views about mandate
impact in both case studies were favourable. Rehabilitation outcomes were generally
considered to have improved since the introduction, although not uniquely as a consequence
of the mandate. While the overall network level view points toward improvement, it diverges
from the policy level in that there was not as m u c h equivocation by informants about
performance. There are also differences of view between mandated and nonmandated
organizations within each case study. These are discussed below.
Of all the organizations in the heavy manufacturing sector, the employer was the only
one that was in anyway equivocal about rehabilitation outcomes over the five year period.
Two of the three informants found it difficult to say with certainty, but considered that, on
balance, performance had remained fairly constant, that there had been no improvement. The
third suggested that improvement was continuous. The comments were m a d e without
reference to objective data, even when pressed. Interestingly, the employer organization had
evaluated its rehabilitation activities thoroughly in the late 1980s. The results of a formal
study at that time indicated reasonable success in implementation and, among other things,
pointed to the need for measures of rehabilitation of efficiency and effectiveness. These

centred on return to work rates achieved, figures that were produced regularly by the
employer. Yet, even w h e n improvement in return to work rates was mentioned by one
informant, this w a s attributed not so m u c h to the result of rehabilitation efforts as "a lot of
injured employees are returning back to work of their o w n volition because they're concerned
for their job security". Indeed, achievement of successful occupational rehabilitation was
seen as increasingly difficult, largely as a result of extensive organizational restructuring and
the progressive advent of multi-skilling that had been in train in recent years. This employer
observation was corroborated by an officer of WorkCover and in discussions with two of the
rehabihtation providers.
Of the remaining mandated organizations in the heavy manufacturing case study, both
the rehabilitation providers and the unions considered that rehabilitation outcomes had
improved, albeit not to any great degree. Significantly, reasons proffered for this
improvement were predominantly interorganizational in character: a higher acceptance of
occupational rehabilitation as a valid intervention by all parties involved, greater cooperation
between provider and employer, more referrals by orthopaedic surgeons and neurosurgeons
for rehabilitation, and increasing employer awareness and responsibility of what
rehabilitation entails. N o mention w a s m a d e of improved treatment or W o r k C o v e r
enforcement as reasons. O f the three providers, one (provider 1) appeared m u c h more aware
and knowledgeable about mandate impact, particularly in terms of its o w n involvement and
WorkCover Authority performance indicators. A s discussed in the previous chapter, this
was probably due to its main business being occupational rehabilitation, whereas for the
other two it was peripheral to their respective public and private hospital activities. It is quite
consistent for those w h o consider themselves to be less involved to k n o w less about
rehabihtation outcomes.
This last above point is particularly relevant w h e n considering nonmandated
organizations' views on rehabilitation outcomes in Case Study 1. Those at the boundaries of
the rehabilitation network (diagnosticians (pathologists and radiologists), certain treating

specialists, treating hospitals, safety equipment supplier and pharmacist) were also marked
by their ignorance of mandate outcomes and impact. The large majority simply did not hold a
view. The remaining nonmandated organizations, mainly general practitioners, orthopaedic
surgery and physiotherapy practices, considered outcomes to have improved, although not as
assertively as the mandated. O n e doctor claimed " I imagine they have improved. They were
so poor before"; another: "there is less conflict in workers'compensation". O n e of the
more frequent views suggested for the improvement was the reduction in financial incentives
for workers to stay off work. Unlike those of the mandated organizations, attributions for
improvement were not of any interorganizational nature.
Negative perceptions of impact were very limited, although it was possible to detect
antagonism between orthopaedic surgeons and rehabilitation providers (discussed in chapter
6), who in asserting marginal improvement over the years, felt that providers were over-used
and too expensive. This theme applied across case studies. Although negative, it is tacit
recognition that one significant impact of the mandate w a s the institutionalisation through
legislated accreditation of the rehabilitation provider niche as an important intermediary
organization in the process. This role as intermediary was to be primarily between employee,
employer, medical practitioners and other primary health care givers. Thus in 1991/92 there
were 128 accredited providers in N e w South Wales with a mandated role where five years
beforehand there were none. O f course, m a n y of the organizations w h o received
accreditation were offering rehabilitation services prior to the mandate's imprimatur: 3 of the
4 providers in the two case studies were in this situation.
There are no pronounced differences to be found in perceptions and experiences of
rehabilitation outcomes in both mandated and nonmandated sections of the tertiary education
case study when compared with heavy manufacturing. The dominant impression is one of
slight improvement. Reasons proffered are broadly similar. However, some of the health
professionals (general practitioners, rheumatologist) cited access to more facilities through
provider organizations as an important factor in successful outcomes. The only dissenting

voice was that of the orthopaedic surgery which considered that "you certainly seem to get
involved in a lot more hassles, more pushing. But in general I don't think there is a lot of
difference in the results". Finally, and in line with Case Study 1, those organizations at the
fringe of the networks in Case Study 2 were characterised by their absence of a view about
rehabihtation outcomes.

7.4 Implications for Interorganizational Relations
The emergence of open-ended, partially mandated form and its implementation
inevitably leads to open-ended, partially mandated impact. In other words, an accurate
assessment of the impact of the occupational rehabihtation mandate needs to go beyond just
the explicit provisions of the law in the books and the I O R between explicitly mandated
organizations. Because the mandate is partial in nature, because successful rehabilitation
depends on the effective interorganizational cooperation of so m a n y nonmandated
organizations, and because the mandate's enforcement design is almost uniquely one of
unenforced mutual regulation, so it is also clearly necessary to evaluate impact of the actions
and interactions of those implicitly drawn into the partially mandated networks. Failure to do
this leaves any assessment of such mandates highly prone to claims of incompleteness and
invalidity.
This is the impact evaluation challenge for public policy-makers seeking to design and
introduce innovative regulatory instruments for increasingly complex, interdependent policy
domains. At the best of times, attribution let alone measurement of cause and effect is
problematic (Cranston, 1987). It is likely to be even more vexacious with the more openended forms of self and mutual regulation: for example, what are the boundaries of the
mandate? It is for these reasons, that an holistic approach to the evaluation of mandate impact
is considered necessary; one which, in addition to embracing explicitly and implicitly
mandated components, accounts for the cyclical nature of legislative development (emergent
form, implementation and impact). This study adopts some of these prescriptions. Future

studies of mandated I O R might consider following Ring and V a n de Ven's (1994)
recommendation for longitudinal research using event analysis. Events are defined as
"critical incidents w h e n parties engage in actions related to the development of their
relationship" (Ring and V a n de Ven, 1994:112). B y ordering data on such events over the
life of a set of IORs, temporal patterns m a y be analysed. In this way, deeper insight into the
cyclical processes of mandate I O R might be gained.
Regardless of the absence of accurate and valid impact measures, at an operational
level, organizations and their relevant staff will m a k e their o w n sense of what is going on
(Weick, 1979), of what effect there has been on outcomes since the introduction of a
mandate. Those at the boundaries of interorganizational networks in a particular mandated
domain will tend not to hold a view one w a y or the other. O n the other hand, those w h o see
themselves as bona fide players in the network will do so, whether or not they have been
mandated to play. Consequently, impact at the network level, and this includes the
regulatory agency in an operational sense, has been shown to be an accommodation of
largely convergent and positive (with a very few divergent) views and experiences about
rehabilitation outcomes. T o the extent that these positive outlooks dominate network
activities means that there will betittlepressure exerted for policy change from this level.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the main attributions offered by the majority of
informants for improvements in rehabilitation outcomes since the introduction of the mandate
were interorganizational in character. Perhaps this is not so surprising if it is recognised that
problems such as occupational rehabihtation, by bringing organizations into contact with one
another, are also relational problems. Relational problems, and therefore relational mandates
designed to address these, will inevitably call for relational solutions. Hence the case for
improved interorganizational cooperation among the parties and access to interorganizational
resources (rehabihtation providers).

7.5

Summary
Reliable and valid assessment of mandate impact is problematic at the best of times.

Where attempts at measurement at the policy level are conspicuous by their absence, serious
questions arise about the purported centrality of occupational rehabilitation in the workers'
compensation system.

In spite of this, officers within W o r k C o v e r Authority and

organizations in the two network case studies all m a k e their o w n sense of mandate impact
based on interpretations of their o w n experiences and in a few instances on systematic local
data gathering and analysis (one employer and two rehabilitation providers). In the main, the
view of rehabilitation outcomes since the introduction of the mandate is one of improvement.
However, this improvement is not attributed to the mandate; rather it is accorded to better
interorganizational cooperation a m o n g the parties and availability of enhanced facilities
(rehabihtation providers). Perhaps, relational mandates spawn relational solutions.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions, Implications and Future Research Directions

8.1 Introduction
In this final chapter, a number of broad conclusions about the study are drawn based
on the extent to which the researchfindingsfulfill the study's objectives. Subsequently, their
implications are discussed with regard to I O R theory, public policy, the management of I O R
and occupational rehabilitation. Lastly, suggestions are made for future research directions.

8.2 Conclusions
The general purpose of this study was to identify and assess the implications of
legally mandating interorganizational relations through public policy. The particular research
problem concerned legislated occupational rehabilitation in N e w South Wales. With the
above in mind, a concept of partially mandated I O R was proposed and justified using a
contextual four phase process model of legislative efficacy, a modification of that originally
proposed by Cranston (1987). The concept and the process model were empirically tested
using multiple method qualitative case research techniques. Through the confirmed
interactive nature of mandate emergence, form, implementation and impact, strong support
was found for the partial mandate concept and consequently for the interdependence between
mandated and voluntary (implicitly mandated) I O R contingencies and organizations. The
theoretical propositions concerning differences between explicitly and implicitly mandated
IOR along six dimensions were partially supported by the empirical findings, although the
threat to autonomy proposition was largely disconfirmed. In other words, the distinction
between interorganizational coordination and cooperation was not as strong as expected.
These conclusions lead to a series of implications which are discussed below.
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8.3

Implications
The major implications of this study are presented in the following order: I O R

theory, public policy, and management of I O R and occupational rehabihtation.

Implications for IOR Theory
Since there is no theory of I O R as such, the implications discussed below m a y be
more appropriately considered in terms of their contributions to theorizing about IOR. B y
refining Cranston's (1987) four phase process model of legislative efficacy to account more
fully for the involvement of explicit and implicit target organizations, this study goes some
way to meeting Barney et al's (1992) challenge of providing a theoretical framework that
integrates organizational and legal analyses. It also permits organizational analysis to enter
and inform the public policy debates concerning regulation, de-regulation and re-regulation
that are so prevalent in industrialized societies, and on which it has been somewhat silent.
Interorganizational networks are dynamic entities that lend themselves to processual
scrutiny, which is well served by qualitative research techniques employing multiple levels of
analysis. In this study the levels of analysis were: the network (the primary unit), the
subnetwork, the institutional (mandate) and the organizational. The major theoretical
implications for I O R drawn from the findings about the above model are summarised below
(they are discussed in greater detail at the end of Chapters 4-7 inclusive).

• Mandate emergence
There is a need for continuous interorganizational learning and adaptation to a
complex, uncertain and variable set of changing legal, procedural and (regulatory
agency) structural circumstances. This is the nature of emergence in social affairs. It
is not emergence that emerges; it is legislative form(s), implementation and impact.
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• Mandate form
The open-ended, partial nature of mandate form, characterised by variable compliance
requirements for different organizations, comparatively vague and loose prescriptions
and a lack of clarity and uncertainty in operational definition, confers a significant
degree of (inter-) organizational choice on the regulator and the explicitly and
implicitly regulated. However, such enforcement and compliance freedom m a y find
expression in (inter-)organizational inaction as well as action. The absence of strong
mandate incentives foretells the dependency on voluntary incentives for
interorganizational enforcement and compliance.

• Mandate implementation
While there is strong support for partial mandates in this study, the extent to which
mandate implementation depends on voluntary incentives and interorganizational
resources is likely to vary according to the form of public regulation. In the case of
self or mutual regulation, as in this study, once the mandate has stimulated initial
compliance seeking behaviour, voluntary I O R contingencies are likely to predominate
as the targetfield(s)is left by the regulatory agency to look after itself.
The absence of empirical support for the threat to autonomy proposition leads to the
idea that just as intra-organizational groups are able to mobilize collective resources
beyond the reach of any individual in pursuit of their tasks, so too will people and
groups in interorganizational networks striving to find interorganizational solutions to
their collective problems. In this way, interorganizational cooperation and
coordination m a y be seen to enhance autonomy as organizations c o m e in touch with a
richer, more varied array of resources and options than would be otherwise directly
available. This view is consistent with the basic precepts of organizational ecology
(after Trist, 1977).
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• Mandate impact
Since the mandate is partial in form and implementation, it is clearly necessary to
evaluate the impact of the actions and interactions of those implicitly drawn into the
partially mandated networks, in addition to those explicitly required. Failure to do so
leaves any assessment of such mandates highly prone to claims of incompleteness and
invalidity.
T o the extent that positive views about mandate impact dominate network activities,
even without the support of objective and valid measures, means that there is more
likely to be satisfaction with the status quo and consequently, little pressure exerted
for policy change from this level.

The foregoing implications, unequivocally lay to rest earlier naive unidimensional
views and treatment of mandates in I O R research as domain consensual phenomena where
organizations k n o w what is expected of them. They bring into sharp relief the dependence of
mandate implementation on network perceptions of the mandated activity, and the
(interorganizational importance attached to those perceptions in terms of ability and
willingness to interact.

Implications for Public Policy
This study contributes to public policy research by examining the influence of I O R in
its formulation and implementation. It achieves this using an interorganizational network
level rather than the more c o m m o n and limited organization-set perspective. In doing so, it
highlights not only the relational aspects of agency-target interactions, but also those arising
out of the germane interactions a m o n g the explicitly and implicitly targeted. Therefore, it
draws attention to the organization ecological nature of the social fields within which such
mandates m a y thrive or wither.
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Students of public regulation m a y be more inclined to acknowledge the problematic
nature of legal-political mandates and thereby attempt to account for the voluntary behaviour
of those w h o are the target of regulation. However, this study goes beyond the rather
narrow concern with implementation (typically agency enforcement strategies), by exploring
the processes by which the mandate emerged in form and impact, in addition to its
implementation. It examines a predominantly, unenforced, open-ended, mutually regulatory
mandate which conforms with the aspirations of some w h o seek innovation as a means for
overcoming the regulation-deregulation stand-off (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). In doing
so, the reliance of the mandate on voluntary I O R and even on nonmandated parties'
cooperation emphasises the need for the architecture and implementation of public policy to
address its relational aspects. The problem however, is that it is notoriously difficult clearly
and precisely to define relational behaviour such as coordination, cooperation, liaison, and
participation. This suggests that active local level involvement by interested parties in
designing their regulations might strike operable definitions and commitment to the requisite
behaviours. This issue is addressed in the following subsection.
Where successful mandate outcomes depend on effective interorganizational
cooperation and coordination a m o n g mandated and nonmandated actors, then the lack of
awareness about each other's legal roles m a y be problematic by leading to erroneous role
assumptions which precede inappropriate compliance behaviours. However, where the
mandate is sufficiently open-ended to provide for broad implementation discretion, then the
need for organizations to k n o w each other's mandated roles will tend to be supplanted by the
need to know each other's intended roles. The public policy implication is that functional I O R
may arise within a mandated context by chance or by intention. B y assuming that policy
architects would prefer an increased probability of positive I O R then such intentions require
conscious attention. Thus, in a self-regulatory context, it m a y be highly desirable for the
regulatory agency to foster interorganizational cooperation a m o n g the mandated and the
nonmandated involved in the problem domain by not only reaching out to the former with
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education, advice and other forms of back-up but also to provide this to the latter. Voluntary,
cooperative I O R in a mandated context require management and nurturing.
A s discussed in chapter 7, there is an impact evaluation challenge for public policy
makers seeking to design and introduce innovative regulatory instruments for increasedly
complex and interdependent policy domains. The attribution and measurement of cause and
effect is likely to be vexatious with the more open-ended forms of self and mutual regulation.
Thus, an holistic approach to impact evaluation is considered most appropriate by embracing
explicitly and implicitly mandated factors and accounting for the cyclical nature of legislative
development. This provides additional support for the modified version of Cranston's model
of legislative efficacy as a suitable analytic tool for such a purpose.

Implications for the Management of IOR
Despite the array of policy instruments that m a y be available to governments, this
study has demonstrated there will always be limits to the effectiveness of public regulation.
Implementation of public policy is likely to depend on its form and the extent to which direct
regulation is actually enforceable and on h o w successfully the policy appeals to the voluntary
contingencies in occupational rehabilitation networks. Policies that rely exclusively on
regulatory agency control over the mandated components will be limited in their effectiveness
since rehabilitation networks contain significant voluntary components as weU. Given these
limitations, it would be worthwhile to explore the viability of the structures that support
voluntary interorganizational collaboration (Gray, 1985, 1989; Trist, 1983). These
structures must assure the protection of the participating organizations' interests while
offering them gains from collaboration that they are not currently getting. Such gains m a y
include improved quality and flow of information, more successful rehabilitation and
improved efficiency through reduced operating costs.
Interdependence is the rationale for collaboration between network organizations,
while the domain is the n e w unit of planning and action that complements and extends the
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capacities of organizations acting independently. A shared awareness is required that makes
it possible for organizations to agree about the nature of the problems facing them and to
identify future directions that are in their interests to pursue jointly. Shifting the focus from
single interests to a domain that encompasses all interests does not deny these separate
interests but, through their interaction, seeks to promote the development of n e w broader
perspectives by stimulating mutual awareness and understanding.
Gray (1985, 1989) explicated a three stage interorganizational collaboration process
involved in creating this shared awareness as well as the conditions necessary for its
facilitation. These stages are: problem-setting, direction-setting and structuring. They are
essentially an elaboration of Trist's (1983:273-5) key characteristics of domain (the object of
inquiry here are field related organizational populations) formation, which he identified as
".... making a shared appreciation .... of the meta problem ...., acquiring an acceptable
identity .... for the domain ...., setting an agreed direction .... for a development pattern into
the future .... overall social sharing .... as regards boundaries, size etc ...., .... evolving an
internal structure .... from stakeholder accommodation ....". Problem-setting seeks to
identify the key stakeholders in the domain and to establish a c o m m o n appreciation of the
problem that brings them together. Conditions considered by Gray (1985) to facilitate
successful interorganizational problem-setting include recognition of interdependence among
stakeholders, identification of a requisite number of stakeholders, perceptions of legitimacy
among stakeholders, positive beliefs about outcomes, shared access power and a skilled
convenor.
Direction-setting is the phase of interorganizational collaboration concerned with
stakeholders beginning to appreciate a c o m m o n purpose through understanding h o w their
values guide their individual actions. T h e search conference is a method suggested as
appropriate for identifying and mapping collective futures (Williams, 1982). Facilitative
conditions required for the direction-setting phase are a coincidence in values a m o n g
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stakeholders through activities such as joint search, and a dispersion of power a m o n g
stakeholders.
The third process phase of collaboration, structuring, or what Trist (1983:274) refers
to as the "evolution of an internal structure", involves the development of accommodating
structure, or referent organizations, to assist stakeholders in undertaking purposeful action on
behalf of the domain. Gray (1985:928-931) proposes the following facilitative conditions for
the structuring phase: a high degree of continuing interdependence a m o n g stakeholders,
external mandates (when tied with earlier processual contingencies such as power
dispersion), allocating power within the domain through negotiation (cf. Trist's (1990)
negotiated order, and Strauss' (1982) interorganizational negotiation) and the ability to
influence positively changes in the contextual environment.
The above discussion has centred on the scope for joint management of I O R in
rehabilitation networks through collaboration at the local, operational level, on the grounds
that localized initiatives are more likely to meet local needs more effectively. However,
advantage m a y also be gained through using collaborative techniques in public policy
formulation. This entails far more than traditional government consultation with targeted
interest groups and search for responses from the community at large on proposed policies.
Under these conditions, there is no guarantee that the contributions from those parties will be
taken into account however valid and valuable. O n the other hand, following the above,
power-sharing, collaborative principles in the development of legal-political mandates m a y
lead to the emergence of improved form, implementation and impact. Improved mandate
form m a y arise out of collective agreement by stakeholders on the problem domain and the
strategies necessary for its management, including the means for accentuating voluntary
interorganizational cooperation. Implementation, both enforcement and compliance, is likely
to be smoother since stakeholder organizations (including regulatory agencies) are more
likely to have the most confidence in and commitment to mandates that they have taken an
active part in designing. A s a consequence, mandate impact is likely to be enhanced.
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Implications for Occupational

Rehabilitation

Occupational rehabilitation viewed as an interorganizational problem has been
neglected relative to the attention directed at the individual and single organization levels. It
deserves greater consideration because rehabilitation of the ill or injured worker often
becomes a haphazard, inefficient and frustrating process w h e n the necessary coordination
and cooperation between organizations are lacking. Such a shift to an interorganizational
field perspective highlights the overlap between related domains. Thus, for example,
occupational rehabilitation is interwoven with workers' compensation claims management,
medical treatment and h u m a n resource management. In this sense, it is often not so m u c h a
workplace-based phenomenon involving interorganizational networks as a network-based
phenomenon with a workplace focus.
Rehabilitation providers, particularly those nominated by employers, emerge from
this study as the primary coordinators of nonmandated interorganizational involvement.
Employer organizations and their internally appointed rehabilitation coordinators are more
active intraorganizationally and with the trade unions. Coupling the above with the earlier
observation that there m a y be simultaneously more than one locus of control over
rehabihtation lends support to the use of voluntary interorganizational collaboration as a
means for tackling occupational rehabilitation problems holistically and in accordance with
network needs at local levels. T w o challenges arise in adopting such an approach. The first
is how to cope with the variability of the composition and the ephemerality of the
rehabihtation networks. The network is likely to be different for each case: by degree (less
participants if the case is not too serious, and vice versa), by specific organizations, as each
case creates its o w n network of constituents, and by duration. Assuming this first challenge
can be addressed successfully, the second is to identify and agree on the organizations with
salient power and then to create an awareness and ability among these to handle effectively
shifting, often overlapping control.
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Finally, taking occupational rehabihtation as one aspect of the quality of working life
(QWL), this study recasts this traditionally internally focused set of activities into one which
explicitly identifies and explains the influence on choice of extended, and important social
institutions such as legal-political mandates. Such choices are likely to be mediated through
interaction with these wider social networks.

8.4 Future Research Directions
Several directions for future research into publicly mandated I O R arise from this
study. First, this research would benefit from replication under different initial conditions to
test further the robustness of both the concept of partial mandates and the model of legislative
efficacy, and to extend the generalizability of the findings. Examples of such conditions
include different injury types, other industries, other regions and smaller employer
organizations.
Second, by following the events, activities and the organizational as well as personal
interactions during the course of a complete and discrete case, a clearer picture of the
dynamics of mandated occupational rehabilitation might be garnered. Even more accurate
insights into I O R processes would emerge through the analysis of specific events. In
addition, the missing perspectives and experiences of the injured worker, the actor in the
process and around and through w h o m these I O R occur, together with those of extraregional organizations such as lawyers' firms and medico-legal assessors would m a k e an
important contribution in this regard. T h e challenge in such an event and process based
undertaking would be to secure the agreement of the various parties w h o are often bounded
strongly by various confidentiality and privacy constraints. This last point leads to a third
direction for the future research agenda. Confidentiality and privacy as barriers to effective
interorganizational collaboration and cooperation warrant further examination, as do safe and
ethical means for their unravelling, especially since these interorganizational processes are
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largely reliant upon openness, information sharing and joint decision-making a m o n g the
participating organizations.
A fourth research direction indicated by this study is the application and analysis of
the concept of partially mandated I O R to regulatory structures and strategies dealing with
other complex problem domains, for example, multiple regulatory agency involvement in the
management of major river systems and in urban planning. Furthermore, examination of
pohcy domains where the courts are more active would also ensure that consideration of this
important legal institution is brought into account. A broader extension of the first direction
discussed earlier, the aim of this direction is also to assess the concept's robustness and
permit wider cross validation. Moreover it would assist deeper analysis by targeting problem
domains less heavily beset by confidentiality structures. A useful approach, suggested in
chapter 6 (section 6.5), would be to employ the empirically-based enforcement taxonomy of
regulatory strategies developed by Braithwaite et al (1987) as a means for the systematic
examination of a wider range of legislative forms and their effectiveness.
Fifth, more work is needed on unpacking the concept of partial mandates. It requires
refinement, in particular a clearer definition and explanation of the varying degrees of
partiality and their relevance for mandate effectiveness. In this way, public policy makers
and interested parties involved in or affected by a policy domain might be better informed as
to the mandate design most appropriately suited to the demands of the particular problem.
This m a y range from highly prescribed c o m m a n d and control through to decisions not to
legislate.
Finally, this study points to the need for conducting more research into the scope and
means for mobilizing the requisite voluntary interorganizational cooperation and collaboration
in the formulation and implementation of public policy. M o r e work is required on the
development of positive bridging strategies such as co-optation (Selznick, 1949) and
tripartism (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). In this way, the integration of organizational
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participation in government (Olsen, 1981) might be more sensitively and effectively
embraced.
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Appendix I

RESEARCHERS QUESTIONNAIRE
Guiding Questions for Assessment of Mandate Compliance and
Associated Interorganizational Relations

GENERAL

1. Can you tell me about your organization in general? Things such as the industry you
are in, your primary products and services, the number of employees, affiliations with
other groups (for example, professional/industry associations etc.), organization
structure, industrial relations, etc. H a v e there been any major changes or
developments that have occurred to your organization in the last 5 years? (For
example, restructuring, retrenchment, n e w products/services etc.)

2. Can you tell me about your organization's involvement with respect to occupational
health and safety? For example:
• number of staff directly employed in occupational health and safety and their roles;
• polices and procedures;
• major hazards encountered;
• accident frequency and duration rates etc.;
• where major responsibilities he;
• accountability systems;
• support structures (such as safety committees, assessment committees etc.);
• resources committed to occupational health and safety (such as training, time,
financial etc.); and
• top management commitment.
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Have there been any major changes in occupational health and safety that have
occurred in the last 5 years? (For example, information system, improvement in
performance.)

SPECIFIC TO OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION

3. Can you tell me what involvement your organization has in occupational
rehabilitation? For example:
• what you do (and others in your organization);
• h o w you might typically be involved in a case;
• policy/procedures;
• specialist staff;
• external consultants;
•staff training;
• performance appraisal and accountability; and
• record keeping and information reporting systems.

Have there been any significant changes to occupational rehabilitation that have
occurred in the last 5 years? (For example, few/more cases involved; more/less
external involvement.)

Perceptions of Mandate Form
4.

W h a t role do the law/guidelines require you to play specifically with respect to
occupational rehabihtation?

5. How clear do you find the law (and the guidelines) so far as explaining what you are
required to do with respect to occupational rehabihtation?
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H o w m u c h discretion (choice of action) does the law (and the guidelines) give you
with respect to occupational rehabihtation?

To what extent do you find the law (and guidelines) relating to occupational
rehabilitation to be complex? If so, why?

In your view, have there been many changes to the law (and guidelines) that covers
occupational rehabihtation? What effect, if any, have these changes had?

Importance of Mandated Activity
Is occupational rehabilitation important so far as your organization is concerned? H o w
important? (For example, key activity, not very relevant to overall aims of the
organization etc.) W h y ? Has this changed over the last 5 years or so?

Organizational Readiness and Capability
W h a t kind of commitment is there to occupational rehabilitation within your
organization? (For example, top management words and action, resources, time etc.)

Do you consider WorkCover Authority enforcement power plays any part in your
organization's involvement in occupational rehabihtation? If yes, in what ways?

Involvement with Other Organizations in Occupational Rehabilitation
(including Network

Definition and Network

Density)

H o w m a n y compensable lost time injuries has your organization incurred during the
last 5 years (1 July 1987-30 June 1992)? (Employer organization only.)

13.
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Based on three of the above lost-time injuries, would you please tell m e which
organizations you had dealings with in respect of those cases without divulging the
n a m e of the injured workers? (Employer organization in conjunction with insurer
only) .
If possible, the three cases should represent:
• a simple, straightforward rehabilitation case,
• a difficult, yet successful rehabihtation case,
• a difficult and contested rehabihtation case.

14. What kind of dealings did you have with these above organizations? (To be based on
a list drawn from Q.13). D o they refer work to you or do you refer work to them (or
neither)?

15. With whom did you deal directly in each of these organizations with respect to the
injured workers? W a s there more than one person? (Also relates to stability and
density).

Perceptions of Mandate Form
16.

What role do you consider the law relating to occupational rehabihtation requires these
other organizations to play in this regard?

Interorganizational Coordination (and Formalization)
17.

Are there established arrangements that exist between you and these other
organizations with regards to occupational rehabilitation? (For example, policy
statements singly or jointly endorsed, written contracts/agreements between the
parties, exchange of letters on arrangements.) Where there are such arrangements,
what are they?
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Interorganizational
18.

Cooperation

Where there are no established arrangements between you and any of the identified
organizations, on what basis do you have dealings with them? (For example, custom
and practice, geographical proximity, necessity to progress the rehabihtation.)

Threat to Autonomy
19.

W h a t kind of influence do the different organizations you deal with in occupational
rehabilitation have upon your activities in this area? (Refer also to question 19.)

Intensity
20.

What amount and what frequency of written and oral contact is there between you and
the other organizations with respect to occupational rehabihtation?

21. Is there any financial exchange between you and the other organizations with respect
to occupational rehabihtation? Which are the major accounts?

Threat to Autonomy
22.

D o you consider that your dealings with (each of the) other organizations in
occupational rehabilitation limits or enhances the amount of choice or freedom you
have about what to do? If yes, or no, w h y ? D o these dealings with the other
organizations give you more or less control over occupational rehabilitation?
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Stability
23.

D o you consider your relations with (each of the) other organizations in occupational
rehabilitation have remained stable over time? (Refer to question 15 for multiplexity
component of stability.)

Concern for Outcomes
24.

W h a t concern do you have for occupational rehabihtation outcomes? W h y ? H o w are
these manifested?
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Appendix 2

RESEARCHER'S

QUESTIONNAIRE

Guiding Questions for Assessment of Mandate Impact

25. Do you consider that occupational rehabihtation outcomes have improved/deteriorated/
have not changed since the introduction of the legislation in June 1987. W h y ? D o
you have any objective information to support this view?
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Appendix 3

RESEARCHER'S QUESTIONNAIRE
Guiding Questions for Assessment of Factors Influencing
Mandate Enforcement

1. ENFORCEMENT DESIGN

• Form
W h a t form has the enforcement of occupational rehabilitation taken over the last 5
years, that is up to end June 1992? For example, through independent agency or by
the executive.

• Discretion
What discretion has WorkCover Authority had in the enforcement of occupational
rehabilitation over the last 5 live years? For example, wide or narrow. What effect
has this discretion had on enforcement of occupational rehabilitation? For example,
innovative approaches to the problem or uncertainty in how to enforce the law.

• Sanctions
What sanctions (rewards and/or punishments) have been employed by WorkCover
Authority in the implementation of occupational rehabilitation over the last 5 years?

324
NATURE OF THE AGENCY (WORKCOVER)

Surveillance
What surveillance patterns (if any) has WorkCover Authority used with respect to the
implementation and enforcement of occupational rehabilitation over the last 5 years?
For example, reactive or proactive.

Resources
W h a t resources (staff/finances etc.) have been made available to WorkCover
Authority for the enforcement and implementation of occupational rehabihtation over
the last 5 years?

Background of Staff
What is the general background of the staff in WorkCover Authority involved in the
enforcement and implementation of occupational rehabilitation over the last 5 years?
For example, education/work experience.

ENFORCEMENT CONTEXT

The Regulated
W h a t influence have those being regulated (for example, employers/fund
managers/rehab, providers, etc. and their relevant associations) had on those in
WorkCover Authority responsible for the enforcement of occupational rehabilitation?
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•

Other Contextual

Pressures

W h a t significant political/social/economic pressures have there been that have
influenced the enforcement/implementation of occupational rehabihtation over the last
5 years? For example, increasing unemployment levels, change of government,
financial performance of WorkCover Authority.

4. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES

What kinds of occupational rehabilitation enforcement strategies has WorkCover
Authority used during the last 5 years? For example, strict application of the law,
education, prosecution, etc.
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Appendix 4
RESPONDENT'S

QUESTIONNAIRE

Guiding Questions for Assessment of Mandate Compliance and
Associated Interorganizational Relations

GENERAL

1. Can you tell me about your organization in general? Have there been any major
changes or developments that have occurred to your organization in the last 5 years?
(For example, restructuring, retrenchment, new products/services etc.)

2. Can you tell me about your organization's involvement with respect to occupational
health and safety?

Have there been any major changes in occupational health and safety that have
occurred in the last 5 years? (For example, information system, improvement in
performance.)

SPECIFIC TO OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION

3. Can you tell me what involvement your organization has in occupational
rehabihtation? For example: h o w might you typically be involved in a case.

Have there been any significant changes to occupational rehabilitation that have
occurred in the last 5 years? (For example, few/more cases involved; more/less
external involvement.)

4.
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W h a t role do the law/guidelines require you to play specifically with respect to
occupational rehabihtation?

5. How clear do you find the law (and the guidelines) so far as explaining what you are
required to do with respect to occupational rehabihtation?

6. How much discretion (choice of action) does the law (and the guidelines) give you
with respect to occupational rehabihtation?

7. To what extent do you find the law (and guidelines) relating to occupational
rehabihtation to be complex?

8. In your view, have there been many changes to the law (and guidelines) that covers
occupational rehabihtation? W h a t effect, if any, have these changes had?

9. Is occupational rehabihtation important so far as your organization is concerned ?

10. What kind of commitment is there to occupational rehabilitation within your
organization?

11. Do you consider WorkCover Authority's enforcement power plays any part in your
organization's involvement in occupational rehabihtation?

12. How many compensable lost time injuries has your organization incurred during the
last 5 years (1 July 1987-30 June 1992)? (Employer organization only.)

13. Based on three of the above lost-time injuries, would you please tell me which

328
organizations you had dealings with in respect of those cases, without divulging the
name of the injured workers? (Employer organization in conjunction with insurer
only).
If possible, the three cases should represent:
• a simple, straightforward rehabilitation case,
• a difficult, yet successful rehabihtation case,
• a difficult and contested rehabihtation case.

14. What kind of dealings did you have with these above organizations? (To be based on
a list drawn from Q.13). Do they refer work to you or do you refer work to them (or
neither)?

15. With whom did you deal directly in each of these organizations with respect to the
above injured workers?

16. What role do you consider the law relating to occupational rehabihtation requires these
other organizations to play in this regard?

17. Are there established arrangements that exist between you and these other
organizations with regards to occupational rehabihtation?

18. Where there are no established arrangements between you and any of the identified
organizations, on what basis do you have dealings with them?

19. What kind of influence do the different organizations you deal with in occupational
rehabihtation have upon your activities in this area?

20.
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W h a t amount and what frequency of written and oral contact is there and the other

organizations with respect to occupational rehabihtation?

21. Is there any financial exchange between you and the other organizations with respect
to occupational rehabilitation? Which are the major accounts?

22. Do you consider that your dealings with (each of the) other organizations in
occupational rehabilitation limits or enhances the amount of choice or freedom you
have about what to do? Do these dealings with the other organizations give you more
or less control over occupational rehabihtation?

23. Do you consider your relations with (each of the) other organizations in occupational
rehabihtation have remained stable over time?

24. What concern do you have for occupational rehabihtation outcomes?
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Appendix 5

RESPONDENT'S

QUESTIONNAIRE

Guiding Questions for Assessment of Mandate Impact

25. Do you consider that occupational rehabilitation outcomes have
improved/deteriorated/have not changed since the introduction of the legislation in
June 1987? Why? Do you have any objective data to support this view?
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Appendix 6
RESPONDENT'S

QUESTIONNAIRE

Guiding Questions for Assessment of Factors Influencing
Mandate Enforcement

1. What form has the enforcement of occupational rehabilitation taken over the last 5
years, that is up to end June 1992?

2. What discretion has WorkCover Authority had in the enforcement of occupational
rehabilitation over the last 5 live years? W h a t effect has this discretion had on
enforcement of occupational rehabihtation?

3. What sanctions (rewards and/or punishments) have been employed by WorkCover
Authority in the implementation of occupational rehabihtation over the last 5 years?

4. What monitoring patterns (if any) has WorkCover Authority used with respect to the
implementation and enforcement of occupational rehabilitation over the last 5 years?

5. What resources (staff/finances etc.) have been made available to WorkCover
Authority for the enforcement and implementation of occupational rehabihtation over
the last 5 years?

6. What is the general background of the staff in WorkCover Authority involved in the
enforcement and implementation of occupational rehabilitation over the last 5 years?

7. What influence have those being regulated (for example, employers/fund
managers/rehab, providers, etc.. and their relevant associations) had on those in
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WorkCover Authority responsible for the enforcement of occupational rehabihtation?

8. What significant political/social/economic pressures have there been that have
influenced the enforcement/implementation of occupational rehabihtation over the last
5 years?

9. What kinds of occupational rehabilitation enforcement strategies has WorkCover
Authority used during the last 5 years?
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Appendix 7
M a r c h 1993
Occupational Rehabilitation Networks and Public Regulation
Project Outline

Background
This project is being undertaken by Michael Zanko as a P h D thesis at the University of
Wollongong.

Project Aims
1.

To assess the implications of legislating for network relations between organizations,
with particular reference to occupational rehabilitation in N e w South Wales. (It is
quite c o m m o n for a number of different 'players' to get involved in occupational
rehabilitation; players such as employers, unions, fund managers, rehabilitation
providers, doctors, WorkCover, and so on).

2.

To determine opportunities for improving occupational rehabilitation outcomes
through more effective networks.

3.

T o advance theory on relations between organizations within the context of public
regulation.

Actions
To analyse the law, regulations and guidelines relating to occupational rehabilitation in terms
of:
• h o w they emerged
• the form they have taken
• h o w they have been implemented (enforcement and compliance)
• their impact at policy (State) and operational (network) levels
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Analysis will relate to the 5 year period ending 30 June 1992 and will focus on networks that
have arisen in the heavy manufacturing and tertiary education sectors based in the Illawarra
Region.

Methods
Case study methods are to be used and will include techniques such as semi-structured
interviews, content analysis of documents, and participant observation.

Requests of the Participants
Participation by participants is envisaged as follows:
• interviews
• access to any available relevant statistics and associated reports (not individual
files).

Confidentiality
Access to any sensitive material will be treated as confidential.
Note: this study does not intend to focus on specific individual occupational rehabilitation
cases.

Timeframe and Benefits for Participants
It is expected that this study and the final report will be completed by December 1994.
Benefits for participants are anticipated to be:
• improved knowledge and understanding of the processes and the dealings that take
place in occupational rehabihtation between the interested parties
• improved occupational rehabilitation performance
Note, a summary of the findings will be provided to participants
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About the Author
Michael Zanko is a senior lecturer in the Department of Management, University of

Wollongong. He is also the coordinator of the Graduate Diploma in Occupational Health an

Safety. He spent 13 years in industry prior to joining the University in 1987. His resea

interests and publications include occupational health and safety effectiveness, organiza

absence, interorganizational relations, and human resource management information systems
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Appendix 8
ORGANIZATIONS, INFORMANTS A N D INTERVIEWS BY CASE
Case 1: Heavy Manufacturing Sector
Organization
Type

N o . of
<Organizations

employer/insurer
trade union
regulatory agency^
(WorkCover Authority)
rehabihtation provider
general medical practice
orthopaedic surgery
vascular surgery
physician
pathology
radiology
pubhc hospital
private hospital
clinical psychology
physiotherapy
ambulance services
safety equipment supplier
pharmacist
State Agency
Total (without WorkCover
Authority)
Total (with WorkCover
Authority)

N o . of
Informants

N o . of
Interviews

1
2
1

3
2
8

6
3
8

3
3
4
1
1
2
3
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
32

8
3
4
1
1
2
4
1
2
1
5
2
1
1
1
42

8
3
4
1
1
2
3
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
43

33

50

51

Nil Response
general medical practice
orthopaedic surgery
physician
ophthalmic surgery
anaesthetics

3
1
1
1
1
7
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Case 2: Tertiary Education Sector
Organization No. of No. of No. of
Type
Organizations
employer
trade union
regulatory agency (*)
(WorkCover Authority)
rehabihtation provider
general medical practice
orthopaedic surgery
rheumatology
chronic pain specialist
radiology
private hospital
clinical psychology
physiotherapy
workers' compensation
insurance/fund manager
vocational assessment
car rental
driving school
State Agency
Federal Agency
Total (without W o r k C o v e r
Authority)
Total (with W o r k C o v e r
Authority)

Informants

Interviews

1
2
1

2
2
8

3
2
8

1
2
1
2
1
3
1
1
1

2
2
1
2
1
4
2
1
1

4
2
1
2
1
3
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
2
1
23

2
1
1
1
2
2
29

2
1
1
1
2
2
30

24

37

38

Nil Response
general medical practice 1
clinical psychology
physiotherapy
acupuncturist
massage therapy

1
1
1
I
5

TOTAL STUDY(2)
Total No. of Total No. of Total No. of
Organizations
Informants
56 79 81
Nil Response

Interviews

12

Notes
(1)
The regulatory agency (WorkCover) forms part of both cases.
(2)
In totalising all interviews and informants, 5 organizations (the radiology and clinical psychology
practices and the private hospital) were located in both cases. Also WorkCover Authority was not
double counted.
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Appendix 10
NUDIST INDEX CODES FOR MANDATE COMPLIANCE AND IMPACT
FIELD RESEARCH QUESTIONS (SEE APPENDICES 1 AND 2).
Nudist
Index
Code

Construct (and N o d e Title)

1

Background - general

1

2

Background - occupational health and safety

2

3

Background - occupational rehabihtation

3

4.

Perceptions of mandate form (self and others)

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16

5

Importance of mandated activity

9,3

6

Organizational readiness and capability

10, 11,3

7

Involvement with others

13

)
)

Field Research
Question N u m b e r s

14

8

Types of dealings

)

9

Specific involvement

)

10

Interorganizational coordination

17

11

Interorganizational cooperation

18

12

Formalization

17

13

Density

13, 15

14

Intensity

20,21

15

Threat to autonomy

19,22

16

Stability

23, 15

17

Concern for outcomes

24,9

18

Impact

25

network definition

15
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Appendix 11
TEXT UNITS AND INDEX CODES FOR
AN ON LINE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT
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Q.S.R. NUDIST Power version, revision 3.0 GUI.
Licensee: micbael zanko.
PROJECT: MANDAT94, User michael zanko, 4:43 pm, Jul 21, 1994.

++
+++ ON-LINE D O C U M E N T : W C
+++ Document Header:
•INTERVIEW HELD WITH
AUTHORITY,

OFFICER
O N FRIDAY, 18TH JUNE, 1993

WORKCOVER

+++ Retrieval for this document: 855 units out of 855, = 100%
++ Units:
(1121)
++ Text unit 45:
(112 3 1)
++ Text units 1-855:
++ Text unit 23:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 68:
++ Text unit 1:
(1121)
++ Text unit 46:
(112 3 1)
(112 2 1)
++ Text unit 24:
(112 2 1)
++ Text unit 69:
++ Text unit 2:
(112 1)
++ Text unit 47:
(112 3 1)
(112 21)
++ Text unit 25:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 70:
++ Text unit 3:
(1121)
++ Text unit 48:
(112 3 1)
(11221)
++Text unit 26:
(112 2 1)
++ Text unit 71:
++ Text unit 4:
(1121)
++ Text unit 49:
(112 3 1)
(112 21)
++ Text unit 27:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 72:
++ Text unit 5:
(1121)
++ Text unit 50:
(112 3 1)
(11221)
++Text unit 28:
(1122 1)
++Text unit 73:
++ Text unit 6:
(1121)
++ Text unit 51:
(112 3 1)
(112 2 1)
++ Text unit 29:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 74:
++ Text unit 7:
(112 1)
++ Text unit 52:
(112 3 1)
(11221)
++Text unit 30:
(1122 1)
++Text unit 75:
++ Text unit 8:
(1121)
++ Text unit 53:
(112 3 1)
(11221)
++ Text unit 31:
(11221)
++Text unit 76:
++ Text unit 9:
(1121)
++ Text unit 54:
(112 3 1)
(112 21)
++ Text unit 32:
(112 2 1)
++ Text unit 77:
++ Text unit 10:
(112 1)
++ Text unit 55:
(112 3 1)
(11221)
++ Text unit 33:
(11221)
++Text unit 78:
++ Text unit 11:
(1122 1)
++Text unit 56:
(1123 1)
(112 21)
++ Text unit 34:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 79:
++Text unit 12: "
(11221)
++Text unit 57:
(1123 1)
(11221)
++ Text unit 35:
(11221)
++Text unit 80:
++Text unit 13:
(11221)
++Text unit 58:
(1123 1)
(1123 2)
++Text unit 36:
(11221)
++Text unit 81:
++ Text unit 14:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 59:
(112 3 1)
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 37:
(11221)
++ Text unit 82:
++ Text unit 15:
(112 2 1)
++ Text unit 60:
(112 3 1)
(1123 2)
++ Text unit 38:
(11221)
++Text unit 83:
++Text unit 16:
(11221)
++Text unit 61:
(1123 1)
(1123 2)
++ Text unit 39:
(11221)
++Text unit 84:
++Text unit 17:
(11221)
++Text unit 62:
(112 3 1)
(1123 2)
++ Text unit 40:
(11221)
++Text unit 85:
++ Text unit 18:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 63:
(112 3 1)
(11221)
++Text unit 86:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 41:
++Text unit 19:
(1122 1)
++Text unit 64:
(1123 1)
(1123 2)
++ Text unit 42:
(1122 1)
++Text unit 87:
++ Text unit 20:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 65:
(1 12 3 1)
++ Text unit 43:
(11231)
++ Text unit 88:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 21:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 66:
(1 12 3 D
(1123 1)
++Text unit 89:
(1121)
++ Text unit 44:
• Text unit 22:

(11221)

++Text unit 67:

(11223)

(1123 1)
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++ Text unit 90:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
++Text unit 91:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
++ Text unit 92:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
++ Text unit 93:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
++ Text unit 94:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
++Text unit 95:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
++ Text unit 96:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
++ Text unit 97:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
•H- Text unit 98:
(1122 3) (11 2 3 1)
++ Text unit 99:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
++ Text unit 100:
(112 2 3) (11 2 3 1)
++ Text unit 101:

(1122 1)
++ Text unit 102:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 103:
(112 21)
++Text unit 104:

(1122 1)
++Text unit 105:
(1122 1)
++ Text unit 106:

(1122 1)
++ Text unit 107:
(112 2 1)
++ Text unit 108:
(112 2 1)
++Text unit 109:
(11221)
++Text unit 110:
(112 21)
++Text unit 111:
(1122 1)
++ Text unit 112:
(11221)
++Text unit 113:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 114:
(112 2 2)
++Text unit 115:
(112 2 2)
++Text unit 116:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 117:
(11221)
++Text unit 118:
(1122 1)

++ Text unit 119:

(1122 1)
++ Text unit 120:

(1122 1)
++ Text unit 121:
(112 2 2)
++Text unit 122:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 123:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 124:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 125:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 126:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 127:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 128:
(112 2 2)
++Text unit 129:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 130:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 131:
(112 2 2)
++Text unit 132:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 133:
(112 2 2)
++Text unit 134:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 135:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 136:
(112 2 2)
++Text unit 137:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 138:
(112 2 2)
++Text unit 139:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 140:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 141:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 142:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 143:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 144:
(112 2 2)
++ Text unit 145:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 146:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 147:
(1 122 3)

++ Text unit 148:
(11223)
++ Text unit 149:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 150:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 151:
(1122 3)
++ Text unit 152:
(1 122 3)
++ Text unit 153:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 154:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 155:
(112 2 3)
•H- Text unit 156:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 157:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 158:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 159:

(11223)
++ Text unit 160:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 161:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 162:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 163:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 164:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 165:
(1122 3)
++ Text unit 166:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 167:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 168:
(1122 3)
++ Text unit 169:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 170:
(11223)
++ Text unit 171:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 172:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 173:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 174:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 175:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 176:
(112 2 3)

++Text unit 177:
(1 122 3)
++ Text unit 178:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 179:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 180:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 181:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 182:
(1122 3)
++Text unit 183:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 184:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 185:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 186:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 187:
(11223)
++Text unit 188:
(11223)
++ Text unit 189:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 190:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 191:
(1122 3)
++ Text unit 192:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 193:
(1122 3)
++ Text unit 194:
(112 23)
++ Text unit 195:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 196:
(1122 3)
++ Text unit 197:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 198:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 199:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 200:
(1122 3)
++ Text unit 201:
(11223)
++ Text unit 202:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 203:
(11223)
++ Text unit 204:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 205:
(112 2 3)
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++ Text unit 206:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 207:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 208:
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 209:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 210:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 211:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 212:
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 213:
(112 2 1) (112 2 2)
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 214:
(112 2 1) (112 2 2)
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 215:
(112 2 1) (112 2 2)
(112 23)
++Text unit 216:
(1122 1) (11222)
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 217:
(1122 1) (1122 2)
(11223)
++Text unit 218:
(11221) (11222)
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 219:
(112 21) (112 2 2)
(11223)
++ Text unit 220:
(112 21) (112 2 2)
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 221: •
(112 21) (112 2 2)
(1122 3)
++ Text unit 222:
(112 2 1) (112 2 2)
(112 2 3)
++Text unit 223:
(112 2 1) (112 2 2)
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 224:
(112 2 1) (112 2 2)
(112 2 3)
++ Text unit 225:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 226:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 227:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 228:
(112 3 2)

++ Text unit 229:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 230:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 231:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 232:
(112 3 2)
++Text unit 233:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 234:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 235:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 236:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 237:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 238:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 239:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 240:
(112 3 2)
++Text unit 241:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 242:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 243:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 244:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 245:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 246:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 247:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 248:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 249:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 250:
(112 3 2)
++Text unit 251:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 252:
(112 3 2)
++Text unit 253:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 254:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 255:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 256:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 257:
(112 3 2)

++ Text unit 258:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 259:
(112 3 2)
++ Text unit 260:
(112 3 2)
++Text unit 261:
(112 3 3)
++ Text unit 262:
(112 3 3)
++ Text unit 263:
(112 3 3)
++ Text unit 264:
(112 3 3)
++ Text unit 265:

(1 124 1)
++ Text unit 266:

(1 124 1)
++ Text unit 267:

(1 124 1)
++ Text unit 268:
(1 1241)
++ Text unit 269:

(1124 1)
++ Text unit 270:
(11241)
++Text unit 271:
(11241)
++ Text unit 272:

(1 124 1)
++ Text unit 273:

(1 124 1)
++ Text unit 274:

(1 124 1)
++ Text unit 275:

(1 124 1)
++ Text unit 276:
(11241)
++ Text unit 277:
(11241)
++ Text unit 278:
(11241)
++ Text unit 279:
(1 1241)
++Text unit 280:
(112 4 1)
++Text unit 281:
(1124 1)
++Text unit 282:
(1124 1)
++Text unit 283:
(11241)
++ Text unit 284:
(11241)
++ Text unit 285:
(112 4)
++ Text unit 286:
(1124)

++ Text unit 287:
(1124)
++ Text unit 288:
(1124)
++ Text unit 289:
(112 5)
++ Text unit 290:
(1125)
++ Text unit 291:
(112 5)
++ Text unit 292:
(1125)
++ Text unit 293:
(1125)
++ Text unit 294:
(1125)
++ Text unit 295:
(1125)
++ Text unit 296:
(112 5)
++ Text unit 297:
(1125)
++ Text unit 298:
(112 5)
++ Text unit 299:
(1 12 5)
++ Text unit 300:
(1125)
++ Text unit 301:
(112 4 2)
++ Text unit 302:
(112 4 2)
++ Text unit 303:
(1124 2)
++ Text unit 304:
(112 4 2)
++ Text unit 305:
(112 4 2)
++ Text unit 306:
(112 4 2)
++ Text unit 307:
(112 4 2)
++ Text unit 308:
(112 4 2)
++ Text unit 309:
(112 4 2)
++Text unit 310:
(112 4 2)
++Text unit 311:
(112 4 2)
++Text unit 312:
(112 4 2)
++Text unit 313:
(11242)
++Text unit 314:
(112 4 2)
++Text unit 315:
(1124 2)
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++Text unit 316:
(1124 2)
++ Text unit 317:
(1124 2)
++ Text unit 318:
(1124 2)
++Text unit 319:
(1124 2)
++ Text unit 320:
(11242)
++Text unit 321:
(11221)
++ Text unit 322:
(112 2 1)
++ Text unit 323:

(1122 1)
++ Text unit 324:
(11221)
++ Text unit 325:
(112 2 1)
++ Text unit 326:

(1122 1)
++ Text unit 327:
(11221)
++ Text unit 328:
(11221)
++ Text unit 329:

++ Text unit 347:

++ Text unit 374:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 375:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 376:

(1122 1)

(12114 8)

++ Text unit 348:

++ Text unit 377:

++ Text unit 345:

(1 122 1)
++ Text unit 346:

(1122 1)

(112 2 1)

(12114 8)

++ Text unit 349:
(11221) (112 5)
++ Text unit 350:
(112 2 1) (112 5)
++Text unit 351:
(11221) (112 5)
++ Text unit 352:
(112 21) (112 5)
++ Text unit 353:

++ Text unit 378:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 379:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 380:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++Text unit 381:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 382:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 383:

(112 2 1) (112 5)
++ Text unit 354:
(112 21) (112 5)
++Text unit 355:
(11221) (112 5)
++ Text unit 356:

(1122 1) (112 5)
++ Text unit 357:

(1122 1) (112 5)
++ Text unit 358:

(1122 1)

(1122 1) (112 5)

++ Text unit 330:
(11221)
++Text unit 331:
(11221)
++ Text unit 332:
(11221)
++ Text unit 333:
(11221)
++ Text unit 334:
(11221)
++ Text unit 335:

++ Text unit 359:
(11221) (112 5)
++ Text unit 360:

(1122 1)

(1122 1) (112 5)

++ Text unit 336:
(11221)
++ Text unit 337:

++ Text unit 365:

(1122 1) (112 5)
++ Text unit 361:
(11221) (112 5)
++ Text unit 362:

(1122 1) (112 5)
++ Text unit 363:
(11221) (112 5)
++ Text unit 364:

(12114 8)
++ Text unit 384:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 385:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 386:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 387:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 388:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 389:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 390:
(12114 8)
++Text unit 391:
(12114 8)
++ Text unit 392:
(12114 8)
++Text unit 393:
(12114 8)
++ Text unit 394:

(12114 8)

(12114 8)

++ Text unit 366:

++ Text unit 395:

(1122 1)

(12114 8)

(12114 8)

++ Text unit 338:
(112 21)
++ Text unit 339:
(11221)
++ Text unit 340:
(11221)
++Text unit 341:

++ Text unit 367:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 368:

++ Text unit 396:

(1122 1)

(12114 8)

++ Text unit 342:
(11221)
++ Text unit 343:

++ Text unit 371:

(11221)
++ Text unit 344:

(1 1221)

(12114 8)
++ Text unit 369:
(12 1 1 4 8)
++ Text unit 370:

(12114 8)
++ Text unit 372:
(12114 8)
++Text unit 373:
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Appendix 12
OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION SERVICE

Under the Workers Compensation Act 1987, Section 59 defines occupational
rehabilitation service as "any of the following services provided by or on behalf of a provider
accredited under Section 152 or by a person, or a person of a class, prescribed by the
regulations:

(a) initial rehabihtation assessment;
(b)

functional assessment;

(c)

workplace assessment;

(d)

job analysis;

(e)

advice concerning j ob modification;

(f)

rehabihtation counselling;

(g)

vocational assessment;

(h)

advice or assistance concerning job-seeking;

(i)

advice assistance in arranging vocational re-education or training;

(j)

preparation of a rehabihtation plan;

(k)

any other service prescribed by the regulation, but does not include hospital
treatment."

356
Appendix 13
REHABILITATION CASES USED IN EACH CASE STUDY:
ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS DIRECTLY INVOLVED

Preamble

The three rehabihtation cases used in each of the two main case studies were selected
by the employer organization in conjunction with the insurer using the following criteria:

• one case to be simple and straightforward
•

one case to be difficult and yet successful

•

one case to be difficult and contested

•

all rehabihtation cases must have used a rehabilitation provider.

The organizations and persons directly involved in each rehabilitation case were
ehcited from interviews with knowledgeable informants w h o in turn had access to the
relevant hard copy and computerised rehabilitation and workers compensation files and
records. It should be noted that in Case Study 1, the employer organization and the insurer
are one and the same, whereas in Case Study 2, they are separate entities.
In reading the rehabilitation cases below two explanatory points are to be borne in
mind:
1.

* denotes that at least one interview was held with an informant holding that position,
or a key position in that organization.

2.

Since the areal criterion for this study (with the exception of central offices of the
WorkCover Authority) was limited to the Illawarra Region of N e w South Wales, all
those organizations located in Sydney are excluded.

Case Study 1:

Heavy

Manufacturing,

Hazardous

Work

Private

Environment, Self-Insured

Compensation
Rehabilitation Case A :

Simple and Straightforward

Employee Position: Maintenance Worker
Sex:

Sector,

Employee Age:

34 years

Male

Nature of Injury:

Right Lower Leg Fracture

Cause of Injury:

Struck by Moving Machinery Part

Organizations and Persons Directly Involved

Employer
Senior Foreperson
2 Contact Officers
Immediate Supervisor
Rehabihtation Officer*
Occupational Physician
Workers' Compensation Officer*
Safety Equipment Officer
General Practitioner
General Surgeon
Vascular Surgeon
Orthopaedic Surgeon
Orthopaedic Surgeon*
Pathologist*
Public Hospital (treatment and accredited rehabihtation provider)
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Rehabihtation Specialist*
Occupational Therapist*
Occupational Therapist
Physiotherapist*
Physiotherapist
Clinical Psychologist
Physiotherapy Clinic*
Trade Union*
Safety Equipment Supphes*
Ambulance Service*
Medical Aid Suppliers (Sydney)

Rehabilitation Case B: Difficult and Yet Successful

Employee Position: Leading Hand Fitter
Employee Age: 34 years Sex: Male
Nature of Injury: Multiple Injuries (Neck, Shoulder, Pelvis, Hand, Foot, Tibula)
Cause of Injury: Motor Vehicle Accident

Organization and Persons Directly Involved

Employer
Line Superintendent
Senior Foreperson
Senior Counsellor
Maintenance Specialist
Maintenance Superintendent

H u m a n Resources Superintendent
Human Resources Officer
2 Occupational Physicians
Workers' Compensation Officer*
Rehabihtation Officer*
Rehabihtation Coordinator*
Training Officer
Private Hospital (treatment)*
Public Hospital (treatment)
Accident and Emergency Services Specialist*
Private Hospital (treatment and accredited rehabihtation provider)
Rehabihtation Specialist
Occupational Therapist*
General Practitioner*
General Practitioner*
General Practitioner
Orthopaedic Surgeon*
Radiology Services*
Radiology Services*
Radiology Services*
Physiotherapy Centre*
Physiotherapy Clinic*
Pathology Services*
Anaesthetist
Pharmacist*
Anaesthetist (Sydney)
Anaesthetist (Sydney)

Anaesthetist (Sydney)
Orthopaedic Surgeon (Sydney)
Medical Specialist (Sydney)
Medical Specialist (Sydney)
Medical Specialist (Sydney)
Private Hospital (treatment, Sydney)
Private Hospital (treatment, Sydney)
Occupational Psychology Assessors (Sydney)
Insurer's Solicitors (Sydney)
Third Party Insurer (Sydney)
Medical Aids Suppliers (Sydney)

Rehabilitation Case C: Difficult and Contested

Employee Position: Labourer
Employee A g e

49 years

Sex:

Male

Nature of Injury:

Multiple Injuries (predominantly musculoskeletal)

Cause of Injury:

Struck by Motor Vehicle

Organizations and Persons Directly Involved

Employer
Line Supervisor
Line Superintendent
Training Officer
Workers' Compensation Officer*
Rehabihtation Officer*

Rehabihtation Coordinator*
Human Resources Supervisor
General Practitioner*
General practitioner (locum)
Orthopaedic Surgeon*
General Surgeon*
Radiologist*
Ophthalmologist
Public Hospital (treatment)*
Accredited Rehabihtation Provider*
Physiotherapy Centre*
Physiotherapist*
Clinical Psychologist*
Interpreter Services*
Trade Union*
WorkCover Authority*
Insurer's Solicitors (Sydney)
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Case Study 2:

Tertiary Education, Public Sector, Relatively Safe W o r k
Environment, Externally Insured W o r k e r s ' Compensation

Rehabilitation Case X: Simple and Straightforward

Employee Position: Labourer
Employee Age:

61 years

Sex:

Male

Nature of Injury:

Back, Chest (Musculoskeletal)

Cause of Injury:

Manual Handling

Organizations and Persons Directly Involved

Employer
Safety/Rehabilitation Coordinator*
Immediate Supervisor
Senior Personnel Officer
Insurer (Fund manager)
Workers' Compensation Manager*
Senior Workers' Compensation Officer*
General Practitioner
Rheumatologist*
Chronic Pain Specialist*
Radiologist*
Radiologist*
Private Hospital (treatment only)*
Physiotherapy Centre*

Industrial Clinic (treatment and accredited rehabihtation provider)
Occupational Physician*
Occupational Therapist*
Physiotherapist
Tertiary Education Institution (other than employer)
Orthopaedic Surgeon (Sydney)

Rehabilitation Case Y: Difficult and Yet Successful

Employee Position: Labourer
Employee Age:

53 years

Sex:

Female

Nature of Injury:

Strained A r m s

Cause of Injury:

Continuous Movement of Mechanical Eqmpment

Organizations and Persons Directly Involved

Employer
Safety/Rehabilitation Coordinator*
Personnel Manager*
Senior Personnel Officer
Immediate Supervisor
Insurer (Fund Manager)
Workers' Compensation Manager*
Senior Workers' Compensation Officer*
General Practitioner*
Rheumatologist*
Industrial Clinic (treatment and accredited rehabihtation provider)

Occupational Physician*
Occupational Physician
Occupational Physician
Occupational Therapist*
Physiotherapist
Clinical Psychologist
Masseur
Trade Union*
WorkCover Authority*
Car Hire Firm*
Driving School*
State Agency (other than WorkCover Authority)*
Federal Agency
Rehabilitation Specialist, medico-legal (Sydney)
Orthopaedic Surgeon, medico-legal (Sydney)
Orthopaedic Surgeon, medico-legal (Sydney)
Medico-legal Assessor (Sydney)
Medico-legal Assessor (Sydney)
Medical Examination Centre (Sydney)
Insurer's Solicitors (Sydney)
Union's Solicitors (Sydney)
Equipment Manufacturers (Sydney)

Rehabilitation Case Z:

Difficult and Contested

Employee Position: Cleaner
Employee Age:

31 years

Sex: Male

Nature of Injury:

Disc Prolapse, Sore Back

Cause of Injury:

Cleaning Duties

Organizations and Persons Directly Involved

Employer
Safety/Rehabilitation Coordinator*
Personnel Manager*
Senior Personnel Officer
Immediate Supervisor
Department Head
Supervisor (other than Immediate)
Insurer (Fund Manager)
Workers' Compensation Manager*
Senior Workers' Compensation Officer*
General Practitioner*
Orthopaedic Surgeon*
Chronic Pain Specialist*
Radiologist*
Clinical Psychologist*
Private Hospital (treatment)*
Industrial Clinic (treatment and accredited rehabihtation provider)
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Occupational Physician*
Occupational Therapist*
Occupational Therapist
Physiotherapy Centre*
Vocational Assessors*
Trade Union*
Psychiatrist (Sydney)
Orthopaedic Surgeon, medico-legal (Sydney)
Pathologist (Sydney)
Radiologist (Sydney)
Licensed Commercial Agents (Sydney)

